

Orbis

A Journal of World Affairs

Volume 41, Number 4, Fall 1997

Murray Weidenbaum
On the Defense Industry

WESTERN CIV IN WORLD POLITICS

What We Mean by the West

William H. McNeill

America, the West, and NATO Expansion

James Kurth

The Many Wests of Western Imagination

David R. Gress

Sacred and Secular in the West and Russia

James H. Billington

The West's Bloodless Win under Bush

Harvey Sicherman

Israel's Lebanese Tar Baby

Adam Garfinkle

Future International Systems

Robert E. Harkavy

Foreign Policy Research Institute / JAI Press Inc.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE



Founded in 1955, the Foreign Policy Research Institute is an independent, nonprofit organization devoted to research, publication, and education on international affairs. It brings the insights of scholarship to bear on the development of policies that advance U.S. national interests abroad.

Current research projects examine new directions in U.S. relations with Russia, China, and Japan. Other projects focus on American defense policy, Gulf Security, Indian-Pakistani relations, nuclear crime, and sources of instability in Latin America.

FPRI's Marvin Wachman Fund for International Education promotes international and civic literacy. Its Wachman Fund activities include the *Templeton Lecture on Religion and World Affairs*, the *Cynthia P. Robinson Memorial Lectures on International Affairs*, the *Bobby Hall Luxenberg Memorial Lecture on Japan*, and the *Sheila T. Benjamin Memorial Lecture*—all for scholars and the interested public; *Global Classroom* and *History Academy*, for secondary-school teachers; and the *Internship Program*, for students contemplating a career in international affairs.

The Institute also publishes the following bulletins: *FPRI Wire*, a two-page commentary on world affairs; *Peacefacts*, on the Middle East peace process; *CubaWatch*, on developments in Cuba and their implications for the United States; and *Footnotes*, for educators.

To inquire about membership, write or call the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610, Philadelphia, PA 19102-3684, Tel: (215) 732-3774, ext. 105, Fax: (215) 732-4401, E-mail FPRI@aol.com. All contributions to FPRI are tax-deductible.

PRESIDENT

Harvey Sicherman

VICE PRESIDENT

Alan H. Luxenberg

BOARD OF TRUSTEES

John Gilray Christy
Chairman

Bruce H. Hooper

Marvin Wachman

Vice Chairmen

Charles B. Grace

Treasurer

S. Michael Alexander

John H. Ball

W.W. Keen Butcher

David B. Duncan

Robert A. Fox

Susan H. Goldberg

Alexander M. Haig Jr.

N. Peter Hamilton

Kenneth D. Hill

Bobbie Hillman

Tatnall Lea Hillman

Herbert M. Johnson

John F. Lehman

David Lucterhand

Martin Meyerson

Stephen S. Moody

Ronald J. Naples

Frank N. Piasecki

Samuel J. Savitz

Harvey Sicherman

Robert Strausz-Hupé

John M. Templeton Jr.

David V. Wachs

William H. Wurster

Dov S. Zakheim

BOARD OF ADVISORS

James Courter

Midge Decter

David Eisenhower

Samuel P. Huntington

Bernard Lewis

William H. McNeill

Martin Peretz

James R. Thompson


Richard Thornburgh

Murray Weidenbaum

Orbis

A Journal of World Affairs

Volume 41, Number 4, Fall 1997



In May 1797 a fledgling U.S. Navy launched its first warship, the frigate *United States*, thus inaugurating a new era in the history of the seas. Designed and built by Joshua Humphreys of Philadelphia, the vessel set sail with Revolutionary War hero John Barry in command. Print courtesy of the National Archives, Philadelphia.

Published for the Foreign Policy Research Institute

by  JAI PRESS INC.

Greenwich, Connecticut • London, England

BOARD OF EDITORS

STEPHEN E. AMBROSE
University of New Orleans

PAUL BALARAN
*Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace*

ALVIN H. BERNSTEIN
Marshall Center

RICHARD K. BETTS
Columbia University

HENRY S. BIENEN
Northwestern University

PAUL BRACKEN
Yale University

ELIOT A. COHEN
*The School of Advanced
International Studies,
Johns Hopkins University*

STEPHEN P. COHEN
*University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign*

L. GORDON CROVITZ
Hong Kong

ARTHUR CYR
*Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations*

PETER DUIGNAN
The Hoover Institution

MARK FALCOFF
*American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research*

ALTON FRYE
Council on Foreign Relations

ALEXANDER GEORGE
Stanford University

COLIN S. GRAY
University of Hull

PAUL HOLLANDER
*University of Massachusetts
at Amherst*

IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ
Rutgers University

ZALMAY M. KHALILZAD
RAND Corporation

CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER
The Washington Post

EDWARD N. LUTTWAK
*Center for Strategic &
International Studies*

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM
*The School of Advanced
International Studies,
Johns Hopkins
University*

KENNETH MAXWELL
Council on Foreign Relations

JOSHUA MURAVCHIK
*American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research*

STEPHANIE G. NEUMAN
Columbia University

WILLIAM E. ODOM
Hudson Institute

RICHARD PIPES
Harvard University

BARRY R. POSEN
*Massachusetts Institute of
Technology*

PETER W. RODMAN
*Nixon Center for Peace and
Freedom*

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN
University of Pennsylvania

ROBERT A. SCALAPINO
*University of California
at Berkeley*

RICHARD F. STAAR
The Hoover Institution

SHIRIN TAHIR-KHELI
*Foreign Policy Research
Institute*

MARC TRACHTENBERG
University of Pennsylvania

STEPHEN VAN EVERA
*Massachusetts Institute of
Technology*

GEORGE WEIGEL
*Ethics and Public Policy
Center*

SAMUEL F. WELLS, JR.
*Woodrow Wilson Interna-
tional Center for Scholars*

Editorial Assistants: Jessica Landrey, Kavita Patel, Alexandra Shaw

Articles appearing in *Orbis* are indexed and/or abstracted in *ABC Political Science*; *Academic Index*; *America: History and Life*; *Articles 1st*; *CARL UnCover*; *Contents 1st*; *Current Contents: Social and Behavioral Sciences*; *Historical Abstracts*; *International Political Science Abstracts*; *(Newspaper and) Periodical Abstracts*; *Public Affairs Information Service (PAIS)*; *Social Science Citation Index (SSCI)*; *Social Science Index*; *U.S. Political Science Documents*.

A Program Announcement and Dedication

The end of the cold war accelerated an already strong “culture war” in the United States. At the broadest level this concerned America’s identity: were Americans “Western,” that is, primarily part of European civilization? Or was the nation redefining itself into something new, its own civilization owing allegiance to many different cultures?


The historian of American ideas will recognize a replay here of the New World vs. Old World issue that marked the United States from its revolutionary origins. But beyond the politics and sociology of interest groups, ethnic groups, immigration, victimology and all the rest, there exists an important foreign policy issue. The United States is the sole “superpower,” the indispensable nation, to use President Clinton’s formulation. But a nation unsure of its identity and not clear about what it has to give to the rest of the world offers an unreliable foundation for its role in international politics.

With these matters in mind, the Foreign Policy Research Institute has established a new Center for Studies on America and the West. Its purpose is to bring the best of scholarship to bear on such subjects as the meaning of the West; whether there is a common heritage that defines America in contrast to other cultures; the role of religion in shaping Western values and American international attitudes; the West as a political entity; the West as an influence on American foreign policy. We anticipate a steady flow of articles, books and conferences devoted to these topics. This issue of *Orbis* is an example of what the Center will do.

We are also happy to dedicate the Fall Orbis in honor of the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s founder, Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupé. Scholar, diplomat, and friend, Dr. Strausz-Hupé has always taught that a geopolitical American foreign policy should be guided by the values of Western civilization.

Harvey Sicherman, President
Foreign Policy Research Institute

NEW TITLES IN POLITICS



WHATEVER IT TAKES

The Real Struggle for
Political Power in America

ELIZABETH DREW. "Drew's book makes the case that the battle for the House ultimately was more important to the nation's long-term political alignment than was the contest for the White House."—*The Washington Post*. 312 pp.

Viking 0-670-87536-8 \$24.95

DIVIDED HIGHWAYS

Building the Interstate Highways,
Transforming American Life

TOM LEWIS. The brilliant and fascinating story of the largest engineered structure in world history, from the conception of the Pennsylvania Turnpike to the traffic jams of the present, rich in social and political history. 320 pp.

Viking 0-670-86627-X \$23.95

LIBERAL RACISM

JIM SLEEPER. A hard-hitting attack on the idea of race and its destructive tendencies and a clarion reminder of the principles that promise the most of American life for everyone. 208 pp.

Viking 0-670-87391-8 \$21.95

THE LETTERS OF SACCO AND VANZETTI

NICOLA SACCO & BARTOLOMEO VANZETTI. Edited by Gardner Jackson and Marion D. Frankfurter. Introduction by Richard Polenberg. First published in 1928, this book of primary source material is as famous for the splendor of its impassioned prose as for the light it sheds on the characters of two dedicated anarchists who became the focus of worldwide attention. 320 pp.

Penguin Classic/20 C 0-14-118026-9 \$10.95

RISE TO GLOBALISM

American Foreign Policy Since 1938
New Eighth Revised Edition

STEPHEN E. AMBROSE & DOUGLAS BRINKLEY. "One of the most lively and provocative interpretive studies of the major events in recent American diplomatic history."—*American Historical Review*. 448 pp.

Penguin 0-14-017536-9 \$14.95

RURAL RADICALS

A History of Political Extremism in America

CATHERINE MCNICOL STOCK. "A first-rate and highly accessible history of radicalism in rural America."—*Kirkus Reviews*. 416 pp.

Penguin 0-14-026847-2 \$12.95

For a free Political Science catalog,
call 212-366-2372

PENGUIN PUTNAM INC.

ACADEMIC MARKETING DEPT. • 375 HUDSON ST. • NEW YORK, NY 10014

<http://www.penguin.com>

Orbis

A Journal of World Affairs

Volume 41, Number 4, Fall 1997

Editor's Column	Walter A. McDougall	503
------------------------	---------------------	-----

WESTERN CIV IN WORLD POLITICS

What We Mean by the West	William H. McNeill	513
---------------------------------	--------------------	-----

The Drama of Modern Western Identity	David R. Gress	525
---	----------------	-----

The West's Stake in Russia's Future	James H. Billington	545
--	---------------------	-----

NATO Expansion and the Idea of the West	James Kurth	555
--	-------------	-----

Images of the Coming International System	Robert E. Harkavy	569
--	-------------------	-----

The U.S. Defense Industry after the Cold War	Murray Weidenbaum	591
---	-------------------	-----

Israel's Abiding Troubles in Lebanon	Adam Garfinkle	603
---	----------------	-----

Correspondence		613
-----------------------	--	-----

Review Essays

NATO Germany and Pragmatism's Finest Hour	Harvey Sicherman	615
---	------------------	-----

The Wilsonian Legacy in the Twentieth Century	Francis J. Gavin	628
---	------------------	-----

Russian Foreign Policy in Search of a Nation	Yaroslav Bilinsky	642
--	-------------------	-----

The Unwinnable War on the Drug Trade	Patrick Lloyd Hatcher	653
--------------------------------------	-----------------------	-----

Index to Volume 41		663
---------------------------	--	-----

A complete picture of America's international involvements since 1776

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS

4 Volumes

Senior Editors:

Bruce W. Jentleson and Thomas G. Paterson

Prepared under the auspices of the
Council on Foreign Relations

This comprehensive reference work examines the political, economic, military, and cultural interactions of the federal government and the American people with nations and peoples abroad from colonial times to the present. It includes more than 1,000 signed entries, ranging from brief biographical sketches to major essays on critical issues of U.S. foreign policy.

The only encyclopedia on the subject of such breadth and authority, it is indispensable for anyone interested in the history of America's involvements with the greater world community, including scholars and students, policymakers, and general readers.

1997 1,936 pp.; 150 charts and maps
\$450.00 for the 4-volume set


For a complete article list, visit our website at <http://www.oup-usa.org/acadref/efr.html>. To order or for more information, call 1-800-451-7556. In Canada, call 1-800-387-8020. Price is subject to change and applies only in the U.S.

"A remarkable accomplishment..."

Will be immensely useful to anyone interested in this vast subject—from beginning students looking for accessible overviews and bibliographies to scholars wishing to check facts that are out of mind (but no longer, happily, out of reach). The editorial team responsible for these volumes—which every library should have, and every scholar and policymaker will want—has superbly executed a herculean task."—*Foreign Affairs*

"A treasure-trove of excellent scholarship

from well-known historians, political scientists, and assorted academicians affiliated with the study of diplomacy...It is unmatched in its treatment of this dynamic and fast-changing field...An indispensable resource."—*Library Journal*



OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Editor's Column

"The beginnings of Western culture are to be found in the new spiritual community which arose from the ruins of the Roman Empire owing to the conversion of the Northern barbarians to the Christian faith." So wrote British historian Christopher Dawson, who went on to conclude that the importance of this convergence of classical, barbarian, and Christian cultures was "not to be found in the external order they created . . . but in the internal change they brought about in the soul of Western man—a change which can never be entirely undone except by the total negation or destruction of Western man himself."¹

Dawson, like C.S. Lewis and T.S. Eliot, was an Anglican sympathetic to the Catholic understanding of history, and his viewpoint reflected an appreciation for the spiritual roots of Western civilization that was characteristic of the era of the Second World War and early cold war. Their embattled generation, loath to consider Nazism and Stalinism as products of Western civilization, tended instead to define them as outbursts of pre-Christian paganism or post-Christian materialism, and the struggles against them as crusades for the survival of civilization itself.

Today Dawson's vision may seem dated indeed. For several older and some newer notions of where Western civilization came from and what it consists of dominate the discourse on the nature and "clash" of civilizations. As David Gress describes in his weighty new book on the intellectual history of the concept of the West, European scholars have over time identified many competing "magic moments" when, they claim, the values or institutions of our civilization sprang into being.² To some, it happened in the city-states of ancient Greece, where our notions of democracy, citizenship, deductive philosophy, experimental science, and artistic aesthetics were born. To others, it happened when Greek culture was united with Roman law and technology, or when the apostle Paul preached in the *agora* of Athens, symbolically conflating Jewish theology and Greek philosophy, or when the Emperor Constantine split the Roman world, facilitating the divorce between an eastern Greek, Byzantine, Orthodox civilization and a western Latin, Roman, Catholic civilization. Modernists, on the other hand, often feel alienated from the ancient and medieval worlds, and trace the origins of what we think of today's Western civilization no farther back than the Renaissance, Enlightenment, or in-

¹ Christopher Dawson, *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1950), quotations from pp. 23, 274.

² David R. Gress, *From Plato to NATO* (New York: The Free Press, 1997).

dustrial revolutions. After all, it is not Christian or Graeco-Roman values and institutions that define the world-girdling Western civilization of today, but rather those of science, technology, the market economy, representative government, and human rights.

So what is Western civilization: religious or secular, material or spiritual, a matter of geography, consciousness, ethnicity, economics, military alliances, technology, or institutions? Is it a palpable "something" or just a vague term of convenience that no one can define? And if, as Samuel Huntington has boldly asserted, civilizational identities are not only real, but "are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world,"³ are they worth defending against enemies within and without? Or ought an evolving human race (to employ New Age terminology) seek to transcend its cleavages born of history and culture in the interests of peace and unity?

In These Pages

These questions may enthrall scholars, pundits, and policymakers for a century to come. But in these pages, four eminent observers kick off discussion of the ways in which Western civilization can be defined and be seen to function in world politics. First, William H. McNeill, the dean of world historians, describes how the West has been understood

in the past, how "Western Civ" rose and fell as a course of study in American colleges, and what its place ought to be in a proper outline of world history. Next, David Gress explains how competing concepts of what constitutes the West have warred against each other in the past and present. Thirdly, James Kurth asks whether a concept of the West as civilization is relevant to real-world political issues, not least the expansion of NATO. Fourthly, Librarian of Congress James H. Billington shares his insights into the global forces likely to shape the international system of the future, and his extraordinary first-hand account of the role played by religious sensibilities in the downfall of the Soviet Union. Finally, Harvey Sicherman dissects the voluminous literature on the unification of Germany—and potentially Europe—wielding a whetted and whimsical scalpel in the way we have come to expect.

Elsewhere in this issue Murray Weidenbaum provides an expert's overview of the U.S. defense industrial complex (injecting a rarely heard note of optimism), and Adam Garfinkle reminds us that whatever happens with the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, the divided country of Lebanon remains a tar baby for Israel and cat's paw for Syria. Robert Harkavy adds a useful survey of all the theories advanced to predict what sort of international system is likely to replace the cold war's bipolarity, and Patrick Lloyd Hatcher, Yaroslav Bilinsky, and Frank Gavin review books, respectively, on the drug trade, the foreign policies of the ex-Soviet bloc countries, and the impact of Wilsonianism on the twentieth century.

³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), p. 20.

Night Thoughts of an I.R. Professor

No sooner had Bill Clinton won reelection than he reportedly began to fret about his "place in history," thereby inspiring a *Doonesbury* series in which a clutch of historians is invited to the White House for a sales pitch. Lyndon Johnson was more methodical. While doing research at the LBJ Library (itself a monument to a Pharaonic ego), I discovered that Johnson had commanded all federal agencies to compile voluminous accounts of the deeds done during his tenure. That suggested to me that perhaps the best first cut to make about the character of our presidents is to divide them into those who cared about their place in history—and those who did not.

Rating historical figures is wonderful sport, so when the Intercollegiate Studies Institute asked me to serve on a panel ranking American presidents I readily agreed and promptly drafted the following more or less objective measures. Was the president a *political* success insofar as most Americans at the time applauded his performance? Did the president address the pressing issues faced by the nation and win approval for his proffered solutions? And did those solutions, in retrospect, promote the security, prosperity, and liberty of the American people? The principle behind these criteria is historicity, which is to say that we ought to assess historical actors, not according to the ideology, conventional wisdom, or cant of our own day, but by imagining the circumstances in which historical figures found themselves and identifying the constraints upon

them and the limited choices they faced. What cannot be discounted in a poll of past presidents, of course, is the "normalcy factor": presidents who had the misfortune to govern in times of repose may well have been great if challenged, but had no chance to prove their mettle. That, perhaps, is Clinton's bane.

My full report appears in the September "Back to School" issue of *National Review*. But for the purposes of *Orbis* I decided to rate the presidents solely on their conduct of foreign policy. Here, at the risk of raising the dead and the hackles of readers, I offer one historian's ballot:

George Washington.

Great. Truly the "indispensable man," he defined the diplomatic powers and set the precedents of the office of the presidency, founded the State Department, the tradition of bipartisanship in foreign policy, and the principles that would guide U.S. policy for a century in his Farewell Address, still the greatest state paper in American history.

John Adams.

Below Average. A great patriot, diplomat, and political philosopher, he was a one-term disappointment as president. His quasi war at sea with Revolutionary France and Alien and Sedition Acts poisoned the diplomatic and domestic atmospheres, though he did found the U.S. Navy and extricate the United States from its alliance with France dating from 1778.

Thomas Jefferson.

Great. A radical ideologue with too loose a tongue in the 1790s, he performed as president with statesman-

ship and kept his eyes fixed on national interest. His 1803 Louisiana Purchase was a coup and the Lewis and Clark Expedition a triumph of vision. Echoing Washington, he gave us the phrase "no entangling alliances" in his second inaugural address.

James Madison.

Failure. A brilliant philosopher out of his depth in diplomacy, he ruined New England with his anodyne trade sanctions against the warring French and British, was duped by Napoleon, and bungled into the War of 1812.

James Monroe.

Great. In domestic policy he coasted through an era of easy consensus, but in foreign policy he excelled thanks in large part to John Quincy Adams, the greatest U.S. secretary of state. His treaty with Spain in 1819 won Florida, set the boundary of the Louisiana Purchase, and ceded to the United States Spain's claims to the Oregon Territory, while the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 was second only to Washington's Farewell as a blueprint for wise foreign policy.

John Quincy Adams.

Below Average. The great diplomat was a one-term bust, left office embittered, and devoted the rest of his life to the abolitionist movement.

Andrew Jackson.

Average. A freebooting soldier contemptuous of authority who flooded Washington with hicks from the sticks (a practice emulated by more recent Southern presidents), he was a charismatic defender of Jeffersonian principles at home but had little

opportunity to strut and bluff in foreign policy.

Martin Van Buren.

Below Average. He kept the United States wisely neutral in the Canadian revolt of the late 1830s and 1840s, but was unable to overcome gridlock in Congress over whether to annex Texas after its revolt against Mexico, and otherwise did little. His only legacy was the slang term "O.K."

William Henry Harrison.

Failure. Tippecanoe died after a month in office.

John Tyler.

Average. The first "accidental president," he draped the Monroe Doctrine over the Hawaiian kingdom when it was threatened by Britain in 1841, and as a lameduck in 1845 rammed through the annexation of Texas, not by a treaty that would need a two-thirds majority in the Senate, but by a joint resolution of Congress. Of course, that also sowed the seeds of war with Mexico.

James K. Polk.

Near Great. He was the greatest conqueror in U.S. history save Washington himself, and canards to the effect that he was a creature of slaveholders or Manifest Destiny zealots are false. On the contrary, Manifest Destinarians were either airy pacifists, "Fifty-four Forty or Fight" warhawks hot to seize Oregon from the British, or ideological crusaders eager to annex "All-of-Mexico" to export Yankee civilization. Polk spurned them all, and made peace (with Britain) and war (with Mexico) in 1846 for limited ends with realistic means.

Zachary Taylor.

Failure. He came to office with no agenda and died after eighteen months.

Millard Fillmore.

Average. Not the cipher many think, he dispatched Commodore Perry to open Japan and presided over the 1850 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty with Britain that first gave the United States rights to build a canal in Panama.

Franklin Pierce.

Below Average. Perry's mission led to a treaty with Japan under his tenure, but the sectional crisis at home blocked new initiatives.

James Buchanan.

Failure. The only Pennsylvania president, he muttered "nothing will have changed" while the national Democratic party, hence the Union, cracked up. No one did more potential harm to America's standing in the world than the man who stood by while civil war broke out.

Abraham Lincoln.

Great. His war leadership (brilliant in terms of morale, but marred by numerous false starts and errors) and generous plan for Reconstruction aside, he and his canny secretary of state William H. Seward kept the Europeans out of the American conflict and expanded U.S. trade with Asia while pushing through the Transcontinental Railway, Homestead Act, and Land Grant College system, thus laying the foundations for a continental superstate.

Andrew Johnson.

Average. An obvious failure at home—he was almost impeached and convicted—he acquired Alaska in 1867 (thanks to Seward) and ousted the French puppet Emperor Maximilian from Mexico.

Ulysses S. Grant.

Failure. His secretary of state Hamilton Fish settled the "*Alabama* claims" arising from British support for Confederate commerce raiding, but otherwise his terms were marked by scandals, depression, disastrous Indian wars, and botched plots to annex Santo Domingo.

Rutherford B. Hayes.

Below Average. A product of smoke-filled rooms following the crooked, dead-heat election of 1876, he had no mandate and little desire to do much. Despite that, he almost provoked a border war with Mexico.

James A. Garfield.

Failure. A decent man, he was murdered within months.

Chester A. Arthur.

Below Average. He signed (albeit reluctantly) the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, thereby undoing forty years of progress in U.S. relations with the Ch'ing Empire.

Grover Cleveland.

Near Great. Perhaps the best candidate for greatness who never got the chance to prove it, he was the only president save FDR to win the popular vote in three successive elections (though he lost the Electoral College in 1888). He championed Free Trade in the teeth of big business, quashed

a sordid bid to annex Hawaii in 1893, hung tough against Britain and Germany when they bullied Venezuela, and refused to get sucked into the Cuban war of independence against Spain. A man of principle.

Benjamin Harrison.

Below Average. A worthy Hoosier, he won the White House as a legacy and minority vote-getter and pushed tariffs unreasonably high, but did accelerate the modernization of the Navy.

William McKinley.

Below Average. A tough call, since he was an honorable man whose term came to be identified with the Spanish-American War and colonies of 1898, neither of which he especially wanted. Most damning is his decision to annex the Philippines, which landed the Army in a bloody war and launched the United States on its career as a self-righteous crusader. Suffice to say that Woodrow Wilson *approved* of all that he did.

Theodore Roosevelt.

Great. The only accidental president to achieve exalted status, he was a leader in every sense and arena. His policy of peace through strength (the "big stick"), defeat of the Filipino insurrection, construction of the Panama Canal, Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (in spite of which he was *loved* in most of Latin America), and mediation of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 (earning him a Nobel Peace Prize) justify his place on Mt. Rushmore.

William Howard Taft.

Below Average. A fine chief justice, he failed as president in part because "TAFT" did *not* stand for "Take Advice From Theodore." His "dollar diplomacy" in Asia undid Roosevelt's balancing act there and made Americans seem "ugly" for the first time.

Woodrow Wilson.

Failure (by his own admission). The most controversial call of all, since many would rate him as great. But he manifestly failed to "teach the Mexicans to elect good men" despite two invasions, failed to democratize Haiti through invasion, failed to create a Pan-American league, failed to defend U.S. neutral rights at sea during World War I, failed to "keep us out of war," failed to make a peace based on his Fourteen Points, then failed to win Senate ratification of the Versailles Treaty and League of Nations—all thanks to his priggish self-righteousness and stubborn thirst for power.

Warren G. Harding.

Average. A humble man without ambition, his term should be remembered less for the scandals (minor by today's standards) than for his exceptional Cabinet featuring Herbert Hoover, Andrew Mellon, and Charles Evans Hughes, who presided over the 1921–22 Washington Conference on China, the Pacific, and naval disarmament. Had he not died in 1923, he would have been reelected and perhaps gone down in history as a twentieth-century James Monroe.

Calvin Coolidge.

Average. What else for Silent Cal? In retrospect, the paper treaties and paper

money that tied the 1920s world together were no defense against the winds of Depression and fascism. But at the time, the U.S.-backed Dawes Plan for German and European recovery and Kellogg-Briand pact outlawing war were considered great steps forward. Alas, he also signed the Japanese Exclusion Act of 1924—a slap in the face that played into the hands of Japan's militarists.

Herbert Hoover.

Failure. The Republican equivalent of Wilson, he was a man of soaring high-mindedness and energy whose presidency ended in shipwreck, in this case thanks to the Crash of 1929 and the collapse of the postwar orders in Europe and Asia. He failed to win Americans or foreigners to free trade solutions to the Depression, and Secretary of State Stimson's useless "non-recognition" of Japan's conquest of Manchuria reflected the pacifism of the Quaker in the White House.

Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Near Great. A "great" president all around—whatever one thinks of his character, policies, or legacy—his foreign policies were too slapdash, ineffectual, unconstitutional, or frivolous to rate as great. He lurched from deep isolationism in the mid-1930s to disingenuous interventionism from 1937 to 1941, to harebrained Wilsonianism and coddling of Stalin during World War II. But his leadership in world depression and world war was unparalleled, he held the Allied coalition together, and—to borrow Tip O'Neill's line about Reagan—"Da people loved 'im." No one made more momentous decisions affecting the fate of the world, and he

could have done much worse than he did.

Harry S. Truman.

Near Great. Second only to McKinley as a tough one to rate, because even though he gave us much to admire, his term was not marked by peace or prosperity, the American people rejected him in the end, and the initiatives attending the birth of containment—including the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan and NATO—were less Harry's doing than Acheson's, Marshall's, Kennan's, Nitze's, etc. That said, he courageously broke with FDR's legacy of accommodation toward Stalin, courageously stood up to MacArthur over Korea, and courageously rallied Americans to wage the cold war.

Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Great. Peace and prosperity for eight years, the Korean War ended, new Third World conflicts averted, and the military downsized without endangering national security (the "missile gap" being a sham): more than enough for foreign policy greatness. He made mistakes—the Suez affair damaged NATO for years, and Castro's takeover of Cuba was vexing—but overall he was more successful than any other president at waging cold war abroad while insulating domestic America from the worst of its effects. No wonder Colin Powell's greatest asset is that people hope he's another Ike.

John F. Kennedy.

Below Average. He was mostly show, not substance, and his foreign policy was awful from his "Pay any price . . ." inaugural speech to the

Bay of Pigs, Vienna summit of 1961, Cuban Missile Crisis (viz. his pledge never to try to oust Castro), "neutralization" of Laos, overthrow of the Diem regime in Saigon, and escalation in Vietnam.

Lyndon B. Johnson.

Failure. Far worse than JFK, he did more damage to the Republic than any president of his era, perhaps any era. To be sure, Vietnam was a debacle he inherited, but his chosen conduct of the war amounted, in Paul Johnson's phrase, to a veritable "suicide attempt." Hubris is too gentle a word to apply to a man who nearly tore the country apart.

Richard M. Nixon.

Great and a Failure at once. So schizoid is his record that only a split ranking will do. Nixon's and Kissinger's diplomatic achievements, including detente, the opening to China, and localization of the Yom Kippur War, cannot be overestimated: they laid the foundation for the ultimate defeat of the Soviet empire. But he, like Wilson, lost his domestic base and destroyed himself in the end, thereby undoing the Vietnam peace accord and sapping the will of Americans to hold the line against Communism. His greatest virtue, perhaps, was his willingness to run for the presidency at all in the horrible year of 1968 and so assume a thankless, impossible, and dangerous task.

Gerald R. Ford.

Below Average. He resembles Harding in that the nation yearned for a bland, mediocre leader to restore it to normalcy—and, like Harding, he

had a magnificent Cabinet. But he was stymied in foreign policy by the post-Vietnam hangover, and had to watch South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Ethiopia, Somalia, North Yemen, Angola, Mozambique, and Nicaragua lurch into the Soviet camp. On the other hand, his Helsinki Accords look good in retrospect: their requirement that the Soviets respect human rights fueled the Solidarity movement in Poland and helped to delegitimize the Soviet empire.

Jimmy Carter.

Failure. He brokered the Camp David Accord (for which American taxpayers still ante up), but otherwise is rightly associated with the loss of Iran, the hostage crisis and "Desert One" debacle, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and a woefully premature (if not just wrongheaded) emphasis on North-South issues and human rights. Should have been a preacher.

Ronald Reagan.

Great. He made some mistakes in foreign policy (Lebanon, Iran-Contra), and was lucky to follow five consecutive troubled administrations. But he gave America eight years of peace and prosperity, restored the nation's optimism with a skill akin to FDR's, broke the backs of OPEC and inflation, and together with Thatcher, Walesa, John Paul II, Solzhenitsyn, and Gorbachev, tossed the Soviet empire on the ashpit of history. The leadership void he left behind testifies to his stature.

George Bush.

Average. A bureaucrat/party man/company man, he was superb when given a mission: e.g., peaceful

unification of Germany or throwing Saddam out of Kuwait. But strategically (vis-à-vis defeated Iraq, the collapsing USSR—recall the “Chicken Kiev” speech—and the “New World Order”) he was vision-impaired.

Bill Clinton.

Below Average (pending). It is too soon to tell, of course: he may be impeached or rise to some crisis. But as of now it is hard to name anything of his own that he has achieved (NAFTA was Bush's initiative). He dithered on Bosnia, picked trade and human rights quarrels with Japan and China at the same time, learned the wrong lessons from Vietnam regarding intervention in the Third World, and has damaged the morale and preparedness of the U.S. armed forces. Still, he may match Reagan's

record of peace and prosperity, and will thus look good to posterity by comparison to Presidents Bush . . . and Al Gore.

Speaking of Gore, one pattern that clearly emerged from this exercise is that presidents who follow a successful two-term of the same political party invariably flop: e.g., John Adams, Madison, John Quincy Adams, Van Buren, Andrew Johnson, Taft, Hoover, Truman, and Bush. Would Nixon have stumbled had he won the election in 1960? Will Gore do so if elected in 2000? And is this pattern due to cyclical swings in the mood of the electorate, or the fact that popular presidents are hard acts to follow, or that successful presidents tend to mortgage the future to obtain short-term results, obliging their successors to inherit the wind?





Journal of International Affairs

THE SINGLE TOPIC JOURNAL WITH MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES

South Asia: The Challenges of Statehood

The Summer 1997 issue analyzes the political development and economic progress of the South Asian states. This year marks the 25th or 50th anniversary of statehood of the five nations in the region, and thus makes it an appropriate time to evaluate the progress these countries have made and the challenges that lie ahead of them.

Articles and authors include:

India's Perspective on the CTBT

Ambassador Arundhati Ghose

Western Perspective on the CTBT

John Holum

Political Anarchy in Afghanistan

Zalmay Khalilzad

Women and Development

Nancy Barry

Regional Population Growth and Development

Nafis Sadik

Subscription Order

One-year Subscription:

- ☐ Individual (\$16.00)
- ☐ Institution (\$32.00)

Two-year Subscription:

- ☐ Individual (\$31.00)
- ☐ Institution (\$62.00)

Foreign Postage: \$8.00 per year

(no postage necessary for U.S., Canada or Mexico)

****Pre-payment required in U.S. dollars drawn on U.S. banks****

Name _____

Institution _____

Address _____

City/State/Zip _____

Send check with order to *Journal of International Affairs*, Box 4, International
Affairs Building, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027 USA

Phone: 212-854-4775 Fax: 212-662-0398 e-mail: jia@columbia.edu

What We Mean by the West*

by William H. McNeill

The subject today is the meaning of “the West” in the sense of Western civilization. The first and most obvious point to make is that the meaning of the West is a function of who is using the word. Those who feel themselves to be part of the West—who think of the West as “we”—will surely have flattering things to say about their civilization. Those who think of the West as the “other” are likely to define it in less flattering terms. The basic meaning of the word is “where the sun sets”—one of the cardinal directions. Chinese geomancers drafted elaborate and codified rules about what that direction meant as opposed to the East, North, or South. But we in the West have nothing so precise as the Chinese: to us the West connotes all sorts of characteristics desired by some, eschewed by others.

In the United States, for instance, the West conjures up the Wild West of our historic frontier, a place of freedom, open spaces, new starts, and a certain manliness. But it was also a place where danger, loneliness (largely due to the paucity of women), and lawlessness often prevailed. At the same time, Americans have habitually embraced a contradictory meaning of the West. For inasmuch as all North America was the West vis-à-vis the Old World that colonists and later immigrants had left behind, the West was considered a “more perfect” place conducive, not to danger and lawlessness, but to liberty, equality, and prosperity. Americans were “new men under new skies,” as Frederick Jackson Turner proclaimed.

And yet, at the same time, Americans undeniably brought much of the Old World with them to the New. Hence, whatever qualities were to be found in both worlds tended to unite them and bespeak a broader notion of the West. At first, it encompassed the Atlantic littoral of Europe (the British Isles, Scandinavia, the Low Countries, France, and Iberia) plus America. In time, it came to

William H. McNeill taught history at the University of Chicago from 1947 to 1987. During that time he wrote a good many books, the most important of which were *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community* (1963), *Plagues and Peoples* (1976), *Pursuit of Power* (1982) and, in retirement, *Keeping Together in Time* (1995).

* Based on the keynote address to the FPRI's History Institute on “America and the Idea of the West” held in Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, on June 1–2, 1996, this text has been revised for publication by the author and the editor of *Orbis*.

encompass Australia, New Zealand, and all other European overseas settlements. The West, therefore, could be imagined as a civilization independent of locale. Finally, one hears today of a West that includes not only nations populated by European stock, but also non-Western nations that have assimilated Western institutions, techniques, and to some extent values: Japan, for instance.

What the West means in a given context, therefore, depends entirely upon who is invoking the term and for what purpose. But it is fair to say that virtually all definitions of Western civilization drew a line somewhere across Europe placing Germany (at times), Poland and Eastern Europe (at times), and Russia and the Balkans (at all times) beyond the pale of Western civilization. A Briton might joke that “the Wogs begin at Calais,” a Frenchman dub the Rhine the frontier of civilization, a German insist that “at the Ringstrasse the Balkans begin,” and a Pole that Asia begins with the westernmost Orthodox church; but wherever drawn, that line is the most enduring political/cultural demarcation in the history of Europe.

The meanings we give to the West today, in the United States, are by and large translated from the usage of Western Europeans in the late nineteenth century: the era when the British and French colonial empires bestrode the world and Germany and Italy were, by comparison, marginalized. But the outskirts of this Anglo-French core—Germany to the east and America to the west—might demand to be recognized as part of the West at the same time as they rivalled Western Europe for power and influence. The story of Western civilization in the twentieth century, in fact, might be organized around the theme of the alternative visions of Western civilization that Germany and the United States each pressed, by force, on the Euro-Atlantic core.

Perhaps the most profitable way to proceed, therefore, is to trace so far as possible where this Western European self-conception came from, how it was received in the United States around the turn of this century, and how it was subsequently embodied in our own high school and college curricula.

The Classical Cradle

The birth of a concept of a West as opposed to an East can be dated exactly to events that occurred on either side of the Aegean Sea in the years 480 and 479 B.C. That may seem exceedingly strange—to wit, that the West of Anglo-French imagination sprang from a Persian imperial invasion of Greece some twenty-five hundred years ago—but it is nonetheless so. The army of the Persian Empire crossed the Hellespont to assault a ragged confederacy of some twenty-odd city-states. The imperial side deployed perhaps sixty thousand professional soldiers with an abundant supply train stretching fifteen hundred miles. The Hellenic side could field mere militia forces composed of citizen-soldiers. And yet, against all odds and apparent reason, the Empire lost and the militias won. That they did so posed a logical quandary even for the Greeks. But the classical answer offered by Herodotus was simply that free men fight better than “slaves.” This classical explanation of Greece’s deliverance was so

powerful, persuasive, and it must be said, flattering to the Greeks that it echoed throughout the rest of Mediterranean antiquity. The only life worth living, it held, was that of a free citizen who might take part in the public deliberations that affected his fate up to and including the risk of death in battle in defense of freedom. So mighty was this ideal that it survived the conquest of the city-states themselves and entered into the public consciousness of their conquerors, Macedon first, and then Rome. And even though those empires liberated the Greeks themselves from their internecine warfare, the Greeks never ceased to mourn their lost freedom.

The republican spirit born of the love—and power—of liberty pervaded most of the classical texts that have come down to us: not only the histories of Herodotus, Tacitus, and Livy, but the oratory of Demosthenes, Cicero, and Cato, and the theater and poetry of Greece and Rome. The same spirit burst forth again in Renaissance Italy when city-states similar to those of the ancients reemerged, and in time it came to infuse the educational systems of all western Europe thanks to the Humanist revival of the classics. Indeed, that spirit could still be descried in the early twentieth century, playing on the minds and the feelings of Europe's elites, calling them to honor its collectivized ideal of heroic virtue.

I say “collectivized” because the republican spirit always extolled, not personal heroism, but heroism and sacrifice in the service of polity and country. To live, and perhaps to die, for the *patria* was the only way to fulfill human destiny in its most complete sense. So it was that the French revolutionaries would consciously imitate the Roman Republic, nineteenth-century Germans consider their land the modern equivalent of ancient Greece, and the British Empire invoke the universality and virtues of ancient Rome.

But the phrase “so it was” is a loaded one. It may indeed appear natural that Renaissance Italy would notice its resemblance to Classical Greece, but trans-Alpine Europe was a region of dynastic territorial states, even national kingdoms, and thus hardly an analog to the original West of Athens, Sparta, and republican Rome. What is more, the Christian heritage, which was much stronger in northern Europe than in Italy (“the nearer the papacy, the farther from God,” quipped Machiavelli), was utterly at odds with the heroic republican ideal of antiquity. The Church taught obedience and humility as the paths to holiness and salvation, and a life and death given to God, not the state. How was it then, that republican *virtù* born at Thermopylae and reborn in Italy's glorious *quattrocento*, in effect inspired the West as nineteenth-century English and French defined it?

The West of the Renaissance

To address that question, however inadequately in a short talk, we must stretch our minds back beyond even Athens and Sparta to the megalithic cultures of the second millennium B.C. Little is known about them and their mysterious monuments, but it is clear that they spread around the shores of

Europe from the Mediterranean to the North Atlantic, carrying with them the message that when a human being died, the soul migrated west to the Isles of the Blessed, to follow the sun and, like the sun, to rise once again. This doctrine of immortality most likely originated in Egypt, but it took root among many peoples, the Celts especially.

In time, of course, an overlay of Christianity obscured the older megalithic cultures of Western Europe, but the dream of the West as a sort of heaven, the place one goes to escape the crowding, pain, and heartaches of mortal life in an imperfect East, lived on. To the peoples residing near the coast of Atlantic

**The
“threadbare”
West felt deep
ambivalence
toward the
opulent East.**

Europe folk wisdom taught that the West is always a better place, a place whither one’s ancestors went, a place to be reborn.

To view the East as impure, even dark, could not have clashed more sharply with the early Christian aphorism *ex oriente lux*: enlightenment comes from the east, the land of the rising sun. And indeed the initial political cleavage between a self-conscious West and East dates from the division of the Roman Empire under Constantine, the first Christian emperor, in the fourth century A.D., and the removal of the imperial capital from Rome to Constantinople (Byzantium). Within a century and a

half the Western Roman Empire fell before the barbarians, but the Eastern Roman (or Byzantine) Empire survived for a thousand years as a center of power, wealth, and Classical culture.

The West, by comparison, was laggard, poor, and soon divided into semicivilized Germanic or Celtic kingdoms. Even after Charlemagne revived the Western empire in the late eighth century, Western Europeans remained threadbare country cousins to the magnificent, grandiose Byzantines. And yet, as is always the case when less “civilized” peoples encounter comparatively richer, mightier, and more highly skilled cultures, the West felt a deep ambivalence toward the East. Yes, those “Greeks”—as they referred to the Byzantines—may be grander than we in material terms, but they are also decadent, corrupt—and heretical. For whatever its other shortcomings, the Catholic West could boast of the papacy and the maintenance of true religion and virtue. The pope, as successor to Peter the Prince of the Apostles, was the guardian of correct Christian doctrine both in theory and, as ecumenical councils invariably recognized, in practice as well. The papacy, therefore, became the sole principle of unity and authority and the focus of consciousness and self-assertion in Catholic Europe, and the line that resulted from the peripatetic activity of missionaries from Rome on the one hand and Byzantium on the other came to divide Europe more deeply and lastingly than any geographical, ethnic, political, or economic one. The West meant Latin, Catholic Christendom, and a balance between church and state; the East meant Greek Orthodoxy and caesaropapism.

But however much the reach of papal authority defined the West, the very tension between spiritual and secular authority in a disunified West meant that the papacy had to cope with enemies within. The Holy Roman Empire, ruled by Charlemagne’s heirs, embodied the imperial principle in the West; the autonomous city-states of Northern Italy (that grew rich, ironically, off the

Crusades) embodied the republican principle, and both opposed papal pretensions to Western unity based on a hierarchical church and dogmatic faith. Their long-simmering rivalries boiled over in the Renaissance and split all northern Italy into the warring camps of the pro-papal Guelfs and pro-imperial Ghibellines, purporting to incarnate the civic humanism of the ancients.

What made the conflicts of Renaissance Italy of surpassing importance to Europe and the world was that the Italians of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were the cultural, intellectual, and, not least, economic leaders of all Europe and the Mediterranean (the Byzantine Empire having shrunk to a rump besieged by the Turks). The Italian project was nothing less than to organize the western promontory of the Eurasian landmass into a single, integrated market economy through commerce, specialized production, new credit mechanisms and new means of mobilizing capital such as the joint-stock company. The city-states themselves pioneered tax systems that allowed them to mobilize relatively enormous resources, floating public debt that allowed them to amortize the cost of wars and public works over decades, and efficient new political/military administrations that magnified the power of civil government (in Florence and Venice at least; in Milan the military escaped civilian control).

This was the achievement—this congeries of skills enhancing power and wealth—that accounts for the otherwise anomalous fascination for things Italian that gripped trans-Alpine Europe from the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries. The kingdoms of Spain (and through Spain, the Low Countries), France, and England imported Italian methods and so developed such powerful central monarchies that the Italian city-states themselves were soon eclipsed. The French invasion of 1494 sounded the death knell for Italian independence, and yet the wars that followed only hastened the diffusion of Italian knowledge to the north and west of Europe, including the Classics, the ancient philosophies about how to lead a good life, the ideal of collective patriotic effort in war and in peace, a curiosity about (and glorification of) the natural world, and the pursuit of Humanist, not strictly Christian, virtue.

Not surprisingly, this spreading and eager embrace of what appeared to be secular values provoked a backlash among the pious. We call it the Reformation, and it occurred just where one would expect, in the region of Europe that had not absorbed nor benefitted from the new Italian ways of life, but in fact felt exploited by them: Germany. Luther thus represented a reactionary movement, but even so, he and Calvin employed Humanist literary techniques in their effort to elevate the authority of Scripture. The imperatives of survival in the so-called Religious Wars that lasted more than 150 years then forced Protestant and Catholic states alike to learn and use the tools of power forged in the Renaissance. But the concepts of citizenship and republican virtue were the special province of Calvinists, first in Geneva, then in the Dutch Republic, and in Cromwellian England.

All the while, of course, the great Age of Exploration, the invention of printing, and all the discoveries of the Scientific Revolution gradually persuaded Western Europeans, for the first time in history, that they might actually know more than the ancients, and if so, know more than anyone in the world! To

be sure, those annoying Ottoman Turks seemed to belie this new Western conceit. The largest and most enduring of the “gunpowder empires” of the Early Modern centuries, Ottoman Turkey swallowed almost all of Araby, Byzantium, and the Balkans, and cast its shadow over Central Europe. A religious interpretation of the Ottoman phenomenon might dismiss it, not as a sign of Western inferiority, but as God’s scourge for the sins of the Christians. Certainly, neither the Turks nor the Europeans believed they had aught to learn from the other and an intense mutual *disregard* was their preferred posture. But whether one viewed the Turks as punitive agents of God or (like Voltaire) as an interesting, if frightening Asian apparition, no Westerner doubted that his civilization was freer, truer, and in the long run stronger than that of the East, notwithstanding the fact that Protestants and Catholics within the West fought for differing definitions of freedom, truth, and strength.

Birth of the Anglo-French West

Now, so far as the future United States is concerned, the intense (or intensifying) conflict between a definition of the West based on republican virtue and liberty, and a definition based on true doctrine as upheld by the papacy, threw up two major landmarks. They are utterly familiar to Anglo-American audiences, but still worth recalling. The first was the series of English Revolutions from 1640 to 1660 and 1688. In one sense these were as reactionary as Luther’s revolt in that they rejected the efficient “modern” royal government crafted by the Tudors and Stuarts in the name of Parliament’s medieval powers, not to mention sectarian strife. Yet in another sense—by one of those slights of hand by which history is so often turned inside out—after 1688 the “reactionaries” in Parliament invented what amounted to an entirely new kind of sovereignty in what came to be known as Great Britain. It was government by consent of the taxpayers, representative government that asserted rights over the crown and thus preserved a private sphere for differences of religion and much besides, that made private property sacred and thus pulled the sting from the arbitrary tax collector, and that rested, though a monarchy still, on a vigorous dose of republican virtue and liberty. For the English system could not have functioned for a season without the recognition by the enfranchised possessing classes that they must pay, they must serve, as the legal forms of parliamentary consent prescribed. The Glorious Revolution proved to be a remarkably effective compromise that preserved a broad zone of personal freedoms and security against the power of the state, yet permitted the state to mobilize the nation for common action under parliamentary cabinet government.

So successful was Britain in its wars, mostly with France, after 1688, and so alluring was its economic expansion, that the British system became a model for many other European reformers. The English Revolution was a dramatic demonstration of how a movement that began by kicking against the pricks of modernity ended by inventing a sort of supermodernity that left all its foreign competitors gasping for breath. (The leaders of Japan’s Meiji Resto-

ration, who overthrew the shogunate in the name of seclusion only to launch a crash modernization campaign, provide a later example.) By the late eighteenth century, therefore, the French in particular recognized that the institutions established by the Bourbon kings were hopelessly superannuated, laying the groundwork for the second great landmark, the French Revolution. Many Enlightenment thinkers, such as Montesquieu, proposed that France reform its institutions along British lines, but others sought to get to the very roots of things, which is what being “radical” means. What the British called “the rights of Englishmen” the French radicals set out to improve upon by invoking “the rights of all mankind.” Where British liberalism meant oligarchical rule by taxpayers, French radicalism would mean democratic rule by all male citizens, displaying (even imposing) the republican ideals of Athens and Rome: a worship of reason, virtue, liberty, equality, and fraternity. And where the British practiced a certain tolerance and reconciled their freedom with an established Christian church, the French revolutionaries explicitly repudiated the Christian tradition and replaced it with a secular, civic cult.

The excesses and contradictions of the French Republic of Virtue need no elaboration. But it must not be forgotten that the methods of military and financial mobilization employed by the French Republic (and later by Napoleon) were so shockingly successful that Britain, Prussia, and the Austrian Empire had no choice but to copy French techniques or perish. In fact, the demonstration of what democratic government *à la française* could achieve in war was so compelling that even after Waterloo no part of the Western world could afford to neglect it. Taking the common people into active partnership with government and catering to social elites became, quite simply, an imperative of success and even survival in the competition among sovereign powers. Even tsarist Russia and Tokugawa Japan, after their respective humiliations at the hands of the Anglo-French in 1856 and by the Americans in 1854, were obliged to abolish legal inequality and embrace Western methods of national mobilization with all their implications for “citizenship.” Indeed, we may say that the mobilization of the masses became the principal political agendum of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

And that, of course, was the essence of the West—the Anglo-French West—that imposed itself on the rest of the world between 1750 and 1914, and loomed as a model when America’s national career began. It was a model to be imitated, but it also struck Americans as a seat of the corruptions that they yearned to cast off as they crossed the Atlantic and breathed Western air. The United States would be better, purer, freer, even though more ignorant, crude, and clumsy: the same ambivalence Medieval Europe felt toward Byzantium, that northwestern Europe felt toward Renaissance Italy, that Germany felt toward France.

But the United States caught up expeditiously. Favorable geopolitics permitted it to realize Manifest Destiny and build a continental state of enormous proportions by comparison to anything in Western Europe. It did not occur painlessly, as the Civil War graphically proved, but Americans caught up with the core European West by the late nineteenth century and developed that

chip on the shoulder born of an inability to decide whether we ought to imitate or repudiate the Old World. The crisis point came with the First World War. Should the United States join the Anglo-French West in its fight against Eastern barbarians and so merge into the West once and for all, or stay out? Under Woodrow Wilson, Americans chose to engage: and at that moment what we think of as Western civilization, Western Civ, was born.

The West of American Schools

The courses and curricula in the history of Western Civ that became ubiquitous from about 1930 to 1960 were first crafted in response to U.S. belligerence in 1917. Initially, at least at Columbia University, Western Civ was designed to teach soldiers what it was they would be fighting for in Flanders Fields. Imitations proliferated, textbooks were written to accommodate them, and the texts bred a certain standardized interpretation, which in turn formed the intellectual bedrock for two generations of American college students and governing elites. The West as understood in the United States, therefore, was a product of what those students heard in the lecture hall, read in the texts, and expressed in their own words in the essays and examinations assigned in Western Civ courses.

Now, by the time I myself took such a class in the 1930s, Western Civ had evolved (at the University of Chicago and elsewhere) into a powerful and frankly missionary enterprise. The curriculum was based upon a systematic polarity between reason and faith—"St." Socrates versus St. Paul—and the notion that truth was an evolving, discovered thing rather than a fixed, dogmatic certainty laid down once for all in the Bible or church doctrine. The effect of this on young people was to give them a sense of emancipation from old religious identities, often ethnically transmitted, a sense of common citizenship and participation in a community of reason, a belief in careers open to talent, and a faith in a truth susceptible to enlargement and improvement generation after generation.

This was indeed a liberating message for many Americans in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s: it conveyed membership in the great cultivated, reasonable, sophisticated world of "us", the heirs of a Western tradition dating from Socrates and surviving all the tribulations of the Medieval and Early Modern eras. World War II and the cold war only intensified, even as they perhaps narrowed, the agenda of a unified West led by America fighting for freedom and reason and tolerance, and mobilizing itself through an appeal to republican virtue, against new Eastern tyrannies, be they German or Russian.

Yet, oddly, the 1960s were the very moment when college courses in Western Civ began to be abandoned. One reason for this was that young teachers of history, be they graduate teaching assistants or junior faculty, simply refused to become apprenticed by their elders to serve as "slave labor" in the sections of large Western Civ courses. Instead, they tended to stake out their little private kingdoms built around the subjects of their Ph.D. theses. It does

not really matter what one studies, they insisted, for one piece of history is as good as another. What is more, the senior professors always teach courses around their projected next book, so why shouldn't I? After all, I must write books, too, in order to get promoted to tenure. So how dare you indenture me to somebody else's course whose naïve ideas I do not want to propagate anyway?

That attitude was, I believe, a highly destructive and narrowly careerist response to what were real deficiencies in the way Western Civ was taught at the time. But more recently, perhaps since the late 1970s, the debate has taken a different twist as more and more historians agree that the overspecialized "smorgasbord" curricula of the 1960s were disastrous, but disagree about the nature of the survey courses that ought to be reintroduced. Some call for a revival of Western Civ, albeit updated in such a way as to accommodate new historiographical trends. Others insist on world history courses as necessary to introduce young Americans to the globalized, multipolar world they live in today. Unfortunately, world history itself has often been contaminated by what I regard as patently false assertions of the equality of all cultural traditions. Every flower has an equal right to bloom, say the multiculturalists, just as the young rebels of the 1960s said that every subspecialty had equal value in the curriculum. Neither of these propositions is true.

One cannot know everything, hence one must make choices. And just as some facts are more important to know than others, so certain cultures have displayed skills superior to others in every time and place throughout history. Simply imagine living in proximity to a competitor—be it a business, tribe, ethnic group, or nation—possessed of skills greater than yours. There is no use asserting that your culture is just as good as his. It palpably is not, and you must do something about it. Perhaps you will borrow from your rival in an attempt to catch up, in which case your differences shrink, or perhaps you will rally your people to repel the rivals to keep them at a distance, in which case your differences magnify. But one way or another you must change your own ways.

Superiority, real and perceived, and inferiority, real and perceived, are the substance of human intercourse and the major stimulus to social change throughout the course of history. Those actions and reactions, ambivalences and conflicts born of perceived disadvantage, have made human beings what we are and conditioned our behavior. Now, in terms of Western Civ and what our young people need to know about themselves and their world, it seems to me that the obvious globalization of human contacts and interactions means that the study of civilizations in isolation no longer suffices. We must teach and learn world history so as to prepare ourselves to live in a world in which the West, no less than "the rest," must respond to challenges from abroad. World history must make space for all the peoples and cultures in the world, but it must also recognize the fact that events in some places and times were, and are, more important than others. And the principle of selection is simply this: what do we need to know in order to understand how the world became what we perceive it to be today?

Thus, we must focus the attention of our students on the principal seats of innovation throughout history, while remaining aware of the costly adaptations and adjustments, and in many cases the suffering of those conquered or displaced by dint of their proximity to those seats of innovation. The main story line, therefore, is the accumulation of human skills, organization, and knowledge across the millennia, which permitted human beings to exercise power and acquire wealth through concerted action among larger and larger groups of people across greater and greater distances until we reach our present era of global interaction.

Now, in the last four or five centuries the West defined as the European core plus overseas periphery is certainly the major player. But it has not been the only one, and lately we see signs that the center of highest skills may indeed be migrating to the Pacific Ocean littoral, just as it shifted from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic littoral after the year 1650. A proper history of the world needs to make clear that such shifts have occurred in the past and may occur again in the future, and that the mechanism by which they occur is successful borrowing from the prior centers of superior skill and incorporation of such skills into a different cultural context able to make new use of them, innovate further, and so become a new center of superior skills.

That is how the West became dominant in the first place, by borrowing from China above all. China had, quite transparently, been the leading center on the globe between 1000 and, say, 1450: just think of gunpowder, printing, and the compass. Francis Bacon was the first to state explicitly that those borrowed skills were the principal secret to the rise of the West, and he was certainly correct to a large degree. One ought to add the Chinese notion of meritocracy, the examination system for recruitment into a bureaucracy, imported to Europe in the eighteenth century. These four tools of power, technology, and organization Europeans took from China, domesticated into European culture, and exploited in more radical and far-reaching ways than the Chinese themselves had done.

One of the most visceral issues in our current debate over history curricula is how to reconcile this vision of the human past, which is true to the intellectual purpose of history, with the desire to preserve and pass on American institutions and cultural values, which is true to the civic purpose of history. That is no small problem because liberal multiculturalists are loath to admit the true inequality of cultures, and sometimes undermine our specific national heritage by denigrating it, while conservatives are loath to admit the contingency and possible inferiority of Western and American ways. Yet the conservative response is dangerous too. In fact, it makes the same mistake the Chinese made when confronted by the Europeans. Their past was so brilliant that they could not believe the "South Sea barbarians" mattered. Unfortunately, they found out after 1839 that it did not suffice to tell Europeans that they were immoral to trade in opium. They came anyway, bearing guns with which the Chinese could not cope.

The Turks had exactly the same history with respect to their confrontation with Europe except that it happened earlier, after 1699. They had steadfastly

paid no attention to the West until it was too late for them to catch up and adjust their institutions to the European challenge.

If we Americans likewise believe that we possess all the truths that matter—for instance, those expressed by the Declaration of Independence, Constitution, and so forth—and need only recite them piously, we will not be able to react intelligently to changes that may occur, or are already in train, in the world around us. We must instead continue to adapt lest we, too, be left behind, and cultivate an open-mindedness towards the rest of world, and be at the ready to borrow ideas and skills of value. To do so, of course, may require that we adapt, adjust, and even reject treasured aspects of our past.

One obvious example is what I regard as Americans' almost obsessive individualism as compared to commitments made to primary groups in which fellow spirits may meet and share and make life worthwhile. I firmly believe that groups are needed to maintain that private sphere of freedom and fulfillment and creative variety that emerged so stunningly in seventeenth-century England. But the preservation of that zone of freedom requires that individuals in fact join in groups and choose to devote themselves to common undertakings conducive to the polity's health. That is not to say that groups organized around treasured grievances or anger against all who are different, as displayed by some of the militias and eccentric sectarians today, do not indeed threaten public order and perhaps even the wide world beyond. But for people to spurn all groups, even the family, in the name of individual satisfaction, is no less destructive of culture.

Thus, the choices we make every day about which groups to join and how fully, enthusiastically, and loyally to participate in them will shape the future of our country and the world. I must say that the Internet and other new forms of communication will presumably permit new groups to form around national, ethnic, political, professional, religious, even sports loyalties. Indeed, loyalty to everything from the nuclear family to nationhood to the human race and—if you want to get really cosmic—the DNA form of life—is the potential stuff for a group loyalty even as the rise and fall of groups is the stuff of history. Conflicts among loyalties pose the central moral problem of human life. We all belong to many groups and embody many identities, and how to reconcile them effectively one with another has been the ethical challenge to human beings ever since tight-knit, separate primary groups of hunters and gatherers ceased to be the sole form of human society.

In recent centuries the group called the “nation” has come to the fore. But there is nothing eternal about it, and no one knows what new forms of community may emerge and what new challenges they may pose. It seems to me, therefore, that understanding how groups have interacted in the past is the only preparation for responsible, effective action in the future. And that means that world history is a far better guide than Western Civ alone, which is, in the largest frame, a mere episode in the human saga: an important one, to be sure, which no rational world history would leave out, but an episode just the same.

**Conflicting
loyalties pose
the central
moral problem
of human life.**

So insofar as a concept of the West excludes the rest of humanity it is a false and dangerous model. Situating the West within the totality of humankind is the way to go, and we should in our classrooms move as best we can in that direction, believing always in the ennobling effect of enlarging one's circle of sympathies, understanding, and knowledge, and aspiring to share that belief with our students. There can be no higher calling for historians, and above all, for teachers of history.



"An excellent survey of U.S. foreign policy."—*Library Journal*

RISE TO GLOBALISM: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1938


STEPHEN E. AMBROSE AND DOUGLAS G. BRINKLEY

Incorporating the most recent scholarship, this eighth revised edition of *Rise to Globalism* offers a concise and informative overview of the evolution of American foreign policy from 1938 to the end of the first Clinton administration, focusing on such pivotal events as World War II, the Cuban missile crisis, Vietnam, and the SALT treaties. Ambrose and Brinkley closely examine such recent topics as the Iran-Contra scandal, free elections in Nicaragua, the rise of international terrorism,

the fall of Communism, the Gulf War, the crisis in Bosnia, and President Clinton's international trade policy.

In light of the enormous global power of the United States, the authors analyze how American economic aggressiveness, racism, and fear of Communism have shaped the country's evolving foreign policy.

"One of the most lively and provocative interpretive studies of the major events in recent American diplomatic history."
—*American Historical Review*.



**New
Eighth
Revised
Edition**

PENGUIN

428 PP.

0-14-026831-6

SEPT. 1997

\$14.95

PENGUIN PUTNAM INC.

ACADEMIC MARKETING DEPT. · 375 HUDSON ST. · NEW YORK, NY 10014

<http://www.penguin.com>

The Drama of Modern Western Identity

by David R. Gress

Ask scholars and intellectuals, and they will tell you that Americans and citizens of other countries normally thought of as part of the West live in an era of *posts*: post-cold war, postmodern, postindustrial, post-Christian, post-ideological, postmaterialist, post-Eurocentric. Almost no one among the academic elite of the North Atlantic nations is prepared to define these last years of the second millennium as being *pre*-anything. It is as though everything has already happened; all the political, ideological, religious, strategic, and emotional options of human life have been discovered and tried; hence the denizens of the *post*-era can look forward only to endless rounds of trying on one familiar suit of clothes after the other: rationalist, romantic, revolutionary, reactionary, multiculturalist, American, pagan, Christian, liberal, conservative.

Ask economists who instruct developing and former communist nations how to achieve capitalist growth, however, and they will tell you that far from being over, the best of the modern era, whose hallmarks are progress and universality, is yet to be. In their optimistic vision, which differs so radically from the *post* mentality of our universities, talk shows, and magazines, the Western inventions of capitalism, science, and liberal democracy have not only been astonishingly successful in their culture of origin, but are on the verge of embracing the vast majority of the world's people, not least the most numerous and by many measures most competent of all, the Chinese. The twenty-first century, the optimists say, may be the first truly democratic and capitalist century thanks to the long-overdue return of China to the center of the global stage. As the great bulk of humanity enters irrevocably on the path of democratic and capitalist development, the prospects for peace, prosperity, and stability will become better than ever before. *Post*modernism? Hah! Not only is the modern age not over, it has not even properly begun.

Both mentalities are right on their own terms—they are simply not looking at the same reality. In America the late 1990s are undeniably a post-Western age, yet it is also true that the Western-born ideas of democracy and capitalism seem headed for a glorious future. Does this mean that even as

David R. Gress is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and a research fellow at the Danish Institute of International Affairs in Copenhagen. This article is based partly on the first chapter of his forthcoming book, *From Plato to NATO* (The Free Press, 1997).

America de-Westernizes her culture, pedagogy, society, and religion, China and East Asia are rapidly Westernizing? Is it true, as the optimists claim, that the West is becoming a universal civilization and/or will reincarnate itself in the East? The answer is no, because science, democracy, and capitalism—the three pillars of modernity—may have arisen in the West (to be precise, in England and Holland) but are not in themselves bearers of substantive culture. The very point of modernity is that it is universally applicable, hence does not belong to any particular culture. In the words of the French historical sociologist Jean Baechler, modernity is the arithmetic of reality, not a style of thought about reality.¹ That modernity had a particular origin in a particular culture is something that has to be explained in terms of that culture, but the virtue of modernity is that, once invented, it is universal and does not require that other civilizations adopt the European form of culture that happened to serve as modernity's cradle. The history of Chinese capitalism may ultimately show that some cultures are better than the West at modernizing, even though they did not themselves invent modernity.

The optimists confuse two different things when they point to American technological and strategic hegemony and to the spread of democracy and capitalism and conclude that Western civilization is becoming universal. The right conclusion is more likely to be the opposite, for three reasons.

First, modernity dissolves all existing civilizations and creates, in Baechler's words, a matrix for future civilizations that do not yet exist. A fully modern world may have as many, or more, civilizations as did the premodern world because a civilization is not just a matter of democracy, science, and capitalism, but of ritual, manners, literature, pedagogy, family structure, and a particular way of coming to terms with what Christians call the four last things: death, judgment, heaven, and hell. Modernity will not change or remove the basic human condition, to which each culture provides its own distinct answers. To repeat, modernity transforms all existing civilizations, including that of the West. It is not Westernization, but a universal change in the fundamental conditions of any and all civilizations.

Secondly, American strategic and technological hegemony is a function of mere instruments, procedures, and methods, not of a culture or civilization. Technology and strategy may be powerful, pervasive, and universal, but by the same token they convey no fixed civilizational pattern, Western or otherwise. Likewise, democracy and capitalism, as elements of modernity, do not equate to Westernization, because there is nothing necessarily Western about them, even though the West invented them.

From these two points follows a third, which is that American hegemony, and the spread of democracy and market economies do not equal Westernization because modernity has already de-Westernized the West. This is why the ideologues of *post* and the optimists alike, while they identify vital transformations, draw the wrong conclusions. The former are right that we live at the end of

¹ Jean Baechler, *Le capitalisme*, vol. 2 (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), p. 429.

an era, but they wrongly identify the era that is ending as that of modernity. In fact, modernity is only beginning and it is the premodern world that is ending. The latter are right that modernity is becoming global, but they are wrong to trumpet that process as Western universalism.

Some, perhaps most, of the ideologues of *post* are frankly anti-Western at heart, and are pleased that an imperialist, racist, sexist, and environmentally destructive West is dying. This conclusion parodies the West and is in any case unwarranted. Western civilization may survive in some form or other, but if so, one of the preconditions is informed reflection on its past that is neither unjust nor arrogant. And this is where the *post*-ideologues and the optimists again conspire, unwittingly, to muddy the waters. For different reasons, each group has an interest in undermining Western identity in America, reducing it either to a litany of past evils or to a glorious gospel of democracy and capitalism.

America's Three Dirty Secrets

Let us attempt to recover, therefore, the important stages in the history of Western identity as depicted in the "grand narrative" of Western civilization that held sway in most schools and universities from the late nineteenth to the late twentieth century. That narrative may have been flawed insofar as the story it told was one of unbroken liberal progress from poverty and superstition to prosperity and the rule of reason, but it was by no means utterly wrong. To reconstruct Western identity for the new age means, first, to understand the narrative, and then to revise it.

A preliminary question is, why was the narrative so effectively discredited in America after the 1960s? Why, to be precise, did the optimists, who presumably liked the West, allow its story to be forgotten? The answer can be found if we look at another contemporary paradox, that of American triumphalism in an age otherwise characterized by a pervasive American incompetence.

The gap between the pessimists who insist that the West's modern project of science, democracy, and capitalism, is over, and the optimists who say that the Western project is only now becoming universal parallels the gap in American politics and culture between the mounting evidence of a social and educational crisis on the one hand and the triumphalism of American political and business leaders on the other. How can it be that a nation of illiterates, innumerates, and incompetents, a nation of cable-watching couch potatoes, and what 1950s writer Cyril Kornbluth dubbed the "marching morons," not only maintains but intensifies its technological and pop-cultural hegemony over large parts of the world, in the teeth of resistance from all manner of radicals, nationalists, traditionalists, and Marxists stretching from France to China from the 1960s to the 1980s?

For both things seem to be true: Americans have abandoned their shared ideals of meritocratic competition, excellence, and high standards in schools and universities even as they continued to organize the most efficient

businesses and markets and invent the most revolutionary technologies yet seen on the face of the earth.

But both things are not true, or rather, they represent two different sides to reality. The pessimism and the triumphalism conceal two dirty secrets of American success and American fragility. The first is that American political and educational elites in the 1970s and after made a bargain with themselves. They would allow standards to decline in the name of diversity, tolerance, and multiculturalism so long as these changes did not seriously affect the innovative dynamism of the economy, with the result that America, after some rocky passages in the 1970s and 1980s, became so productive that it could afford the mass “dumbing down” promoted by the follies of the ivory tower elites. The second dirty secret is that the bargain was not open-ended, but had a terminal date which is now fast approaching. The post-1960s American system of sustaining competence in some social compartments such as science and business while subsidizing incompetence in the humanities and social sciences was inherently contradictory, for both competence and anticompetence are dynamic. Thus, Microsoft or the Sloan-Kettering Institute might promote competition and force competence to undreamed-of levels, but the antimeritocratic tendencies in education and scholarship also proliferate and do genuine damage in contexts where the margins for error are less generous. For instance, a lowering of standards may not do much harm to a Harvard graduate, who is likely to succeed in any case, but is devastating to those who discover that their state college degrees do not prepare them to compete in a world where the skills demanded of new workers grow ever more intricate and challenging.

Straws in the wind indicate a storm is on its way. Labor market experts who marvel at the U.S. economy’s phenomenal ability to generate well-paid jobs worry that there will not be enough competent Americans to fill those jobs. And that observation suggests a third dirty secret, to wit, that the incompetence revolution amounted to an attack on the weak by the strong. Countercyclical evidence coming to the fore in the 1990s, starting with the story of Jaime Escalante in the Los Angeles barrio and continuing with the spate of news about how inner-city Catholic schools can teach—Eurocentrically—supposedly unteachable children, confirms what all good pedagogues from Socrates onward have known, namely, that it is the intellectually weak, not the strong, who most need content, discipline, and information. Elite suburban kids may well survive twelve to sixteen years of fluffy, feel-good classroom experience. Underprivileged children cannot.

The same elites that brought us curricular reform, postmodernism, and the end of “dead white male” hegemony now point to the results of their labors and declare that we are living in the age of *post*. Other elites who tacitly condoned the cruel bargains of the past three decades extol the glorious future all mankind is to share. Neither side has much interest in the history and identity of the thing they are constantly condemning or praising: Western civilization itself.

The “Grand Narrative” on Ancient Greece

Since Samuel Huntington published his “Clash of Civilizations” essay in *Foreign Affairs* in 1993, and his book in 1996, it has been again acceptable, if not always popular, to examine world politics in terms of cultural identities on the assumption that the world is not about to succumb to universal Westernization. If he (and Baechler) are right, that only makes it more important to remember what Western identity really has been, and not what the equally ignorant pessimists and optimists claim it has been, or will be. Let us turn, therefore, to the grand narrative of “Western Civ” and recall those episodes and ideas that remain, for better or worse, the essential elements of Western identity.

Understanding the causes of things may make one happy, as Virgil suggested, but may also make one nervous, especially when those causes have to do with one’s own cultural identity. The grand narrative of Western history constructed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was meant to spread happiness and to assuage the nervousness of Western elites in the face of revolutions in politics, literature, philosophy, psychology, social relations, and challenges from the disciples of Karl Marx, who denounced Western notions of justice and liberty as fig leaves for exploitation, or philosophers like Friedrich Nietzsche who considered the West a pious fraud perpetrated by the weak on the strong.

The grand narrative of Western civilization, by contrast, provided a cultural and historical basis for a liberal consensus about the merits and potential of the West that was unapologetically rationalist, progressive, and confident of the benefits of science and industry. It was meant to foster excellence in education, common ground in politics, and harmonious assimilation in society. It was, in sum, a construct of American liberalism as it existed before American liberals themselves stopped believing in excellence, reason, and assimilation, and in the grand narrative that underpinned those beliefs.

In its basic form, the grand narrative followed an axis that spanned five millennia, from ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia to mid-twentieth-century America. It was a history of reason, democracy, and economic growth. Its authors assumed that progress was real, objectively definable, and universally desirable. Being free was better than being enslaved, wealth better than poverty, health better than disease, enlightenment better than superstition, peace better than war, and progress meant the movement towards the better in both civil and international life. The grand narrative told how a fortunate part of the human race found the keys to such progress, and then shared them with others. This faith in progress was both a strength and a weakness. By tracing the remote origins of contemporary institutions and doctrines, the grand narrative provided, at its best, a sweeping, eagle’s-eye view of the long haul of history which was often inspiring to students and citizens. On the other hand, by looking at the past mainly, if not exclusively, to find the origins of the superior present, the authors of the grand narrative unhistorically ignored those features of past cultures that were not compatible with a modern liberal West. The grand

narrative assumed what it set out to explain: that the West existed, and that it was good.

What follows are some of the high points of the grand narrative that illustrate the controversies about Western identity that must be recovered if Westerners today are to avoid sinking either into post-competent lethargy or a facile triumphalism.

First, according to the liberal grand narrative, the empires of the ancient Near East and Israel were not early stages of Western civilization, but prehistory. The Western story proper began with the Greeks, whose civilization was apparently unprecedented. Ancient Greece, and particularly the city of Athens in the fifth century B.C., was the central pillar of Western identity and the font of Western literature, democracy, and philosophy.

Perhaps the most startling of the several paradoxes of Greek civilization was that its greatest literary works, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, were also its earliest. These two epic poems were composed in a culture without writing, by two, or perhaps only one poet whom the Greeks knew as Homer. Literacy began to spread in Greece around 700 B.C., but the poems appear to be somewhat older. Homer thus composed, memorized, and passed on the epics to posterity without perhaps even knowing what writing was. The second astonishing feature of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* is their dramatic sophistication, their quality as stories held together over thousands of lines by major, unifying themes. And Homer commanded not only the large-scale structure, but minute details and subplots that recur thousands of lines later and betray amazingly few inconsistencies. No other nonliterate cultures produced epics rivaling the Homeric poems in skill or sheer size. What is more, Homer lived at the end of the Greek dark age, which archaeological evidence shows to have been a poor, rural culture. The impression, therefore, is that these works of unsurpassed complexity appeared literally out of nowhere. Homer's language is also extraordinary, its grammar and phrasing elaborate, and its vocabulary enormous.

The authors of the Western Civ narrative, having established that the Greeks invented Western literature, then asserted that the Greeks also invented science, philosophy, and art, and credited the so-called Ionian thinkers with being the first to use natural reason to establish cosmologies and account for human behavior, ethics, and morality. Greek scientific thought and philosophy owed much to Greek religion, which commanded man to "know himself." Literature came to fruition in the tragedies of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and representational art reached heights never since rivaled in the sculptures of the Parthenon or the temple of Apollo. Philosophy matured with Socrates and culminated in Plato and Aristotle. As if that were not enough, the Greeks also invented democracy and the study of history, and saw the two as related.

The father of history, according to the grand narrative, was Herodotus, who set out to explain the causes of the greatest event of his day, the victory of the few but free Greeks over the mighty "slave" armies of the Persian invaders. He began with Demaratus, a king of Sparta who fell victim to an intrigue and went into exile at the Persian court. There were quite a few like him, disappointed men who hoped to ride Persian coattails back to power, hence the Persian

wars did not pit Persians against Greeks, but rather a multi-ethnic Persian army, including many Greeks, against other Greeks. In 480 B.C., Xerxes led his great army across the Hellespont and held a muster of his host. Herodotus described the spectacular panorama of Indians, Scythians, Egyptians, Libyans, Medes, Assyrians, Ethiopians, and a dozen lesser known tribes that joined the invasion force. With a sense of drama worthy of Homer, Herodotus did not follow up with a list of the Greek order of battle. Against the seemingly invincible Persian array, he wrote, stood an idea, and the idea was decisive.

After inspecting his army, Xerxes asked Demaratus if the Greeks would resist. "I believe that not even if all the Greeks and the rest of the people living in the West were gathered together, would they be able to withstand me in battle, not being united."² Alluding to the opulence of the display, Demaratus replied that Greece was by contrast a poor country, and that its *arete* (courage, virtue) was the result of the harsh discipline of poverty, wisdom, and strict laws. To the Greeks life was a struggle which taught them the necessity of virtue. "Using courage and virtue, Greece defends herself against both poverty and subjection."

**The West
valued military
virtues and
absolute
discipline.**

Xerxes ridiculed the notion. In another dramatic masterstroke, Herodotus let the Persian king and not the Greek exile bring up the next key idea, namely freedom. If your political life is as you tell me, Xerxes answered, meaning that you are brave, wise, and law-abiding, then you, as a former king of the poor but law-abiding city of Sparta, should be able to defeat twenty men single-handed, which is absurd. Furthermore, the great king went on, the Greeks would not be able to resist, "being all equally free and not commanded by one man." Thus to Xerxes, "free" simply meant "disorganized." Demaratus then explained that "though they may be free, they are not free in all things. For above them is a master, the law, which they fear far more than your subjects fear you." And this master commanded them never to flee but to remain in the ranks "either to win or die."

The American classicist Victor Hanson has argued, with learning as well as evident feeling, that such ideas inaugurated a "Western way of war" that was more bloody and brutal than warfare in other civilizations, which made its practitioners stronger than others and thereby gave them the chance to conquer and oppress the many peoples of the world who were not such fanatical fighters. According to Hanson, the small, tight-knit communities of the early Greek city-states of the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. required and generated intense solidarity among their male citizens, who together constituted not only the citizenry, but the army, which was constantly being called on to defend each city against its rivals. Demaratus's account of a "law" that commanded Greek soldiers to unite and win or die perfectly summarized the mix of determination and bloody competence that underpinned Greek morale and infantry tactics.³

² Herodotus 7.101, author's translation.

³ Victor D. Hanson, *The Western Way of War* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1988).

Unquestionably, young men in the modern West looked to this passage in admiration because it expressed an ideal they hoped to follow. Today Hanson disapproves of the “Western way of war,” which he blames for much Western imperialism and arrogance. As late as 1914 French general Joseph Joffre issued an order of the day at the Battle of the Marne in which he virtually paraphrased Demaratus: “French forces will not give ground. If necessary, they will let themselves be killed in place rather than retreat.”⁴ For better or worse, belief in military virtues and in absolute discipline was, as Hanson rightly argues, a central feature of the West.

The word for law in Greek was *nomos*, which could mean a regulation or statute. Demaratus, however, was not saying that the Greek cities had laws forbidding cowardice. He was using the word in its broader sense of fundamental social custom, the political bond that created society and which all members had to learn. To break the bond was to put oneself outside the political community. *Nomos* was both social and political in a way typically Greek but alien to the modern Western distinction between politics, the sphere of decision, and society, where people found and lived out their values. The two spheres were coextensive in Greece, which explains why Herodotus had Xerxes use the word “political” to refer to Demaratus’s claim that the Greeks were brave because they knew they must and should be. To the Greeks, the social was the political.

In constructing this marvelous scene and having it hinge in part on the irony that Xerxes the despot spoke of “political life” and “freedom” without knowing what they meant, Herodotus set up his climax, the defeat of the powerful and opulent Persian army, whose discipline was imposed by coercion, by the poor and outnumbered Greeks, who fought because they knew they had to and not because they were ordered. That Greeks owned themselves freely was also the principle on which Athenian democracy rested: the right of male citizens to express their opinions on public matters, and their duty to participate in the collective decisions of the city.

The grand narrative’s idea of Greek democracy as the source of Western democratic virtues tapped other sources, especially the famous passage from Thucydides, the other father of history, about the Peloponnesian War (431–404 B.C.), in which Athens and Sparta fought for hegemony. The passage in question was the Funeral Oration of Pericles, the leading Athenian citizen of his time, supposedly delivered at the end of the first year’s campaign to honor the Athenian dead. Thucydides had Pericles say that he would honor the dead by describing the constitution of Athens. “Our forefathers, who have always inhabited this land, by their *arete* (courage and virtue) handed it down in liberty from generation to generation.”⁵ As in Herodotus, the essential quality of the free man was *arete*, which connoted skill, strength, personal courage, and the pursuit of excellence in all activities. Pericles then praised the present generation for having worthily received and expanded the power of the land bequeathed

⁴ Quoted in Jean-Marie Domenach, *Regarder la France* (Paris: Perrin, 1997), p. 103.

⁵ Thucydides 2.35, author’s translation.

them in liberty by their forefathers. What was the secret of Athens's strength? The answer was in its constitution "that does not seek to rival the laws of our neighbors, since we are rather an example to others than their emulators. And because this constitution is settled on the many rather than on the few it is named *demokratia*." Democracy gave every man a stake in Athens and called forth his *arete* in its defense. Democracy made men eager to learn so that they could properly take part in ruling their city: "We alone call the man who does not participate in public business not a man who minds his own, but a useless one." Then, to hammer home the theme that democracy made men strong and committed, Pericles insisted that "we love beauty without affectation and pursue wisdom without becoming effete. . . . All in all, our city is the model of instruction for Greece . . . we need no Homer to sing our praises."

Not all Greeks or even Athenians agreed that democracy was a good thing. Many thought that Xerxes had a point when he equated freedom with chaos. In the Peloponnesian War, democratic Athens lost to militaristic Sparta, and in 338 B.C., all of Greece fell to Philip of Macedon and his son, Alexander the Great. But while Alexander and his generals were creating new empires in the East, the hitherto obscure city-state of Rome was embarking on its own career, which was eventually to bring it to center stage in the Western drama.

The "Grand Narrative" on Ancient Rome

The authors of Western Civ's narrative saw the Romans as bringers of law and unity to the Mediterranean world after centuries of conflict. In so doing, they created the precondition for the later synthesis of Christian faith and Roman order that was the true beginning of the West. Where the Greeks had admired new and daring thoughts and demanded that practices, ideas, and customs be justified by reason, the Romans, in the grand narrative, abhorred innovation. Roman virtue was always the virtue of the past, of an older and better time when Rome was small and poor, and when conduct was governed by *mos maiorum*, the way of the ancestors. Whenever a Roman needed to justify change, he portrayed it as a restoration of old customs that had become lost or dishonored.

The Roman Empire grew out of the inveterate tendency of the Romans to conclude that they would never be secure in their dominions if they did not conquer the adjacent tribes, regions, and cities as well. The process began in central Italy in the sixth century B.C. and ended only in the first century A.D. when the Romans tried to conquer the Germanic tribes east of the Rhine and failed. This last attempt at expansion fit the tradition perfectly. It was the culmination of a sequence, logical in retrospect, that began in 386 B.C.

In that year Gallic tribes living in the Po valley, then considered part of Gaul, raided deep into Italy. They got as far as Rome itself, which they burned. This was the last time any non-Roman enemy captured the city before the Visigothic invasion of A.D. 410. By the 220s B.C., Rome had grown strong enough to act against this threat. The Romans occupied Milan and annexed

the flat, fertile plain between the Apennines and the Alps which became the province of Cisalpine Gaul.

Following the interruption of their disastrous Second Punic War against Carthage, the Romans picked up where they left off, built roads into Cisalpine Gaul and began a process of intensive colonization there. By the late second century, the region was largely Romanized, but also had become a tempting target for Gallic tribes beyond the Alps. So to secure Cisalpine Gaul, the Romans had to occupy Gaul beyond the Alps. The road to Transalpine Gaul passed, oddly enough, through Spain.

The Second Punic War had shown Rome that the Iberian peninsula was a potential threat and resource base for an enemy. It had to be conquered, which happened in the mid-second century B.C. The conquest of Spain left the coastal region of Transalpine Gaul, later known as southern France, as a vacuum between Roman Spain and the province of Cisalpine Gaul. This region contained the Greek city of Massilia (later Marseilles), which was likewise unprotected against raids from interior Gaul. Roman protection of Massilia, which meant occupation of southern Transalpine Gaul, was required, and duly occurred in 122 B.C. Now the problem shifted to Gaul proper. So long as any part of "long-haired Gaul," the wild hinterland, was unoccupied, Gallic raiders might still sweep down on Massilia, and even into the Po valley. At any rate, that threat was what Julius Caesar used in 57 B.C. to justify his seven-year campaign to conquer all Gaul and extend Roman power to the Rhine. This advance, in accordance with the dynamic of Roman conquest, conjured new threats, for across the Rhine were Germanic tribes who were about to invade Gaul themselves when Caesar beat them to it. Caesar's successor Augustus, the first emperor, soon decided that the Germans would have to be conquered and the Roman frontier advanced to the Elbe. He never discovered what new perils an Elbe frontier might have raised, because in A.D. 9 the Germanic chieftain Arminius, a former Roman soldier, lured three Roman legions into the forest near modern-day Bremen and destroyed them. So traumatic was this defeat that Augustus and his successors abandoned all plans to conquer Germany. The tide that began in 386 B.C. after the Gallic sack of Rome had reached its high-water mark.

Elsewhere, however, the Roman tide continued to flood. In A.D. 115, the emperor Trajan conquered Mesopotamia, and though his successor abandoned the territory, recent scholarship has documented that Roman economic, cultural, and military penetration of the Middle East continued until at least the third century A.D.⁶ In the early third century, a Syriac-speaking Christian philosopher commented on the irresistible force of the Romans, whom no power of the stars had ever stopped "from always conquering new territories."⁷

⁶ Fergus Millar, *The Roman Near East, 31 BC–AD 337* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).

⁷ Quoted in Peter Brown, *The Rise of Western Christendom: Triumph and Diversity AD 200–1000* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), p. 4.

Now, the authors of Western Civ's grand narrative were never quite sure how to handle the Roman Empire since it was neither liberal nor a democracy and grew more oppressive with the passage of time. Even those emperors who governed responsibly were tyrants, and some of them were wicked by modern liberal standards. On the other hand, Rome imposed peace, a common culture, and safe communications across the Mediterranean for several centuries, thus making possible the next and most fundamental of all "magic moments" in the rise of the West, namely the synthesis of classical civilization and Christianity. Homer and Herodotus, arguably, founded Western literature and Western historical imagination; other Greeks invented democracy and philosophy; the Romans created basic concepts of Western law and offered unsurpassed models of duty; but all these things were mere pieces of the West, not the West itself, which could not spring into being until these elements were married to a religion that insisted that a single, sovereign, knowable God had created the universe, asserted the equal value and burden of every human life, and proclaimed that the purpose both of individual existence and of society was to further God's plan of salvation.

The liberal grand narrative took an instrumental view of this synthesis. The marriage of classical culture and Christianity was a magic moment not because it produced the civilization of Medieval Europe—after all, that civilization was also illiberal and undemocratic. Rather, the marriage was providential in a *secular* sense, because modern democracy, and in particular its doctrine of universal human rights, had its roots in the classical political philosophy of freedom, Roman respect for law and duty, and Christian teaching about social justice and the moral equality of all human beings. Modern democracy, in the liberal version, was the fully developed West, the true West.

The grand narrative skated lightly over the following centuries, which to modern liberal eyes had the dual disadvantage of being both seriously Christian and culturally barren. Yet it acknowledged that the modern West would have known little of classical civilization if the patient monks of the Dark Ages had not copied the ancient authors from manuscript to manuscript. The Western book consisting of sheets of parchment, and later paper, sewn and bound between covers, and the modern Western style of writing in upper and lower-case letters and of putting spaces between words were Late Roman and Dark Ages inventions. Ancient "books" had been scrolls of papyrus that had to be unwound to be read, making it hard to find a particular passage; the Western book could be opened to any page at any time, and thus was a much better system for the storage and retrieval of information. One theory about the origins of the book was that it was invented by early Christians, who needed to locate and read particular passages of scripture again and again.⁸

⁸ C.H. Roberts, "The Codex," *Proceedings of the British Academy* 40, 1954, pp. 169–204. This note is an overdue tribute, in an unlikely place, to this article, a classic example of erudite deduction and well worth reading for this quality alone, quite apart from its specific content.

The “Grand Narrative” on Columbus

The next significant episode, especially in the American version of the grand narrative, was the voyage of Christopher Columbus at the height of the Renaissance, considered by many of its own leading thinkers as the reawakening of Europe after a millennium of ignorance and superstition. At the time, few noticed Columbus, for contemporaries in the year 1492 were far more enthralled by two other Spanish events: the fall of Grenada which marked the end of the *reconquista* of Spain from the Moors after seven hundred years, and the royal decree that expelled all unconverted Jews from the Spanish kingdoms under penalty of death for apostasy.

A symbolic high point in the current battle over how to present the history of the West occurred in 1992, when Western elites, especially in Spain and America, had to decide how to commemorate the Columbian voyage that inaugurated the European discovery of America.

Columbus's deed presented a conundrum because by 1992 it was no longer politically correct to take pride in what he achieved. Until the 1970s, young Americans still, by and large, believed that Columbus was a brave, heroic figure who against all caution and common sense sailed beyond the sunset on a desperate gamble, hoping to reach an unimaginably distant land that no one had seen and some doubted even existed. This version had received its finest and most scholarly literary expression in 1942, the 450th anniversary year, in Samuel Eliot Morison's biography entitled *Columbus: Admiral of the Ocean Sea*. Morison, who died at eighty-nine in 1976, was the last of the great American explorer-historians in the mold of William Prescott and Francis Parkman. He was also a descendant of seafaring New Englanders whose Protestant pride born of humility, and self-knowledge, and insatiable curiosity rooted in a solid sense of their own identity drove them to tackle huge questions. For any serious American scholar before the mid-twentieth century, the obvious huge question was the origins and rise of the United States. Prescott, therefore, wrote about the Spanish conquest of Mexico that inaugurated European settlement in the New World. Parkman wrote about European exploration in North America and the relations, both peaceful and hostile, with the natives and among the Europeans, to explain why the United States was born as it was. Morison went back in time and to an even wider stage: the Atlantic Ocean itself and the various ways in which Europeans of many nations discovered, mapped, crossed, and endured it in order to make possible the political, economic, and social history described by his predecessors.

For a quarter century, Morison's image held sway in American culture. During the 1970s and 1980s, however, a new pedagogy arose according to which Columbus could not be depicted as merely a heroic explorer. First, he was not the true “discoverer” of America, because the American continent was first settled by human beings from Northeast Asia many thousands of years earlier. Second, his deed had only made it possible for Europeans to perpetrate such enormities as the decimation of the native Indian population, black slavery, and in time the rape and pollution of the American environment. In this new

dispensation the “Columbian moment” was an unmitigated evil, and writers such as Kirkpatrick Sale established a manichaeian dichotomy between a sinister, corrupt, greedy, dirty, and hypocritical Europe and an ecologically and morally correct American Indian culture.⁹ In Sale’s view, Columbus was the product of a Europe that was already dangerously out of moral and ecological control and had violated the laws of cosmic harmony. Indeed, the Original Sin of Europe had a spiritual and a material side, just as the serpent in the Garden of Eden tempted Adam and Eve with both power and knowledge. Analogously, the spiritual sin of Europe was the drive to discovery, the impulse to expand knowledge, leading to the material sins of exploitation and pollution. Sale viewed the European discoveries as one aspect of a manipulative drive to control the world which led, in later centuries, to science, the Industrial Revolution, and what in his eyes was the enslavement of the world to technology, production, imperialist exploitation, and environmental destruction.

The most ingenious stroke in Sale’s attack was the way he linked his general condemnation of Western exploitation to the voyage of Columbus. Not only was the voyage itself a crime because it sprang from arrogance and pride, it was a particular crime because the Europeans who followed Columbus imported disease and ecological imbalance, decimating the natives and polluting a paradise.

Sale’s volume was a moral treatise rather than a work of history and therefore not amenable to criticism on the normal grounds of evidence and plausibility. He painted a portrait of peaceful natives living in harmony with nature without questioning whether the Indians were largely peaceful and their lives ecologically harmonious, or examining his philosophical assumptions to the effect that peace and harmony were more natural than and superior to a life of conflict and dynamism. But in naming technology, or practical reason, as the chief means by which Europeans broke out of harmony with nature, Sale was tapping into a long-standing tradition that damned technology as the fatal flaw of the West responsible for estranging man from nature and ultimately threatening his very survival with atomic weapons and environmental destruction.

In schools and the popular culture (viz., Disney’s *Pocahontas*), Sale’s defeat of Morison resulted in the bland assertion, now repeated in a thousand textbooks, that Columbus did not “discover” America, but rather began an encounter among three cultures—the European, American Indian, and African—each of which contributed to modern America. These cultures were not morally equal: the European one was aggressive, and the other two victims. Hence, the 1990s doctrine on 1492 portrays Indian and African cultures as creative, complex, and full of promise, whereas that of Europe was intolerant, greedy, and violent.

⁹ Kirkpatrick Sale, *The Conquest of Paradise: Christopher Columbus and the Columbian Legacy* (New York: Knopf, 1990). It is no accident, as the Marxists used to say, that Sale has since turned his favorable attention to environmentalism; see his *The Green Revolution: The American Environmental Movement, 1962–1992* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1993). Nor is it an accident, it is in an odd way rather comforting, that Sale’s co-author on the second book was the well-known radical historian Eric Foner.

Neither the defenders of the old celebratory account of Western Civ nor the energetic and zealous proponents of the new indictment of Western Civ appreciated that they were both caught in the grand narrative's paradigm. Sale hated Columbus because he and those who followed him did bad things to Indians—bad by *Western* standards of humanity, justice, and progress. Neither side understood the real stakes and tragedy of the encounter between Europe and the New World, which the Bulgarian-born French thinker Tzvetan Todorov bluntly identified as the clash between a Mexican “civilization of sacrifice” and a Spanish “civilization of massacre.”¹⁰ Todorov's point is that neither side could understand the other because their symbolic universes were radically opposed. The Indians used language to interpret the universe and the commands of the gods. The Spaniards used language to persuade others to do what they wanted, in other words, to change the world. One of the paradoxes of the Spanish conquest of Mexico is that Hernán Cortés and his men generally admired the Aztecs, even though they saw plenty of evidence that the Aztecs habitually killed tens of thousands in their ritual sacrifices. The paradox is compounded when we read the accounts of people like Bartolomé de las Casas, the Franciscan friar who became a defender of the Indians, of how Spanish settlers tortured, mistreated, and massacred their Indian subjects. The paradox is, if not explained, then at least made less mysterious when we see that both sides regarded the other as impossibly alien, as superhuman or less than human, but rarely as simply human.¹¹

The “Grand Narrative” on Modernity

The grand narrative's account of Western Civ after the Renaissance focused on two, mighty, abiding themes, the first of which was progress. Politically, progress meant the rise and spread of democratic ideas and government. Economically, progress meant the beginnings of capitalism and sustained growth leading, eventually, to the incomparable prosperity of the West and its offshoots. Socially, progress meant the spread of literacy, decline in civil violence, rise of a well-mannered, polite society, growing respect for members of other classes and races, and the rise in the status of women. Technologically, progress meant the invention of machines and procedures to make work and life in general less painful and more productive.

The second theme that defined modernity according to the grand narrative was universality. The good things of the West were not just for those who invented them, but for everyone. The voyages of discovery concretely expressed the West's universalist impulse. It wanted to go everywhere, learn

¹⁰ Tzvetan Todorov, *La Conquête de l'Amérique* (Paris: Seuil, 1982).

¹¹ The novelist Brian Moore used the same opposition of Indian and European culture to construct the central tragedy of his novel *Black Robe* (New York: Penguin Group, 1985), set in seventeenth-century Canada. In Moore's version, the opposition was between an Indian world in which night and day, gods and humans, were indistinguishable, and a European or Christian world in which God and men were radically distinct.

everything, and put everything to practical use. Its success was evidence that it had found the right way to do things, to study the world and exploit its riches. And universalism was the apparently logical child of success. What worked for the West must work for everyone, and what was good for the West was good for everyone.

The grand narrative of the last half of the second millennium A.D. was, in all its variants, based on a scheme that ran something like this. First, in the Renaissance, people freed themselves of superstition and released their minds and imaginations. One result of this new freedom was courage: the courage of Columbus, or of Martin Luther in 1517 when he broke with the Catholic Church in the name of personal faith. The new freedom produced two further results: the rediscovery of classical civilization and all its riches, which thus became the inheritance of the modern West, and the idea of a human nature that was generally the same in all times and places, regardless of religion or culture. This meant that one could construct theories of history, culture, morality, and politics that were valid in all times and places and led by a series of inevitable steps to the universal triumph of democracy.

Five episodes may serve to encapsulate the grand narrative of the modern West: the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, England's Glorious Revolution of 1688–89, the American Revolution of 1776–89, the Emancipation Proclamation of 1862, and the Atlantic Charter of 1941.

In 1588, King Philip II of Spain sent a fleet to invade England. Spain was the core state of Catholicism, the strongest power in Europe and metropolis of a global empire. England was a poor, small, Protestant country of some three million people on the edge of Europe. Faced with the threat of invasion, the English, like other groups in similar crises, discovered a sense of national identity. They rallied around their queen, Elizabeth, and by dint of skill and courage (and luck) defeated the invasion fleet. Spanish prestige suffered a blow from which it never recovered, and as in the Graeco-Persian wars, a small nation of free and determined men defeated a large empire. Having discovered that they were a nation bound by a common commitment to freedom and religious independence, the English went on to develop their democratic and trading instincts, ultimately founding liberal government and capitalism. This interpretation is scarcely consistent with the historical facts. The Armada's plan of action depended on help from Dutch Catholics, who were supposed to keep the English occupied while the Armada landed the army it was transporting. But the Dutch betrayed their trust, so the Armada was left to fight a battle for which it was not prepared. Nor did the English personify a spirit of liberty—Elizabeth was only fighting for her throne against the Catholic Stuart claimants. Nor was the Armada destroyed—most of the Spanish captains courageously found their way home. But no matter: the liberal account of the triumph of freedom over superstition and tyranny served the purpose of the grand narrative. God's hand gave Elizabeth the chance and the obligation to continue the Reformation and maintain England as a bastion of the purified faith.

The second signpost in modern history was the Glorious Revolution of 1688–89. William, Prince of Orange, related to the Stuart kings of England and

Scotland by blood and marriage, invaded England to protect the Protestant state religion and constitutional government against King James II, a Catholic. Few people at the time, including James and most of his subjects, understood or respected the idea of mutual toleration. A state and nation must have one faith, and the faith must be the true one. By definition, the true faith excluded others, and, since error had no rights against truth, a government was duty bound to uphold truth and combat heresy. Therefore, both James and his opponents understood that his strategy of appointing Catholics to high positions was merely the first step of a larger strategy aiming at completing the work that Mary Tudor failed to accomplish: the reconversion of England to Catholicism—by persuasion if possible, by force if necessary.

Why did James think he could openly defy the established order? By relying on another fundamental principle of the age, namely the royal prerogative. A king had an automatic, divinely grounded right to expect and demand obedience of his subjects. A king in error was still a king. This doctrine protected James for some time, because even fervent Protestants were reluctant to do anything that questioned the king's right to govern. But in the summer of 1688, James crossed a line when he arrested several bishops of the Church of England for refusing to promulgate a Declaration of Indulgence, which granted freedom of worship to all non-Anglicans, Catholic as well as Protestant dissenters such as Quakers or Presbyterians. The Declaration was an open attack on the fundamental laws of the realm. It provoked a number of highly placed Englishmen to call on the king's son-in-law, William of Orange, to come to their aid against a monarch who was violating his own oaths of office.

There was another reason that James's opponents chose to act in late 1688. William's wife Mary, James's daughter, had been next in line of succession, because James had no sons, and she, like her husband, was committed to defending the Church of England. Protestant Englishmen who were reluctant to deny the king's right to rule could therefore tell themselves that however outrageously James was behaving, he would eventually die, and then Mary and her husband would come and put things right. But in the summer of 1688 James's wife bore him a son, who became the Prince of Wales and successor to the throne. England and Scotland faced the prospect of a Catholic succession. To some, it seemed that the time was now or never to act against James and block that disastrous prospect.

So William invaded, James fled, and in February 1689 Parliament hailed William and Mary as joint monarchs. It was a revolution because power changed hands irregularly—James did not abdicate—and because the English leaders who enabled William to take power attached conditions that changed the rules of government. In the future, the king would govern in and through Parliament and honor a Bill of Rights from which the later American document took many of its provisions and formulations.

According to the grand narrative the Glorious Revolution was a triumph of civil rights and popular government and, as in the case of the Armada, the narrative was not so much wrong as misleading. James lost power primarily because he violated religious laws. The revolution was not about democracy

or even toleration, because the new regime reinstated the rules against non-Anglicans. The parliament that won more influence over government was not a popular legislature, but the representation of a small elite. Nothing quite like it existed elsewhere, but it was far from democracy, which was an idea offensive and incomprehensible to all but the wildest radicals of 1688.

Both the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution differ from other revolutions in that they were defended sometimes because they restored ancient rights of the people, and at other times because they created new rights. In 1688, the supporters of William and Mary, the Whigs, argued that James deserved to be deposed because he had violated what they called the “Ancient Constitution” of the realm, but this constitution was wholly imaginary.¹² It was James and his diehard supporters who were historically right in pointing to the steady growth of royal power as the central axis of English history up to that time. Later Whigs, such as Lord Macaulay in the nineteenth century, came to agree, and began to justify the Revolution not as a restoration of ancient rights but as the splendid and innovative agency for the creation of new rights. The justification was now in terms of progress, not tradition: a crucial change in the West’s self-perception that came to undergird the grand narrative.

**The grand
narrative was
not so much
wrong as
misleading.**

The American Revolution proclaimed the doctrine of equal and universal rights and established a government and society based on them. The Constitution of 1789 determined that government would be divided to avoid concentrations of power, and federal, with only such power granted to the central government as was necessary for general security. The individual states remained sovereign in most areas and were free, for example, to retain the institution of slavery even though it was inconsistent with the egalitarian and meritocratic ideology of the Revolution. This inconsistency ultimately led to the Civil War and Emancipation, which was what finally permitted American liberals to boast that the United States was of all nations the most advanced and thus the true culmination in history’s grand narrative.

The American Revolution and the Emancipation of slaves during the Civil War were, like the other episodes, more complex than the narrative allowed, but few would deny that they represented steps toward democracy and universal rights. The post-1960s critics of the narrative who denounced the Revolution because it did not give women the vote or abolish slavery were, in most cases, arguing from the premises of the narrative itself. They agreed that female suffrage and abolition of slavery were good things, they merely wanted to expose what they considered the hypocrisy of the American Founders who claimed to have installed liberty while in fact they retained white male privileges.

¹² This fascinating chapter of British intellectual history, which has clear parallels to the American debate on “original intent” versus “the changing constitution” is well summarized by John Kenyon, *The History Men* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983), pp. 20–45. See also Hugh Trevor-Roper’s introduction to his selection from Macaulay, *The History of England* (New York: Penguin Classics, 1979).

But such criticism is even more fundamentally ahistorical than the narrative is itself. The narrative included episodes of the past for what they contributed to a valuable present. This was to ignore aspects of those episodes that did not serve the forward momentum of the story, but at least such a method did not blame the past for not being the present. The critics by contrast, invariably did so, using their own contemporary political preferences as standards of judgment. To be sure, the grand narrative was simpleminded in its well-meaning and positive moralism. Its authors liked the West and were eager to trace its roots. But the critics were equally facile. Not liking the West, they were interested only in showing how the modern West and the episodes that led to it were deficient according to the critics' own parochial moralism.

The Atlantic Charter of 1941 is a fitting episode with which to end a summary of the grand narrative, because this statement of principles by the American and British heads of government in the midst of World War II was among the most important political and philosophical foundations of NATO. In August 1941, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill met on a ship in Placentia Bay off Newfoundland and issued a joint policy declaration known as the Atlantic Charter. It listed three paramount postwar goals: self-determination, collective security, and open markets. All three were in the mainstream of the grand narrative and defined the identity of the modern West as a set of political and economic norms. They were stated as goals that ought to be and implicitly were shared by all right-thinking people, and as goals that would and could be realized.

The Atlantic Charter differed from the earlier episodes in that its actors were consciously defining Western civilization, stating a commitment to it, and proclaiming that the purpose of their war effort was to secure that civilization and extend its benefits. This was not surprising. By the 1940s, the grand narrative was a central part of elite education in the United States and Britain. Both Roosevelt and Churchill had learned early versions of it in their respective schools of Groton and Harrow. Nor was their presentation of its values in the Charter deliberately hypocritical or fraudulent. The postwar transatlantic civilization of peace, prosperity, and technology that grew out of the allied victory served, for several decades, as ample practical confirmation, in most people's eyes, of the grand narrative's image of what the West was and should be.

The problem lay in the fact that the Atlantic Charter's universalism was, on its own terms, inconsistent. The Charter said that the postwar world would be one of self-determination for all peoples, universal access to open markets to generate prosperity and political stability, and collective security, meaning that every nation would understand that its peace depended on respecting the peace of others. But the postwar world was not like that. The principles of the West had, at best, partial support. Worse, the Western leaders themselves did not act according to the Charter during the war or after it, the two most obvious examples being U.S. and British policy toward the Soviet Union and Germany.

It was the Soviet Union which bore the brunt of the war against Germany. The Soviet Union was obviously going to be a major player, if not the decisive player, in shaping the postwar order. So for the Charter to make

any sense as a realistic program, the Soviet Union would have to share its goals. As became abundantly clear in 1945, if not before, Josef Stalin and the other Soviet rulers shared none of the Charter's ideals; indeed, their beliefs, wishes, and ambitions were radically incompatible with the goals the Charter claimed to be universal. They clearly were not, nor did the Western powers try to make them so, because that would have meant war with the Soviet Union.

Germany was the enemy, the target of the crusade for justice and democracy proclaimed in the Charter. This presented an inconsistency of a different kind. The Charter rejected revenge and power politics, and instead proclaimed self-determination for all—even for the enemy states, once their evil rulers had been cast down. In fact, of course, the Western allies did not practice what they preached in regard to Germany, which was occupied, partitioned, and ruled after 1945 as a defeated enemy, nor in regard to the European colonial empires. Dividing the world in this way into those entitled to self-determination and those who were not so entitled was exactly the kind of vengeful power politics that the Charter unequivocally condemned.

In practice, these inconsistencies did not matter to the peoples of America, Britain, or those parts of Europe later included in, or indirectly protected by, NATO. They mattered a good deal more to the Central and East Europeans who found themselves assigned to Josef Stalin, and to the millions of noncombatant Germans uprooted from their native lands and driven westwards by the communist regimes of Poland and other Soviet satellites after 1945. These Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Germans, and others were among the permanent victims of the postwar settlement, those who had no one to speak for them either in NATO or that other organization established to promote the Atlantic Charter's ideals, the United Nations. The authors of the Charter had denounced high-handed policies that decided the fates of millions for reasons of power, and stated that it was precisely the weak and the undefended who needed protection. In Western Europe and America these words had meaning. East of the Elbe, the line dividing Western and Soviet power from 1945–90, they appeared hypocritical.

The grand narrative and its late twentieth-century fate symbolized and reflected the anguished history of Western identity itself during that period, as it moved from liberal self-assertion through radical critique to liberal self-doubt. However, the grand narrative, even in its triumphalist, mid-century version, was more than simply an ideological scaffolding for contemporary interests. Its authors honestly wanted to express what they thought the West should and could be: a civilization able to diagnose and correct what people saw as its own injustices, and one that promised its members more peace, prosperity, and fairness than others. According to the grand narrative, the West was unique in another way as well. More than other civilizations, it had developed within itself ways of living, thinking, and doing that were universally valid and useful to all, including science, democracy, human rights, and prosperity. The optimists of the 1990s agree. They believe that the time has now come for the principles of the West to form the basis of an international political and economic order based on democracy, free markets, and individual initiative.

But, as this essay has endeavored to show, this is a misleading interpretation of the real world today. The grand narrative of the West grew out of an era that was making the uneasy transition from thinking of itself as “civilization” to one in which the West was merely one of several civilizations. It was thus based on a contradiction: it told a story of universal validity which was nevertheless the story of but one part of mankind.

The ideologues of *post* reject Eurocentrism and claim also to reject any overarching story of how to be or what to do. Their paradox is that they cannot escape the modern story, which is, as Baechler put it, simply the arithmetic of reality. The optimists, however, are no more right than the ideologues of *post*, for they, too, mistake the part for the whole. They mistake modernity for the West and think that because modernity is on the march, so also must be the West. Even more inaccurately, they mistake American technological and economic hegemony for the West.

The conclusion of these considerations is that Western civilization is both more and less than the ideologues and optimists think. A fuller story of the West will take into account Victor Hanson’s critique on Greek military ideology and Tzvetan Todorov’s insights into the clash of Indians and Europeans—still the clash of civilizations par excellence, and one that will never be repeated. Even more important, a fuller story of the West must address the biggest black hole in the liberal grand narrative, the hole that is left when religion disappears from the landscape of civilization. As indicated above, the grand narrative’s view of the synthesis of classical and Christian culture that produced the West was an instrumental one. As the narrative had it, this synthesis had to happen in late antiquity for the later North Atlantic civilization of the West to emerge. But if even defenders of the West now realize that its fate is not to be universal, then they have no choice but to seize the chance that scholarship and reflection provide to reconsider the entire history of the West, its religion included, as something other than merely a history of progress toward a now defunct and debilitated liberalism. The house of culture has many mansions, and we owe it to the dead, the living, and the yet unborn to explore it. The world is not flat, and new worlds of consciousness wait to be rediscovered.



The West's Stake in Russia's Future*

by James H. Billington

Foreign policy was barely mentioned in the recent presidential campaign, and in the absence of major warfare abroad or immediately perceptible dangers, the American people seem not inclined to think much these days about the broader world. But periods of calm rarely last long in human affairs—particularly in times of rapid change—and indeed four sorts of real danger may loom on the horizon for our nation and type of society. Three of the four involve a Russia that Americans have perhaps too easily assumed that they no longer need worry about.

The first and most obvious danger is the continued presence and growing risk of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the refinement of delivery systems that could physically devastate and even totally destroy the United States. Although the cold war is over and Russian conventional armed forces are no longer a major threat to their neighbors, Russia still has the long distance strategic capability to obliterate the population centers and infrastructure of North America; and present and future rogue states already have or may acquire some of that potential. This makes the continuance of Russia along its present reform path something the United States should be supporting even more strongly than it has in the past.

A second, less recognized danger is the risk that, having won the cold war against the Soviet Union, Americans could nevertheless still lose the older, more basic struggle against authoritarian dominance in Eurasia. The United States fought five shooting wars in this century all basically to prevent a hostile authoritarian power from gaining control over the great Eurasian landmass. It fought twice in Europe—directly against Germany—and three times in Asia—first against a Japan allied with Germany and then against peripheral but aggressive surrogates of an expanding Soviet Union. America became involved in all its overseas wars in the twentieth century for essentially the same reason

James H. Billington is the Librarian of Congress. A former Rhodes Scholar and the director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars from 1973 to 1987, Dr. Billington is the author of several books including *Russia Transformed: Breakthrough to Hope* (1992), and the forthcoming *Face of Russia*.

* Based on the Templeton Lecture on Religion and World Affairs delivered in Philadelphia on March 17, 1997, this text has been revised for publication by the author and the editor of *Orbis*.

that Britain became involved in continental wars in earlier centuries: in order to prevent an authoritarian hegemony over the world's dominant landmass and resource base. Such an imperium would have marginalized and could have ultimately reduced to vassalage the freer, more participative and entrepreneurial states that developed on the maritime periphery in northern Europe and North America.

This geopolitical risk provides a second reason for being concerned about the fate of the democratic experiment in Russia. If Russia succumbs to the crypto-fascist authoritarian nationalism which continues to threaten its fragile ruling coalition and/or if the radical Muslim states of the Near East or the still-Leninist colossus of China begin expanding their power, either of two likely results would spell disaster for the democratic states: either a spread of Yugoslav-type ethnic and religious violence or the formation of some kind of authoritarian alliance against the less populous democratic world.

But even if the recent trend toward democracy should prevail in Russia, a third gathering geopolitical danger lies in the global population explosion. A new kind of North-South conflict may replace the East-West conflict as the overpopulated, less developed world spills uncontrollably into the less populated nations of the Northern Hemisphere in ways tending to undermine, rather than strengthen democratic institutions.

Immigration streams from the south that began as invited guest workers already pose deep problems of assimilation: Algerians in France, Turks in Germany. Chinese are streaming into vast, resource-rich Siberia, which has a total population only one-hundredth that of China. The population of the newly independent Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union is exploding while that of their Slavic neighbors to the north is shrinking. All of this feeds the growing nationalist paranoia in Russia.

Even in the relatively tranquil American Southwest, the population influx from the south is beginning to cause some to question two features of American democracy that have never before been seriously challenged as being essential to sustaining unity in a large, diverse nation: a common language and inviolable borders.

Finally, this growth of population in a world of limited resources intensifies a fourth—and perhaps most ominous—threat on the horizon: the widespread resurgence of ethnic hatreds and conflicts which the international system seems largely powerless either to accommodate or to curtail. There sometimes seems to be a reversion to tribalism in Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and many other regions where the suppression of information is so effective (Tibet, the Sudan) that the outside world is not even aware of the extent of oppression.

Americans must be concerned about these breakdowns of elementary order and decency not just for humanitarian reasons but also because it is often more difficult in the end to avoid involvement than was assumed at the beginning. In addition, America itself is not immune from this type of breakdown, and, whether one likes it or not, the world looks largely to America as the nation that most defines the future.

The Transformative “Three C’s”

The new and unique opportunities for positive U.S. leadership in the twenty-first century will require attention not only to traditional geopolitical preoccupations—resources, weapons, and diplomacy—but also to the three C’s: commerce, communication, and culture.

Commerce has been described as the continuation of war by other means. But the means of commerce are relatively peaceful, and the end can be beneficial to everyone if zones of free trade are expanded and the playing field is level.

Second and even more transforming is the onset of instantaneous worldwide communication through both the global reach of television and the recent exponential growth of the Internet. At the end of the twentieth century, the number of languages spoken on the planet by significant numbers of people will be only one-tenth of the number that existed at the beginning of this century. English is becoming the near-universal vehicle for basic communication—yet is itself being broken up into the even simpler language of zeros and ones that digitization is making into the world’s real currency for information. Not only words but also sounds and pictures are transformed into numbers, reducing all forms of human communication into an instantaneously and universally available electronic format.

The fact that so much of the world’s knowledge is generated and stored in America represents a great potential economic strength in an age where so much productivity and export growth lie in information-based enterprises. For instance, the enormous storehouse of technical material in all languages residing in the 111 million items at the Library of Congress provides immense potential economic benefit for America. The library already receives almost two million electronic transactions per working day, and is striving successfully to digitize and transmit free in electronic form to the nation five million interesting and important items of American history and culture by the year 2000.

New international communication networks should facilitate interactive, transnational solutions to common international problems such as conserving the environment or dealing with diseases and disasters. However, the creeping uniformity and impersonalization of an antiseptic numerical language may paradoxically increase the human desire to preserve and even to reassert separate cultural identities.

So, if communication, like commerce, is a force tending to bind the world closer together, culture—the last of the three C’s—may be a force tearing it apart. If the new electronic communication creates nonspatially based communities of interest pointing towards global unity, resurgent cultural identities, on the other hand, create new divisions and ethnic conflicts that point towards global anarchy. The task of deeper cultural understanding, therefore, may be the most important imperative of all for avoiding international conflict in the twenty-first century—and may give the unique historical experiences of

Communication and commerce can unite the world, but culture can tear it apart.

the United States a new global relevance that Americans themselves have not yet adequately appreciated.

For America has become in recent years a world civilization—not just through the intertwining of the domestic with the foreign economy, but also through the addition of a growing body of Asian and Latin American immigrants to America's original European, African, and Native American base. America is now the only nation that includes substantial populations from most parts of all the world's major continents.

America has historically been a country that has added without subtracting. It renews and broadens itself by bringing new immigrants and new ideas into a country that, at the same time, has an amazingly durable set of basic institutions and core values. American society functions under the oldest, continuously functioning written constitution in the world.

Finding the National Compass

Unfortunately, Americans seem in many respects to have lost their national compass somewhere on the road into the next millennium. They have great indigenous ethnic and sophisticated educational resources for a desperately needed deeper cultural understanding of the three great rising regions on the Eurasian landmass—Confucian East Asia, Hindu South Asia, and the world of Islam (each of which already comprises more than a billion people). But, at the same time, Americans have grown ever more lazy and rarely study foreign languages. Universities often now lack even a minimal foreign language requirement. Americans seem inclined to consider all foreign cultures more or less the same simply because airports, hotels, and television programs increasingly resemble one another everywhere. To the extent that Americans differentiate among foreign countries, it is mostly by economic statistics and stages of development.

While Americans behave as rigid monoculturalists abroad, they often seem to have become flabby multiculturalists at home. The great U.S. institutions of higher learning seem to have become indifferent to—at times even contemptuous of—their historic function of transmitting a basic understanding of their own culture from one generation to the next. In place of the expanding, inclusive America which adds without subtracting, the ideological multiculturalist would create a Balkanized America and a continuous process of subtraction from any sense of common tradition or shared values. This kind of multiculturalism is the denial rather than the fulfillment of true pluralism, which in the great American tradition assumes a variety of authentic, deep convictions rather than a monistic uniformity of relativistic indifference.

In any country that endures, there must be *unum* as well as *pluribus*; and precisely because Americans are (and should be) tolerant of great diversity, they have a special need to maintain a common language and to transmit a clearer understanding than the educational system has generally done in recent years of both America's durable constitutional system and its distinctively

Judeo-Christian roots. Bridges to other cultures will not be solid unless they begin with casements that are sunk deep in one's own native ground. And all branches of learning die if cut off from the roots that lie within that ground.

George Washington sounded the warning in his two great and unjustly neglected farewell addresses—first to the continental army that he commanded at the end of our War of Independence and, later, to the new nation at the end of his, the first, presidency. He pointed out that a free, self-governing system requires a basically moral people and that morality cannot be sustained without religion. Faith is the lighthouse that points the way as individuals navigate through life's storms and keeps the nation as a whole off those shoals that threaten shipwreck: freedom without responsibility, self-indulgence without charity, and rights without obligations.

The Old Testament is a chronicle of God's repeated and often painful reminders to His people that when responsibility is not engendered from within it will sooner or later be imposed from without. It is a story of those who were chosen by God to realize justice in time in a world where other peoples were merely extending power in space. The New Testament teaches that goodness can reach beyond time and even death if souls can ever learn to love others as God loved humanity in Jesus Christ.

Americans need better and deeper interfaith understanding, particularly among and within the line of prophetic monotheisms—which also, of course, includes Islam. That does *not* mean that faith ought to be diluted in a squishy swamp of New Age platitudes; nor should it be frozen on some haughty mountain peak of intolerant self-righteousness. It does mean, however, that Americans must not either collectively banish the dimension of faith from public culture (as the nation presently seems inclined to do) or individually avoid recognizing what St. Augustine called that self which is deeper within us than we ourselves and which leads us to confront the kind of God that acts not just in clouds of mystery but in lives and history. Faith in a living God can open new dimensions not just for living one's own life but for understanding the lives of others; it opens a window into the deepest—sometimes, alas, the darkest—but almost always the most powerful, source of human aspiration and motivation.

America needs to understand better what the many newly awakening peoples of our planet really believe. This requires more serious study of the art, folklore, and above all, religion of other human cultures. If Western leaders and publics had taken more seriously from the start the religious factor in the conflicts of the former Yugoslavia, for instance, they might have understood before so many lives were lost that there was a serious internal resistance to the Milosevic regime to work with, and that the primate of the Serbian Orthodox Church had the potential to play a central role.

One may or may not share the view that the near total divorce of American higher education from its Judeo-Christian roots during the last half century has been profoundly corrosive for the long-term health of American democracy. But at the very least one ought to grant the more modest point that the failure of the American educational and journalistic elite to take religion

seriously has left them totally ill-equipped to understand—let alone anticipate or even think possible—some of the most innovative political developments of the last twenty years: the rise of the Christian right in America, the explosion of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran, and the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union.

Moscow's Fateful Forty-Eight Hours

Let us zoom in on the last event: the fall of communism in Russia. I happened to be present in Moscow for the fateful forty-eight hours in August 1991 when no more than 150 armed professionals successfully faced down the world's largest armed forces in the capital of the world's largest empire. During those tense two days, one sensed everywhere the power of the new means of communication. The human wall that defended the Russian White House and the leader who mounted a tank were not responding to anyone's plan but spontaneously echoing earlier televised images from Lithuania and Beijing respectively. The heart of the resistance was the Xerox machine; its nerve center, a system of multiple electronic communication links with the outside world; its eyes and ears, the young television technicians whose instant documentaries legitimized the resistance in the manner of medieval chronicles; its key voices of persuasion, such implausible types as young priests, Afghan veterans, and provincial Siberians.

But another group played a key role that has never yet been adequately recognized: the *babushkas*, those old women with bandanas. I happened to be meeting with a large group of them—apolitical librarians—early on the second and decisive night of the crisis (August 20, 1991) when martial law and a death-sentence curfew were suddenly proclaimed over the putsch-controlled television. Spontaneously and without discussion, they all left the meetings—not to go home as they had been ordered, but to join the young men on the barricades and other elderly women who had been rebuking the soldiers in the tanks that surrounded the White House. Lacking clear orders from their military superiors, these young soldiers were now getting moral commands from a rival authority—their mothers.

What could otherwise have escalated into a macho contest of violence between the crew cuts in the tanks and their pony-tailed cousins on the barricades was headed off by precisely those “old women in church” whom Western observers no less than Soviet propagandists had so long patronizingly dismissed as symbolizing the impending death of religion in the USSR. Now here they were—shaming potential attackers, feeding the resisters, manning medical stations for the attack they expected, and refusing to leave when the faintly male chauvinist Afghan veterans insisted that women leave because fighting was near. At about midnight, the patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church broadcast a prayer to the Mother of God in honor of the approaching Feast of the Assumption; he anathematized fratricidal bloodshed and many of the old women began to pray. Perhaps those prayers did matter by those silent

surrogates of that Other Lady in whose heavenly rest many Russians felt there lay both the ultimate assurance of protection and the imminent possibility of miracles.

The attack never came, and by dawn of the third day the tide had turned—and yes, the sun came out after forty-eight hours of nearly continuous rain. Orthodox Christians are inclined to believe that we live in liturgical time. Boris Pasternak's *Dr. Zhivago* saw the communist revolution as a kind of late winter reenactment of the passion of Holy Week. The summer overthrow of communism occurred quite literally in the nine days between the feasts of the Transfiguration and of the Assumption.

The subsequent funeral procession for the three young defenders of the White House who were semi-accidentally killed celebrated both unity and pluralism. Sounds of the Orthodox "Eternal Memory" mixed with those of the Kaddish in honor of one of the victims who was Jewish. Orators repeatedly echoed the Judeo-Christian theme of the redemptive value of innocent suffering. The three boys were unconsciously likened to the first Russian saints, Boris and Gleb, the young sons of Russia's first Christian leader who voluntarily accepted death at an early age in order to overcome the divisions of their people.

The high point of the procession through Moscow came when Boris Yeltsin emerged from the White House, went directly to the parents of the three young men, and said: "Forgive me, your president, that I was unable to defend and save your sons." "Forgive me" is, of course, what one Russian says to whoever is next to him before taking communion. It was also what that other Boris, Tsar Boris Godunov, said to the Russian people in the last words of the greatest of all Russian operas. Power was being relegitimized morally. Someone not to blame was assuming responsibility in a society where no one in power had ever accepted responsibility for anything.

Of course, the Old Testament repeatedly teaches that God's miraculous deliverance from evil does not assure man's subsequent adherence to good. Since those exhilarating August days, Russians have in many ways been spiraling down into economic insecurity, crime, and corruption, seemingly stuck with the worst of both worlds: the authoritarian habits of their former totalitarian system and the disorder and indulgences of their new freedoms.

But it would be false to conclude that nothing has really changed or that there is simply something genetically totalitarian about the Russians. They have, in fact, experienced a revolution not in the violent, utopian, secular sense in which the word has generally been invoked since the French Revolution, but in the older sense that the word was used in the American Revolution: a "re-volution" or revolving back from a temporary tyranny to a preexisting normalcy.

The Spiritual Bridge

Russia's continuing, difficult search for a postcommunist legitimacy is not just a struggle between inward-looking and Westward-looking ideas, but a

**Americans are
tragically
unaware of
Russia's
struggle for its
soul.**

deeper battle within the Russian religious tradition between the recovery of its more inwardly spiritual, locally based, and communally participatory dimension on the one hand and the reassertion of a more familiar, imperial, autocratic dimension on the other—a tendency that might be called Orthodoxy without Christianity. America has an immense stake in the outcome because of the geopolitical dangers mentioned at the outset, and will be the object of future opprobrium if the Russian experiment in freedom fails. For Americans have

more ability to affect the outcome than they realize, let alone exercise, since they remain Russia's current focus of fascination and model for emulation. America cannot control the outcome, but should at least recognize that perhaps the decisive element in the process will be the way the Russian people come to grips with both the greatest Christian martyrology of the twentieth century during the first five decades of Soviet rule and the century's largest mass conversion to Christianity during this last decade. It is amazing and tragic that Americans in general and Christians in particular seem not to be even aware of—let alone

spiritually involved in—this spiritual struggle for the soul of a nation whose fate has for so long been intertwined with their own.

But let us return to the general point. If Americans cannot penetrate into the interior spiritual dialogue of other peoples, they will never be able to understand, let alone anticipate or affect, the discontinuous major changes which are the driving forces in history and which will probably continue to spring unexpected traps in the years ahead. To put it another way, if we cannot learn to listen to others as they whisper their prayers, we may well have to confront them later on when they howl their war cries.

Even if cultural gaps cannot be bridged, one becomes a better person and more appreciative of one's *own* culture by the very attempt to understand someone else's. I recently returned from China about whose past I am largely ignorant and about whose future I am not so optimistic as are many Americans. I was particularly moved in ancient Xian by one lonely stone slab which is all that remains of the Nestorian Christianity that penetrated China at the end of the first Christian millennium before disappearing without a trace. Halfway through the second millennium, the Christians came again in the most nearly successful attempt to bridge the gap between the West and China: the great Jesuit mission to China. When the Jesuits ultimately left in failure at the beginning of the eighteenth century (as America's own missionaries were forced to do when the communists took over in the twentieth), they left behind a moving epitaph.

Go now, voyager,
Congratulate the dead.
Console the living
Pray for everyone.
Wonder and be silent.

It is in prayer, wonder, and silence that one sometimes best finds understanding of others. I felt some of that as I wandered silently and alone through the streets of Moscow after experiencing the forty-eight exhilarating hours that shook the world in August 1991. People constantly repeated the word *chudo* (miracle) and marveled in whispers that Russia had been transformed on the Feast of the Transfiguration—the miraculous first appearance of Christ in a transformed state before His disciples on Mt. Tabor.

It was the persecuted literature and religion of Russia, not the vaunted megacomputers of the West, that saw it all coming. Even during the depths of the cold war Pasternak had written at the end of *Dr. Zhivago* that "Although victory had not brought the relief and freedom that were expected at the end of the war, nevertheless portents of freedom filled the air throughout the postwar period, and they alone defined its historical significance."

In the final poetic lines of the second epilogue of *Zhivago*, his last will and testament to the Russian people, Pasternak mixed images from the Volga basin and the deep, interior Christianity of Russia to suggest the ultimate victory of story over theory—of an old, still uncompleted Biblical story over the new atheistic theory that had been put into practice in Russia with such terrifying results.



You see, the passing of years is like a parable
Which can, at any time, catch fire along the way.
In the name of its terrible majesty
I go down, a voluntary victim, to my grave.
I go into my grave, and on the third day rise
And like little boats spread out across a river
Towards me and judgement, like a caravan of barges,
The centuries flow forward out of darkness.

"WORLD POLICY JOURNAL STANDS APART..."

"For freshness, originality, and provocative analysis,
World Policy Journal stands apart."
Ronald Steel, author of *Walter Lippmann and the American Century*.

Return the coupon below to receive your first issue of World Policy Journal.
Then pay only \$17.95 (over 40% off the newsstand price)
for four quarterly issues, or, write "cancel" on the invoice and owe nothing.
You may keep the issue for **FREE**, as our gift.

WORLD POLICY JOURNAL

*Winner in the
General Excellence
category of the
Utne Reader's 1995
Press Awards*

● An American Grand Strategy:
The Quest for Order in a Disordered World
Walter Russell Mead

● Global Culture and the American Cosmos
Orlando Patterson

● The "Costs" of Human Rights
Is Liberal Internationalism?

● The Consequences of Somalia
Indian Summer of Communism?

● The Coming Millennium
World Politics in the Twentieth Century
David Fromkin

● Cold War, Chill Peace, Middle East
A Global Culture? *David Fromkin*

YES, PLEASE START MY SUBSCRIPTION TO
WORLD POLICY JOURNAL
65 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10003

Name

Address

City

State

Zip

OVERSEAS ORDERS: ADD \$10 FOR SURFACE OR \$20 FOR AIR MAIL DELIVERY

♥ The New School
WORLD POLICY INSTITUTE

65 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10003 212 229 5808

NATO Expansion and the Idea of the West

by James Kurth

The summer of 1997 saw a momentous event in the history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and indeed of the West itself. This was NATO's formal invitation to three Central European countries—Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary—to become members of the alliance. The expansion of NATO has been the major foreign policy initiative of the second Clinton administration, and the entry of the three new members is expected to take effect in 1999. That year will be the fiftieth anniversary of the formation of NATO; it will also be the tenth anniversary of the collapse of NATO's historic and adversarial counterpart, the Warsaw Pact.

Three events, then, are linked in a narrative that is a grand and inspiring one. The first event, the formation of NATO, did much to bring about the second, the collapse of the Soviet bloc forty years later, and the second provided the opportunity for the third, the expansion of NATO to include the core members of the defunct Warsaw Pact (including Warsaw itself). This narrative culminates with the fulfillment, in our time and before our very eyes, of the inspiring vision and heroic determination of preceding generations of Western statesmen, especially those fabled American "Wise Men" who were "present at the creation." It is a fulfillment of two great historic ideas, the idea of Europe and the even broader idea of the West.

The cunning of history may be composing some ironic twists in this narrative, however. For the expansion of NATO may also bear some similarities with another great and even earlier event at the beginning of the cold war: the division of the Continent into Western and Eastern Europe at the Yalta Conference in 1945, which thereby submerged for more than forty years what had been Central Europe. If so, then the idea of Europe will not be reified, but abused. Further, the expansion of the Western project into Central Europe may be occurring at the very time that the concept of Western civilization itself has been discarded within NATO's central and essential power, the United States. If so, then the idea of the West will not be fulfilled, but abandoned.

James Kurth, professor of political science at Swarthmore College, recently returned from a trip to Central Europe. His many books and articles include "The Adolescent Empire: America and the Imperial Idea," in *The National Interest*, Summer 1997.

The Idea of Europe and the Question of the Eastern Frontier

One of the themes of the proponents of NATO expansion is that it will bring the new members back into Europe. This is an especially important and explicit theme for the new members themselves.

From its beginning, NATO was seen as the defender of Europe against the Soviet Union, the great power of an alien Eurasia. But it was always understood that a part of Europe—referred to as Eastern Europe—had been captured (the captive nations) by the Soviet Union, and that this was a great and historic injustice. Although it seemed that little could be done about this injustice at the time, the statesmen of the West—as varied as Truman, Eisenhower, Churchill, and de Gaulle—continued to look for ways to bring about more freedom for the captive nations and to return them to their rightful European home. Now, with the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into NATO (and eventually also into the European Union), these nations will have at last come home.

But, of course, there are several other nations that are indisputably European but that will still remain homeless, at least for a while. In particular, most European members of NATO wanted to add Romania (a favorite candidate of France) and Slovenia (a favorite candidate of Italy) to the list of three new members, but these two additions were opposed by the United States. Other nations, also European but lying further to the east (especially the Baltic states), also wish to join the alliance, but NATO has been vague about how, when, and even if they will be allowed to do so. It has become clear that the eastern boundary of NATO's Europe is itself very unclear.

The question of where the eastern boundary of Europe lies and what it means has been a perennial and disputed one, not just for today but for generations. It raises issues not only of diplomacy and strategy, but of culture and identity. At what point on an eastward journey does Europe fade away and Eurasia (or even Asia) loom ahead?

Metternich famously said, "Europe ends at the Landstrasse," i.e., at the road leading eastward out of Vienna. In saying so, he left out of his definition of Europe all of the Hungarian domains of the Habsburg empire, of which he was the chancellor. Conversely, de Gaulle spoke of "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals." Interpreted literally, his definition of Europe let Russia in but left America (and perhaps even Britain) out. The eastern boundary of Europe, then, may be found someplace between the definitions of Metternich (Vienna) and de Gaulle (the Urals). Between these two definitions is a vast region that has given rise to vast disputes. It is the region now comprising such varied countries as Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, the Balkan countries, the Baltic countries, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldavia, and, most controversial and consequential, Russia.

For many centuries, there was a broad consensus that the eastern boundary of Europe corresponded to the boundary between the Roman Catholic Church and the Eastern Orthodox churches. This in turn corresponded to the even more ancient boundary between the Western and the Eastern halves of the Roman Empire, first established by the Emperors Diocletian and Constantine.

By this boundary, the definition of what was European and what was Eurasian or Asian corresponded to one of the oldest definitions of what was Western and what was Eastern.

Within this definition of Europe, however, there had developed by the nineteenth century the idea that Europe was further divided into three parts—Western, Central, and Eastern. Western Europe or the West proper (Britain, France, the Low countries, but also Spain, Portugal, and the Scandinavian countries) was comprised of countries which, for the most part, touched upon the Atlantic. Many of them accordingly had acquired overseas or seaborne empires from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century. They were thus in some sense global, as well as European, powers.

Central Europe or *Mitteleuropa* (Germany and the Habsburg Empire, but also much of Italy) was comprised of countries which, for the most part, had once been included in that anomalous conglomeration, the Holy Roman Empire. These countries seemed to lag behind those to the west in important dimensions of modernity, such as national unity, liberal democracy, and industrial development (and overseas empire).

The most problematic area was Eastern Europe. It seemed to comprise those eastern reaches of Europe which had been acquired either by the Russian empire, the domain in which Europe turned into Eurasia, or by the Ottoman empire, the domain in which Europe turned into the Near East. The Russian empire had recently expanded westward into countries that seemed to be European in almost every sense (particularly in being either Roman Catholic or Protestant in religion), such as the Baltic countries of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and also much of Poland. The Ottoman empire much earlier had also expanded westward, but into countries that were not fully European (particularly in being Eastern Orthodox in religion), such as the Balkan countries of Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece. Seen in this perspective, Eastern Europe corresponded to some form of Eastern Orthodoxy, either rule by an Orthodox power (Russia) over Catholic and Protestant peoples or rule by a non-Orthodox power over Orthodox peoples (the Balkans). Eastern Europe thus was not really part of Europe proper (and of proper Europe). The admixture of Eastern Orthodoxy produced the anomaly of Eastern Europe.

The defeat of the Ottoman empire in the Balkan Wars and the collapse of the Russian empire in the First World War together freed these problematic or Eastern parts of Europe to become more European. This was most clear with the Baltic countries and Poland. Conversely, however, the collapse of the German and the Habsburg empires (the Central Powers of Central Europe) at the end of the First World War meant that some once-clear parts of Europe became less European. The Austrian territory of Slovenia and the Hungarian territory of Croatia (both Catholic) became part of Yugoslavia, which was dominated by Orthodox Serbia. Another Hungarian territory, Transylvania (which included large Catholic and Protestant communities), became part of Romania, which was largely Orthodox.

The collapse of German power at the end of the Second World War and the occupation of much of Central Europe by the Soviet Union meant that

additional once-clear parts of Europe became less European. Eastern Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary (all either Catholic or Protestant) ceased to be Central Europe and instead became Eastern Europe. As for the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), they appeared to fall away from Europe almost entirely, as they were incorporated once again into a Russian empire.

The New Eastern Europe and Old Northern Flank

The proposed expansion of NATO to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary has the virtue of including countries that were always indisputably part of Central Europe (with the Czech Republic, Hungary, and some of southern Poland historically being part of the Habsburg empire). But other parts of Central Europe (and of the Habsburg empire, namely Slovakia, Slovenia, and Croatia), will remain outside of NATO, at least for a while.

The most serious anomaly is once again the Baltic countries. The nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have had the historical misfortune to be culturally part of Central or even Western Europe (i.e., Lutheran or Catholic in religion), but geographically part of Eastern Europe (i.e., a vital strategic interest of Russia).

**NATOization of
the Baltics
would make
Russia
implacably
hostile.**

If NATO were to expand to include these three Baltic countries, it would drive Russia into an implacable hostility, while it would assume a commitment that would be militarily indefensible. However, if NATO does not include the three Baltic countries, it could leave adrift and unprotected nations which are clearly a part of Europe and Western civilization more generally. The Yalta division of Europe of 1945 could be recapitulated by the NATO division of Europe of 1999, with the new boundary between Western and Eastern Europe simply moved five hundred kilometers to the east.

A new Eastern Europe is thus about to be created with the expansion of NATO into Central Europe. It will comprise those countries that will lie between the expanded NATO and Russia. It will also present a difficult challenge for NATO's identity and for U.S. foreign policy.

One possible model for this new Eastern Europe may be found in the old Northern Europe that was once NATO's Northern Flank. The different security positions of Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Finland during the cold war are suggestive. Each of these four northern countries was politically independent of both the United States and the Soviet Union, but their strategic situations were quite different. Together, these differences formed a security continuum stretching from west to east.

Iceland was most fully integrated into NATO; it was both a member of the alliance and the site of a major U.S. air base. Norway was also a member of NATO, but it did not allow the stationing of NATO military forces on its territory, because northern Norway bordered upon the territory and the vital security interests of the Soviet Union. Norway did allow some prepositioning

of NATO military equipment, however, and Norwegian military forces engaged in regularly scheduled joint exercises with NATO forces.

Sweden was formally a neutral state, but it maintained a strong military capability of its own which could defend that neutrality. Finally, Finland also was formally a neutral state, but it would not have been able to defend that neutrality if the Soviets had ever undertaken military aggression against it. Consequently, Finland in practice was within the Soviet security zone or sphere of military influence.

These four Northern European countries thus spanned a West-East continuum between the NATO and the Soviet security realms. Together, they demonstrate that during the length and even the height of the cold war a wide range of different security relationships were possible, within a large region that lay between what was NATO in its fullest sense and what was the territory of the Soviet Union. Would it be possible and desirable for a comparable West-East continuum to develop in the new Eastern Europe between the NATO and the Russian security realms?

We can begin with the most important and central member of NATO other than the United States, which is Germany. It is a full member of NATO, but under the international agreements that permitted German unification in 1990, no NATO troops can be stationed on that part of German territory which formed the old East Germany (which is also the part of Germany closest to Russia). In this sense, the arrangement for eastern Germany after the cold war has some similarities with the arrangement for Norway during the cold war.

The current understandings between NATO and Russia in regard to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are comparable. NATO has stated that it does not intend to station NATO forces in the territory of these three new members. NATO also has stated that it does not intend to place nuclear weapons in these countries and that it does not intend to convert military bases of the Warsaw Pact into NATO bases. These two additional stipulations, however, are implied in the first one. The current understandings in regard to the three new members, then, have similarities with the post-cold war arrangement for the eastern part of Germany and with the cold war arrangement for Norway.

Had the three Central European countries remained outside of NATO altogether, one might have imagined them (especially Poland) assuming a role similar to that of Sweden during the cold war. They would have been politically independent and culturally and economically connected with the rest of Europe. But they also might have been militarily neutral, with Poland and perhaps the other two having sufficiently strong military forces to put up a defense of that neutrality. None of the countries of the new Eastern Europe, however, are capable of assuming a Swedish-style neutrality. They are all either too divided and unstable (Ukraine) or too small (e.g., the Baltic states, Slovakia, and the Balkan states).

Rather, it is the role of Finland during the cold war that may provide the most relevant model for the new Eastern Europe. Like Finland, some countries could be politically independent and militarily neutral, but still fall within the Russian security zone or sphere of military influence. This is very

likely the Russian intention in regard to the Baltic states and Ukraine. Since this would be so clearly in the vital security interest of Russia, it was already its intention prior to the NATO expansion project. Russia will, however, now see the Finlandization of the Baltic states and Ukraine as its necessary compensation for the NATOization of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.

The recent developments in Belarus can serve as an illustration of another, more negative model for the new Eastern Europe. In the last two years, Russia and Belarus have concluded agreements about economic and political coordination that render Belarus no longer a truly independent state, but instead an autonomous dependency of Russia (rather like Poland or Czechoslovakia were of the Soviet Union).

The real issue and practical choice for the Baltic states and for Ukraine is whether they will become like Finland or like Belarus. The task for NATO and for American leadership within it is not to bring about a second or third wave of NATO expansion that will extend to the Baltics and to Ukraine. This is not possible, given the Russian hostility and the military indefensibility that it would entail. The Baltic states and Ukraine cannot be NATOized; they can, however, be Finlandized. With astute and consistent diplomacy on the part of the United States and on the part of the countries themselves, they may achieve not just the security position of Finland during the cold war, but the even more independent security position of Finland today.¹ It is worth noting that, for all the talk about the necessity of NATO expansion for the security of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, there has been no talk about the necessity of NATO expansion for the security of Finland.

The Baltic countries and Ukraine do face difficulties that are greater than those of Finland, however. Each contains a large Russian minority population (ranging from 10 percent in Lithuania, 25 percent in Ukraine, 30 percent in Estonia, to 35 percent in Latvia), whereas Finland does not. Further, their history of independence or autonomy from Russia has been shorter and less robust than that of Finland.

The best way to confirm that the Baltic countries are an integral and valued part of Europe would be to admit them, like Finland and other European neutrals in recent years, into the European Union. However, the union acts more in accordance with narrow economic interests than with a broad idea of Europe. It continues to put up delays to membership for even Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. It is very unlikely that the European Union will soon fulfill its European responsibilities to the Baltic states. This makes even more important the actions of the United States. But as we shall see below, it is very unlikely that the United States will fulfill what might be called its Western responsibilities.

¹ For a detailed discussion of practical measures for the Baltic states, see Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick, "NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States," *Survival*, Summer 1998, pp. 121–42.

The Idea of the West and the Question of American Commitment

During its early years, NATO did not have to concern itself much with the question of what was the eastern boundary of Europe. The boundary that counted was the frontier between what was then Western Europe and Eastern Europe. At the time, the concern was rather with the western boundary of Europe, that is, how to think about the relationship between Europe and the United States.

As we have noted, from its beginning NATO was seen as the defender of Europe. But this conception did not provide a sufficiently robust base for the participation of NATO's most important member, the United States. Although the two world wars seemed to demonstrate that Europe was essential to American security interests, this kind of strategic argument was not always compelling outside of the U.S. foreign-policy establishment. Something else, more like a philosophical world view than a strategic calculation, was needed to provide the broad popular base for a comprehensive and consistent American commitment to NATO over the long run. It was not enough for America to be just the defender of Europe; it would be best if America was itself a part of Europe, or rather if Europe and America together were parts of something that was even bigger and that they shared between themselves.

As it happened the concept for this something bigger was already available. This was Western civilization or more simply "the West." The idea of the West had been much discussed in both Europe and the United States since the beginning of the twentieth century, it had high prestige among some academic elites, and it had just the right contours to hold both Europe (particularly what was coming to be called Western Europe) and North America.

The idea of the West particularly seemed to fit the original twelve members of NATO when it was formed in 1949. Since these countries bordered upon the North Atlantic (the only exceptions were Italy and Luxembourg), they could also be seen as "the Atlantic community," but Western civilization or the West was an idea that had far more compelling power.

The purpose of NATO or the Atlantic Alliance thus was not just to defend Europe against the Soviet Union. NATO was also the defender of the West against the East, or more particularly of Western civilization against Eastern backwardness, tyranny, even barbarism. The formation of NATO was closely connected and clearly legitimated with the spread of the idea of Western civilization, and with the spread of academic courses which were based upon this idea and which were taught within American universities.

The strength of the idea of Western civilization was multifold. It lay first in the grandeur of its cultural traditions and the attractiveness of its political freedoms. But it also lay in the close congruence between the boundary of Western civilization and the boundary of the vital interests of the United States. These interests lay largely within the North Atlantic region and the member states of NATO. Indeed, there was a symbolic relationship between (1) the idea of Western civilization, (2) the vital interests of the United States, and (3) the

membership of the Atlantic Alliance. This symbolic relationship was greatly strengthened by the close congruence among the boundaries of the three.

In later decades, however, the strong U.S. support for the idea of Western civilization would be undermined by two great changes. One was the steady growth of U.S. interests, especially economic ones, outside the boundary of the West. The other was the steady growth of cultural diversity, especially multicultural ideology, inside the United States itself. By the 1970s, these changes had brought about the decline of the idea of the West among much of the American elite. By the 1990s, they had brought about its total displacement.

As the United States developed vital interests outside the North Atlantic region or NATO, a contradiction developed between the Western definition of U.S. ideals and the more-than-Western definition of U.S. interests. This occurred steadily in the decades after the original formation of NATO and articulation of the idea of the West. The United States already had some vital interests in Latin America and in East Asia in 1949, and these became ever more prominent in later years.

At first, U.S. interests in Latin America could be accommodated within the Western idea. Since Latin America was Latin and therefore in a sense European, it could be interpreted as a part of the West. In later decades, however, Latin America's self-definition became less European and Western and more "Third World" and "native American." A continued emphasis by U.S. business and political elites on the idea of Western civilization would have had the effect of leaving out Latin America (and U.S. interests in Latin America).

Similarly, at first U.S. interests in East Asia could be accommodated within the Western idea, because they were so much focused within Japan. Since Japan was clearly the most modernized or "Westernized" country in Asia and since it was clearly subordinated to the United States, it could be interpreted as a part of the West. However, the massive expenditure of American blood and treasure in the Korean War and the Vietnam War could not easily be seen as in defense of Western civilization. Later on, and especially in the last two decades, economic growth in East Asia spread so widely that there was no way that it could be fitted into the definition of the West. Again, a continued emphasis by U.S. business and political elites on the idea of Western civilization would have had the effect of leaving out East Asia (and U.S. interests in East Asia).

With the spread and growth of U.S. economic interests outside the boundary of the West, the idea of Western civilization became too confining to serve as an adequate legitimization for those interests. There developed a need for an idea that was more universal, that could fit the more universal spread of U.S. interests. Claims by Americans that their ideas and values were universal could not be sustained so long as they had attached to them the name "Western civilization," or "the West." These very terms meant that the ideas and values could not be universal to the East (e.g., East Asia) or to the South (e.g., Latin America). It became necessary to displace the term Western civilization with something else, just as Western civilization had earlier displaced the term Europe. What could this new term be?

Seen in this context, it is clear how useful was the idea of human rights. "Human" was far more universal than "Western," and "rights" fit the American values of individualism and liberalism far more than "civilization." Compared to the idea of "human rights," the idea of "Western civilization" was positively parochial and authoritarian. It was no accident that American political leaders ceased to use the idea of Western civilization about the same time that they began to use without ceasing the idea of human rights, i.e., the 1970s.

The idea of human rights has become the new American creed. The universal pretensions of the American definition of human rights make it a fitting creed for "the only universal nation," which is how some American elites now conceive of the United States.

**The idea of
human rights
has become
the new
American
creed.**

This new American creed which focuses upon human rights around the world, like the earlier American creed which focused upon freedom of opportunity within the United States itself, is a secular one. These two secular American creeds, however, have features which can be recognized as bearing marks inherited from the original American religious creed of Protestantism. Individualism, liberalism, and human rights may appear to be universal values (particularly to individualists and liberals), but they are more likely to issue from a secularized Protestant society than from a secularized Confucian, Islamic, Eastern Orthodox, or even a secularized Catholic one. Conversely, communitarianism, authoritarianism, and social order can claim to be universal values too, even though they also can be recognized as bearing the marks of particular earlier religious creeds such as Confucianism, Islam, or Eastern Orthodoxy.

The Growth of Multicultural Ideology in the United States

Parallel to the growth of U.S. economic interests abroad has been the growth of cultural diversity at home. Whereas the external change caused the business elite to abandon the idea of the West, the internal change caused the intellectual elite also to abandon this idea. While the business elite thinks of the United States as a multinational economy, the intellectual elite thinks of it as a multicultural society.

This internal change came about in part because of the change in U.S. immigration law in 1965 and the subsequent large increase in the Latino American and the Asian American populations of the United States. It also built upon the civil rights movement of the 1960s and the subsequent change in the status of African Americans.

The preferred cultures of the intellectual elite are now those of African Americans, Latino Americans, and Asian Americans. These cultures are derived from African, Latin American, Confucian, and Islamic civilizations rather than from Western civilization. Together, they form a sort of series of beachheads or even colonies of these civilizations on the North American continent, and they have successfully contested the hegemony there of Western civilization.

The increased presence and influence of African Americans, Latino Americans, and Asian Americans were sufficient to create a multicultural ideology by the 1980s and 1990s. But these three groups alone probably would not have been sufficient to have that ideology adopted by much of the American intellectual and political elites, or to have it translated into academic and government policies aimed at establishing a multicultural society. Even a grand coalition among them would not have been grand enough to win power and make policy. A truly grand coalition had to include, indeed had to have at its core, a group that was much closer in social and educational background to the existing elites and much more central to the new economy that was based upon information rather than upon manufacturing. That group, which was not really a group but was actually a majority of the population, was women, and the movement that claimed (often inaccurately) to speak for them was feminism.

The feminist movement has been central to the multicultural coalition and its project. It has provided the numbers, having reached a critical mass first in academia and now in the media and the law. It has promoted the theories, such as deconstructionism and postmodernism. And it has provided much of the energy, the leadership, and the political clout.

The multicultural coalition and its feminist core despise Western civilization, which they see as the work of “dead white European males” or “DWEMs.” Their multicultural project has already succeeded in marginalizing Western civilization in its very intellectual core, the universities, and the media of the United States.

The core ideas in the intellectual critique of Western civilization are deconstructionism and postmodernism. These were invented by French intellectuals in the 1960s and 1970s and then adopted by American academics in the 1980s. The American academic elite has deconstructed Western civilization and has constructed instead a multicultural (often more an anticultural) ideology. It has displaced the modern idea of the West and replaced it with a disparate collection of postmodern, post-Western ideas. In effect, the West has been displaced by the post-West within the brain of Western civilization, the American intellectual class.

This displacement of the West has now spread to the American body politic. American politics has long been defined by the contest between a liberal and a conservative movement. Despite their differences, however, both of these movements were once supporters of the idea of the West. Among liberals now, however, the political energy is found among multicultural activists, who hold Western civilization in contempt. Among conservatives now, the political energy is found among religious believers, who are critical of a Western civilization which has become so secular. Neither these liberals nor these conservatives are believers in Western civilization as it exists today. The liberals identify with multicultural society or a culture that is post-Western. The conservatives identify with Christianity or a culture that is pre-Western.

The question thus arises as to who in the United States still does believe in Western civilization? There is no large and powerful group that provides an obvious answer. Thus, at the very moment of its greatest triumph, the defeat

of the last great power which opposed it and the eastward expansion of its central institution, Western civilization in effect has been abandoned by the great power which was long its principal defender.

NATO Expansion and the Search for a Supporting Idea

The abstract question about who believes in Western civilization has practical consequences for any sustained American commitment to an enlarged NATO. If NATO's original formation was buttressed by the idea of Western civilization, what idea can buttress NATO's current expansion?

Clearly, the two old ideas—the idea of Europe and the idea of the West—are insufficient for the new task. The expansion of NATO into Central Europe can certainly be justified by the idea of Europe, but we have seen that this idea was never big and compelling enough to convince many Americans to put their blood and treasure at risk for the defense of particular European territories. It took the broader idea of the West to build and sustain a broader base for American support of NATO.

The expansion of NATO into Central Europe can also be justified by the idea of the West, but we have also seen that this idea is no longer big and compelling enough to convince Americans to put anything substantial at risk, particularly for the defense of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.

The reigning ideas among American elites today, including human rights and multiculturalism, could theoretically justify NATO expansion into Central Europe. But these ideas are so universal and abstract that they could apply to the expansion of NATO almost anywhere, not just into Eastern Europe but even into Russia and beyond. Indeed, given the prominence of African Americans, Latino Americans, and Asian Americans in the multicultural ideology, it would seem to justify creating new institutions like NATO for Africa, Latin America, and Asia.

Of course, the creation of new military alliances is hardly on the agenda of the current multicultural coalition. Although African Americans, Latino Americans, and Asian Americans have achieved great success by serving in the U.S. military, the liberal leadership of the multicultural coalition despises not only NATO, but all military institutions.

Likewise, the limits of human rights as a supporting idea has been demonstrated in the problematical military operations undertaken by the Clinton administration in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. Human rights was the only idea common to these three cases, but even Clinton officials acknowledged that it was not compelling enough to the American people or the U.S. Congress to provide solid and prolonged support for these peacemaking interventions. The designers of these interventions in the name of human rights had to insure that there would be almost no American casualties and that the operations would last for only a short duration. Operations thus designed have little in common with the military scenarios that were designed for the old NATO, and no one has made the case that they would fit the needs of the new, expanded NATO.

Even Bosnia's ethnic conflicts have little relevance to NATO's three new members, since these are among the most ethnically homogenous countries in the world.

The ideas that are most relevant to NATO expansion are liberal democracy and free markets. The political institutions of liberal democracy and the economic institutions of free markets are a clear and concrete legacy of Western civilization as it has developed since the Enlightenment and as it has been shaped by American power during the twentieth century. The grand cultural achievements of Western civilization may have been abandoned, but making the world safe for democracy is an idea that still has some compelling power for many Americans. The trouble here is that this would imply that the United States should also make "safe" successful democracies in the Baltic states and beyond.

The United States versus Western Civilization

There is a certain irony in the United States searching for a new legitimating idea for NATO to replace the old legitimating idea of Western civilization. For in some respects, the United States itself has become the great power that opposes much of what was once thought of as Western civilization, especially its cultural achievements and its social arrangements. The major American elites—those in politics, business, the media, and academia—now use American power, especially the "soft power" of information, communications, and popular entertainment, to displace Western civilization not only in America but also in Europe. They attack and mock any traditional European authorities, such as religion, nations, families, and high culture. In their stead, they promulgate the current American ideas of human rights, multiculturalism, expressive individualism, and popular culture.

It is the American popular culture that is especially destructive of what was once defined as Western civilization. American popular culture presents as its normative human types the star entertainer and athlete. It exalts the personal qualities of inherent talent, self-centeredness, frantic energy, and aggressiveness. These are the distinguishing qualities of an adolescent, not of a mature person. It is no accident that adults in America are increasingly adopting the qualities of adolescents—particularly self-centeredness and aggressiveness—even in the elite professions, and that the most pervasive rule of American styles, fads, and fashions in Europe and around the world is found among adolescents.

Elite Americans imagine themselves as advancing the ideas of human rights, multiculturalism, and expressive individualism. They might even claim that these ideas are the best, perhaps the only worthy, legacy of Western civilization. In fact, they are subverting not only the traditions of the West, but of all civilizations. It is not surprising that some of these civilizations, especially the Islamic and the Confucian ones, have mounted various forms of resistance to these American ideas. Samuel Huntington has referred to this as "the clash of civilizations" involving "the West against the rest." But it also may be a clash

between all civilizations: both the West and the rest on the one hand—and anticivilization, the actual behavior of many Americans today, on the other.


This new and anti-Western character of the American elite has implications for the grand project of a new and expanded NATO. The new NATO will not be based upon any vision or idea comparable to the Western civilization of the old NATO. That idea helped to build conviction among NATO's most important support, the American people, and to build credibility with NATO's most important adversary, the Soviet Union. That conviction and credibility in turn enabled NATO not only to protect its own members but also to support other countries whose geographical position precluded NATO membership but whose cultural identity was clearly Western, such as Finland, Sweden, and Austria.

The new NATO will lack the old vision and indeed will have no authentic and coherent union at all. It is mostly the product of bureaucratic momentum and political calculations. It therefore will have little conviction among the American people and little credibility with a Russia that one day will regain the strength to assert its interests.

The new and expanded NATO thus will bring with it two dangers. First, NATO will have undertaken a commitment to its three new Central European members—Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary—without the conviction and credibility needed to sustain that commitment in bad times as well as good. Even more ominously, it may have induced Russia to exact compensation from countries that must remain outside of NATO, most obviously the three democratic Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.

The new NATO, as led by the new United States, thus is not likely to be the true fulfillment of the grand vision of the old NATO. It is more likely to be a contradiction of that vision—by putting the Baltic peoples at risk, by giving the Central European peoples a membership devoid of meaning, and by opening up a new gap between the foreign policies of the American elite and the international convictions of the American people.





★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

A stunning rethinking of America's historic role in the world and of the current battle to shape the future of American foreign policy in the post-cold war world

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

"In his sweeping history of U.S. foreign policy, Walter McDougall advances a thoughtful new view of America's conduct of world affairs over 200 years. In illuminating the varying principles that have governed our international relations, *Promised Land, Crusader State* provides a valuable guide for today's policymakers."

— HENRY A. KISSINGER

"*Promised Land, Crusader State* is a masterpiece of historical analysis and foresight, likely to be compared to George Kennan's "Source of Soviet Conduct" written long ago, in 1947, at another palpable moment of transition in U.S. foreign policy."

— DAVID EISENHOWER

Promised Land, Crusader State, by the Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Walter A. McDougall, is an iconoclastic reinterpretation of the traditions that have shaped U.S. foreign policy from 1776 to the present. Entertaining, fast-paced, and learned, it exposes the myths that obscure the real meaning of such concepts as American Exceptionalism, Isolationism, Manifest Destiny, Wilsonianism, and Containment. Looking back over two centuries, McDougall draws a striking contrast between America as a Promised Land, a vision inspired by the "Old Testament" of our diplomatic wisdom through the nineteenth century, and the contrary vision of America as a Crusader State, which inspired the "New Testament" of our foreign policy beginning at the time of the Spanish-American War and reaching its fulfillment in Vietnam. To this day, these two visions and these two testaments battle for control of the way America sees its role in the world.

ISBN 0-395-83085-0 / \$25.00

304 PAGES / 6 x 9 / APRIL

 Houghton Mifflin Company

Images of the Coming International System

by Robert E. Harkavy

The astonishing fact about the end of the cold war is that the events of 1989–92 ushered in a new international system, perhaps for the first time in history, without a hegemonic war. The unraveling of the Soviet empire was, of course, the centerpiece of this change, ending as it did forty-five years of bipolar, global ideologically driven conflict and giving birth to—what? If indeed the present new era of history has any defining feature it is surely the widespread confusion over how to characterize contemporary global politics and project trends and scenarios into the future. Thus, Henry Kissinger recently stated that “never before have the components of world order, their capacity to interact and their goals all changed quite so rapidly, so deeply, or so globally.”¹ In the same vein, Stanley Hoffman has stated that we live today in “a completely unprecedented world. It’s very difficult to call this world anything . . . when you don’t know what a thing is, you call it post—something else.”²

Nowadays, policymakers and academic theorists alike purvey a profuse variety of clashing and contradictory classifications, theories, images, paradigms, and historical analogies, in every case bereft of the familiar signposts once provided by a clear ideological spectrum.³ Former political antagonists now often sing from the same page, while former cold war bedfellows have drifted apart and embraced new identifications and alignments. No two observers seem to agree on whether the present indefinable international system will itself

¹ Henry Kissinger, “How to Achieve the New World Order,” *Time*, Mar. 14, 1994, p. 73, an excerpt from a then-forthcoming book, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).

² Quoted in James Atlas, “Name That Era: Pinpointing a Moment on the Map of History,” *The New York Times*, Mar. 19, 1995, p. E1.

³ The classic mapping of the relationship between an ideological spectrum and a methodological one is in Gabriel Almond, “Separate Tables: Schools and Sects in Political Science,” *PS*, Fall 1988, pp. 828–42. For analyses of the emerging post–Cold War spectrum of political/ideological views on U.S. foreign policy, see Alan Tonelson, “Beyond Left and Right,” *The National Interest*, Winter 1993/94, pp. 3–18; Charles Krauthammer, “The Poverty of Realism,” *New Republic*, Feb. 17, 1986, pp. 14–22; George Weigel, “On the Road to Isolationism?” *Commentary*, Jan. 1992, pp. 36–42; and Alexander Nacht, “U.S. Foreign Policy Strategies,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1995, pp. 195–210.

Robert E. Harkavy is a Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University and an associate of that university’s Institute for Policy Research and Evaluation (IPRE). He recently authored (with Geoffrey Kemp) *Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East* (Brookings Institution Press, 1997).

exhibit more or less stability than did the bipolar system, or whether the current period will prove to be only a brief interregnum, and thus not really a “system” at all. Kissinger, for instance, has stated that the new world order “is still in a period of gestation, and its final form will not be visible until well into the next century.”⁴

Competing Images of the Emerging System

The profuse literature on the state of post–cold war international politics appears to offer seven discrete images, models, or paradigms which, their proponents assert, succeed in capturing the fundamentals of the emerging international reality. They include:

The three-bloc neo-mercantilist thesis, a.k.a., geoeconomics.

The multipolar balance of power model hinged on the traditional “realist” and/or neo-realist frameworks.

The controversial “clash of civilizations” thesis.

The unipolar dominance model, related to the traditional geopolitical “long cycle” theory and to theories of “hegemonic stability.”

The “zones of peace” versus “zones of turmoil” model based on the apparently widening gulf between the developed and developing worlds.

The “global village” model based on the apparent shift of power and sovereignty from nation-states to international or non-governmental organizations, and the growth of functional global regimes.

The bipolar-redux model anticipating either a future challenge to U.S. dominance by China, Russia, Japan, or Europe, or a return to some sort of bipolar bloc structure.

These seven models do not exhaust the possibilities, nor are they necessarily mutually exclusive. Samuel Huntington himself suggests that a world otherwise defined by the “clash of civilizations” might be alternatively characterized by (1) “One World: Euphoria and Harmony,” (2) “Two Worlds: Us and Them,” (3) “184 States, More or Less,” or (4) “Sheer Chaos.” The first parallels

⁴ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 806. Kissinger sees the last several centuries as having had three long definable “systems” or eras: the order that grew out of the Peace of Westphalia that lasted for 150 years, the 100 years of the system created by the Congress of Vienna and (after the twenty-year-long Versailles “armistice”) the forty-plus-years-long cold war.

Francis Fukuyama's "end of history" thesis predicated on the global acceptance of representative government and market economics. The second involves several possible bifurcations, i.e., between rich and poor, zones of peace and turmoil, or the West and the rest.⁵ The third is derived from the classic "realist" theory of international relations, while the fourth is more or less congruent with the "zones of turmoil" thesis which predicts breakdowns of governmental authority, breakups of states, ethnic and tribal conflicts, refugee nightmares, proliferation, and terrorism across much of the developing world. Alexander Nacht, meanwhile, offers a typology consisting of "the end of history," "the clash of civilizations," balance of power, the primacy of economics, and a final catch-all category of "humanitarianism and global trends" focusing on issues such as resource allocation, the environment, and world population.⁶

The Three-Bloc Geoeconomics Model

The theory that held sway in the early years of the Clinton administration posited a new international system in which geoeconomics replaced geopolitics as the most crucial determinant of the rise or decline of nations, and that military power was thus becoming increasingly less relevant, hence wasteful, in the context of global competition. Some writers have spied in this current shift an expression of a long-established historical cyclicity characterized by periods in which national security dominates the agendas of major powers and periods in which those same powers have tended, relatively speaking, to compete through trade and investment.⁷ On the other hand, some analyses have claimed that traditional balance of power politics, stressing the primacy of national security, are never absent. Looking at the period since 1989, when the Soviet empire effectively collapsed, they would be inclined to predict that a temporary interregnum during which the major powers attempt to act in concert will inevitably give way to renewed discord among those powers and a return to a classic balance of power.⁸

Still other analysts, heralding the advent of geoeconomics as the central game of international politics, have abjured notions of cyclicity in favor of a linear view that borders on teleology. Hence the "end of history" thesis, which holds that the ideological conflicts that dominated the global stage since the 1930s, if not since the French Revolution, will now disappear, to be superseded by milder economic rivalries.⁹ The assumption of this happy thesis is, of course, that modern democratic states with high levels of per capita income will not

⁵ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), pp. 29–35.

⁶ Nacht, "U.S. Foreign Policy Strategies," pp. 198–202; see also Council on Foreign Relations, *The New Shape of World Politics: Contending Paradigms in International Relations* (New York: Foreign Affairs, 1997).

⁷ Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State* (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

⁸ Richard Rosecrance, "A New Concert of Powers," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1992, pp. 64–82.

⁹ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

contemplate fighting each other, and instead embrace what Karl Deutsch first termed a "security community."¹⁰

Central to the geoeconomics imagery, as expressed in the writings of Walter Russell Mead, Jeffrey Garten, Edward Luttwak, Lester Thurow, and others, is the belief that the world is evolving into three competitive economic blocs including (1) a Japan-led Pacific Rim region including Korea, Southeast Asia, and presumably China; (2) a U.S.-led Western Hemisphere bloc centered on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and potentially encompassing Latin America; and (3) a German-centered European bloc, assumed to include Russia and other ex-Soviet states and perhaps also North Africa.¹¹ In this way, the less-developed expanses of Africa and South Asia, not to mention the Middle East, are relegated to the status of neocolonial resource zones to be courted by the three major blocs.¹²

The "three-bloc" image is fetching, but flies in the face of the presumed trend toward global interdependence, multinationalized industry, and free flows of investment, production, and marketing. In short, it may be too state-centric, too prone to viewing trade as occurring between nations rather than between firms operating in a complex global environment.¹³ But Thurow brushes aside that caveat, predicting that:

In the race ahead, one of the three great economic powers is apt to pull ahead of the other two. Whichever pulls ahead is apt to stay ahead. That country or region of the globe will own the twenty-first century in the sense that the United Kingdom owned the nineteenth century and the United States owned the twentieth century.¹⁴

Mead, Garten, and Thurow all attempt to analyze the inherent advantages, disadvantages, and trade-offs associated with each of the three blocs in the competitive struggle they assume will occur. These comparative advantages are seen as rooted variously in factors of size, location, demographics, culture, and political acumen. And, indeed, both Mead and Thurow seem to suspect that the U.S.-led bloc may ultimately be the weakest and the European bloc the strongest.

¹⁰ Karl Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957).

¹¹ Walter Russell Mead, "On the Road to Ruin," *Harper's*, Mar. 1990, pp. 59–64; Jeffrey Garten, *A Cold Peace* (New York: Times Books, 1992); Edward Luttwak, *The Endangered American Dream* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993); and Lester Thurow, *Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe and America* (New York: Morrow, 1992).

¹² The role of the Middle East as the strategic prize and high ground in the emerging system is discussed in Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy, *Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East* (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), esp. chap. 1.

¹³ Economist Paul Krugman has also criticized this model implicitly in faulting President Clinton's economic advisors for having overemphasized the role of competitiveness between the three blocs as a central cause of American economic problems. See Steven Pearlstein, "The Bad Boy of Economics," *The Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, Apr. 11–17, 1994, pp. 19–20.

¹⁴ Thurow, *Head to Head*, p. 246.

Mead believes that Europe has a vested interest in bloc politics rather than an open global economy. Hence as the former Soviet-bloc countries move toward market economies, they may serve as sources of low-wage industries for Europe, paralleling the respective roles of Mexico and Southeast Asia for the United States and Japan. Such a Europe could also import raw materials from Africa and Russia, and oil from the Middle East and the former USSR. Such a Euro-bloc would have large agricultural surpluses, especially as ex-Soviet-bloc agriculture was made more efficient. Europe would also move ahead rapidly to develop high-technology industries and thus have little need for goods or services from Asia or the Americas.

Thurow concurs, asserting that "While having been the slowest mover in the 1980s, Europe starts the 1990s with the strongest strategic position on the world economic chessboard," and that if it makes the right moves, it can become the dominant economic power in the twenty-first century, regardless of what Japan and the United States do.¹⁵ As he points out, some 850 million people could come to comprise the "House of Europe," and that they are the "only 850 million people on the face of the globe that are both well educated and start out not poor."¹⁶ He stresses the overall high levels of education in Europe, and notes the synergy among Germany's production capabilities, the science-oriented former Soviet educational system, the design flair of Italy and France, and the world-class London capital market.

Mead sees the Japan-led Asian bloc limiting U.S. technological exports and exploiting the Americas largely as a source of raw materials and market for industrial goods. Japan would move further toward the import of raw materials and low-end manufactured products from China and Southeast Asia, while trading manufactured goods for oil with the Middle East. It would also continue to export capital goods and high-technology products to all these markets plus NAFTA and Oceania in an (asymmetric) exchange for food, minerals, and entertainment products.

Thurow, writing before the bursting of the Japanese bubble, stresses the dominance of Japan's banks, its status as the world's largest net creditor, its world-record trade surplus, and its propensity to invest in plant and equipment (per employee) at a rate triple that of the United States and twice that of Europe. He also stresses Japan's educational levels, particularly its ability to educate the bottom half of its high school classes. To be sure, Japan has a smaller domestic market than the United States or Europe, but according to Thurow, "Cohesion and homogeneity give Japan an ability to focus its economic might that few others can rival. No nation can organize better to march toward well thought-out common goals."¹⁷

The U.S.-led NAFTA, by contrast, has serious disadvantages that Mead believes are likely to land it in third place. It has fewer real customers than

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 251

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 252.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 247.

Europe given the long-term economic stagnation of much of Latin America and the fact that much of Latin America is only weakly tied to the United States and loath to break its traditional ties to Europe and emerging ties to Japan. The U.S.-led bloc is also dangerously dependent on Middle Eastern oil and the U.S. dollar is vulnerable given its continuing role as the key international currency and the magnitude of the U.S. external debt. Mead even predicts that world trade will eventually shift out of dollars into yen and the new European currency.

Thurow grants that the United States will remain the world's military superpower into the next century, but notes that "To be a double superpower, [the United States] will have to be willing to invest what others invest in being economic superpowers and, on top of that, make whatever investments are necessary to remain a military superpower."¹⁸ On the plus side, Thurow lists America's stock of real economic assets, its superior per capita income and average productivity, its universities, and a domestic market which is "far larger than that of Japan and far more homogeneous than that of Europe."¹⁹ It also has cultural strengths as "the country where it is easiest for outsiders to become insiders" and one that historically responds magnificently to crises. On the negative side, he points to America's atrophied educational system, international debts, low levels of civilian R and D, and decaying infrastructure. The United States must therefore shift dramatically from consumption to investment, and solve the educational problems associated with its non-college workforce. Finally, Thurow agrees with Mead that Latin America is not much of an asset in global competition.

A number of general criticisms may be directed at this three-bloc thesis. Not only have its proponents underestimated the multinationalization of production and trade, they may have underestimated some of the political fault lines within the putative regional blocs. In Asia, for instance, it is far from clear that a rapidly rising China, or sullen but strong Korea, can be folded into a Japan-led Asia bloc. And despite rumors about huge oil and gas reserves in the South China Sea, Asia remains as dependent on Middle Eastern oil as the United States and Europe. (The three-bloc thesis also ignores the possibility that still grander economic blocs, such as that pursued by members of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum [APEC], may span the oceans.)

Europe, too, may suffer from political cleavages. German dominance is widely feared, Britain may not prove willing to throw in its lot completely with the continent, and Russia's future remains up for grabs, both with respect to its domestic political regime and its relations with the "near abroad." The European Union may or may not be on the road to full integration, and the specter of a growing fault line between Islam and the secularized West may raise questions about whether the incipient Eurobloc could achieve the preferential access to Middle East oil predicted by Mead.

Perhaps the most glaring weakness of the three-bloc thesis, however, is that some of its key assumptions have already been disproved by events. In

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 254.

¹⁹ Ibid.

the past few years the U.S. economy, far from exhibiting the traits of permanent decline, has rebounded sharply and is again the world's most efficient in terms of productivity. At the same time, Germany and most of Europe have been plagued by stagnation and unemployment born of the excesses and built-in inflexibilities of their social welfare states, their aging populations, and the fiscal austerity required to achieve the single European currency. Ironically, the costs of becoming the almighty "bloc" feared by Thurow are sapping Europe's strength. The Japanese, meanwhile, have not only seen their 1980s bubble burst, they are at a loss as to how to reform and revive their state-led economy. Growth remains low, their banks—far from indomitable as they seemed a few years ago—are in a state of crisis—and their financial markets are flat at a time when U.S. markets are at historic highs. Indeed, Japanese pundits who only a short time ago had viewed America's decadence and decline with more than a little condescension are now worrying out loud about that new Yankee phoenix, "Rising Sam."

**Events have
already
disproved the
geoeconomic
thesis.**

Nothing, however, makes the three-bloc image seem dated more than its notion that China will function as a huge market and source of cheap labor for a Japan-led bloc. By the mid-1990s, forecasters in the Pentagon and think tanks, extrapolating from China's own dynamic growth rates, projected a Chinese GNP on a par with that of the United States and Japan early in the twenty-first century.²⁰ If anything like that is in the cards, it would certainly refute the notion of a Japanese-led Asian bloc and instead turn Japan into a crucial swing-state between a China-led bloc and NAFTA.

Joseph Nye has made three basic criticisms of the three-bloc thesis. First, he says it "runs counter to the thrust of global technological trends," and that "while regional trade will certainly grow, many firms would not want to be limited to one-third of the global market and would resist restrictive regionalism."²¹ Secondly, "restrictive regional blocs run against nationalistic concerns of some of the lesser states that need a global system to protect themselves against domination by their large neighbors." Thirdly, the three-bloc vision is too dismissive of security concerns, for instance, the need of Germany and Japan for a continuing U.S. security umbrella in case Russia or China emerge as a threat.

The Reinvigorated Balance of Power Model

Traditionalists of the realist school of international relations envision a future that could not differ more sharply from that of the geoeconomists.

²⁰ Among numerous sources, see Barber B. Conable Jr. and David M. Lampton, "China: The Coming Power," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1992–93, pp. 133–49; and Michael T. Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993, pp. 136–52.

²¹ Joseph Nye, "What New World Order?," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1992, pp. 83–96.

According to them, security and brute power relationships always function as the most fundamental determinants of international systems, and the end of the cold war makes a return to multipolarity and balance of power almost inevitable. The *Economist* recently published a projection of an emerging global balance of power, noting that:

each period of history has produced its own pattern of relations, settled or otherwise, among the world's powers, and that some in the past have been near monopolies in some corners of the world (the Roman Empire or the Chinese Middle Kingdom), but never on a global basis, while others such as the cold war have been temporary duopolies.²²

More typically however:

the order emerges from the interplay of three, four or five powers which create a shifting pattern of alliances and enmities among themselves. This is the dance of the dinosaurs. It is the way things were in most of Europe and Asia—the core of the historical world—for most of the time in the past few centuries, until 1945; and it is the way things are likely to be again now.²³

Written in early 1994 during the panic over the rise of a “hegemonic China,” this analysis argued that four powers were likely to define the emerging pattern of the twenty-first century: the United States, China, Russia, and Europe. The *Economist* then proceeded to compare the advantages and disadvantages of the four nations in the coming geopolitical competition. America it described as strong and resurgent, its main problem being not its economy, but its will to assert itself rather than choose to withdraw from the arena of world politics. The prospects for a cohesive European power are by comparison dubious, and Russia’s “hope of being a force in the world ever again” is even dimmer than Europe’s. Only China appears to be indisputably upwardly mobile, with a rapidly growing economy that can be translated into military power.

In stark contrast to the three-bloc mercantilist literature, the *Economist* considers Japan a longshot for global power status. Rather, Japan “will have trouble converting its splendidly high GDP-per-head into the more brutal currencies of international power. It is a small, vulnerable island lying between two great powers neither of which wishes to see it build up any very great armed strength.”²⁴ The Muslim world is considered unlikely to spawn a contender for great power status, and India, often mentioned elsewhere as an emerging power and rival to China, is totally ignored in this analysis.

A major strength of the *Economist* essay is its effort to go beyond mere comparisons of emerging national power capabilities to examine the possibilities for alignments among the powers. Indeed, now that cold war ideological affinities no longer serve as a glue among nations, alignments are likely to shift rapidly in the coming era, with today’s friend becoming tomorrow’s antagonist,

²² “The New World Order: Back to the Future,” *The Economist*, Jan. 8, 1994, pp. 21–23.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

and vice versa.²⁵ What are the likeliest possibilities? According to the *Economist*, a Europe-China alliance to keep Russia under control is extremely unlikely, as is a U.S.-Chinese alliance directed at Europe or Russia. Rather, the most likely scenario is a loose alliance among Europe, America, and Russia for the containment of China, “while Japan—intimidated by China’s growing power, and needing America’s protection—stays modestly at sub-great power level.” A second likely scenario is an alignment between rising China and the Islamic world, which would in turn push Russia and Europe closer together.

Other variants depict a rising China at odds with a containment alliance comprised of the United States, Japan (perhaps impelled toward large-scale rearmament), and India, with Korea tilting towards the latter combination and Russia playing a neutral role and selling arms and energy to China. Europe, in this scenario, remains on the sidelines, perhaps making the Americans unhappy by competing with the Russians for arms sales to China. Other scenarios broach the possibility of a China-Japan-Korea alliance aimed at driving U.S. influence out of Asia, with Russia and Europe remaining on the sidelines. Such a confrontation would bring the world close to the “clash of civilizations” model, discussed below.

Kissinger’s analysis of a new, emerging balance of power is somewhat similar. He tends to assume a cohesive if not fully integrated Europe and is perhaps more inclined than the *Economist* to foresee a gradual decline of America’s *relative* power. The United States would remain *primus inter pares* as “the greatest and most powerful nation, but a nation with peers.” Harking back to earlier systems, Kissinger emphasizes that “The absence of both an overriding ideological or strategic threat frees nations to pursue foreign policies based increasingly on their immediate national interest.”²⁶ Nye, in turn, criticizes this multipolar model as a false analogy with the nineteenth-century order that rested upon a balance of five roughly equal powers, i.e., Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia.²⁷ Russia’s economic weakness, China’s status as a developing country, Japan’s limited military power, and Europe’s lack of political unity suffice in his view to refute Kissinger’s historical analogy.²⁸

Finally, Richard Rosecrance questions the validity of traditional balance of power thinking in the present age. He agrees that the balance of power held sway during most of the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth century, but it was an “inefficient mechanism at best, providing no automatic equilibration of power relationships,” and gave rise to the world wars of this century.²⁹ Rosecrance sees nuclear deterrence and rule by a central coalition as

²⁵ For an analysis or projection of the possibilities for a return to a multipolar system in Europe featuring more rapidly shifting alliances, see John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” *International Security* 15, Summer 1990, pp. 5–56. The author sees such a system as inherently more unstable than the preceding bipolar one, and even recommends a degree of nuclear proliferation as an antidote via deterrence.

²⁶ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 805.

²⁷ Joseph Nye, “What New World Order?” *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1992, pp. 83–96.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.86.

²⁹ Rosecrance, “Concert of Powers,” p.64

alternative mechanisms for regulating the anarchic international system, the first having operated successfully if precariously from 1945 to 1989, and the second having operated for brief periods after the Napoleonic wars and World War I. He sees the current period as one in which a concert appears to be in operation. To be sure, a new concert system could crash should the United States, Russia, or the European Union withdraw from international responsibilities out of weariness or domestic priorities, but the prospects for a cooperative system transcending balance of power are real. What is more, unlike most forecasters, Rosecrance sees danger emanating from Japan rather than China.

The most potent future antagonism the world could witness is a radical division between the United States and Japan. The Westernization of contemporary Japan is as yet incomplete. Beneath the external policy of a Japanese trading state boil nationalist resentments directed at a half century of American tutelage and Western neglect . . . If current trends continue, it may not be too long before ideological rationalizations of Confucian strength and vitality are propounded by Japan as antidotes to supposed Western decadence and lethargy.³⁰

Rosecrance's warning about the possible revival of an aggressive Japanese nationalism calls to mind the fascist challenge to the "new world order" that emerged after World War I, and the division of the globe in the 1930s between revisionist and status quo powers. Indeed, Rosecrance's hopes for a concert of like-minded states would be dashed if one or more of its major members turned revisionist in pursuit of territorial aspirations or to erase a historical sense of humiliation or lost status. Thus Russia, humiliated by its loss of the cold war, near-collapse of its economy, and territorial dismemberment could well play the role of a disruptive expansionist.³¹ China nurtures revisionist territorial aims with respect to some or all of the South China Sea islands, portions of Siberia, and perhaps of Kazakhstan—all of which were once in the Chinese orbit. China's long humiliation at the hands of western "barbarians" has also made it especially sensitive to perceived unequal treatment and desirous of "a place in the sun."³² Japan's territorial ambitions do not appear to go beyond those Russian-occupied southern Kurile Islands, but, Japan, too, cannot forever repress its need to unburden itself of the legacy of defeat, occupation, and condescending treatment from its American mentor and protector. Given this potential for revisionist powers in Eurasia, a multipolar balance of power world may be a dangerous one indeed.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 78.

³¹ See among others, Jim Hoagland, "Russia's Gaullist Phase," *The Washington Post Weekly Edition*, May 2, 1994, p. 28.

³² See James R. Lilley, "Nationalism Bites Back," *The New York Times*, Oct. 24, 1996, p. A27, which discusses the resulting Chinese xenophobia.

The Clash of Civilizations Model

A third image of the future, and the one that has dominated recent discussion is the “clash of civilizations” proposed by Samuel Huntington.³³

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.³⁴

Huntington sees in this the latest phase in evolution of international conflict over the past several centuries. For 150 years after the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the primary conflicts in the Western World “were largely among princes—emperors, absolute monarchs and constitutional monarchs attempting to expand their bureaucracies, their armies, their mercantilist economic strength and, most important, the territory they ruled.”³⁵ In the next phase, ushered in by the French Revolution and lasting until World War I, the principal lines of conflict were between nation-states rather than princes. The third phase, triggered by the Bolshevik Revolution, and reaction against it, spawned ideological conflicts culminating in “the struggle between the two superpowers, neither of which was a nation state in the classical European sense and each of which defined its identity in terms of its ideology.”³⁶ But in all the above phases, the world’s great conflicts occurred among Western powers—they were in effect, Western civil wars. What makes the coming age unique is that henceforth the great conflicts may occur between, not within, civilizations.

Huntington defines civilization as “the highest cultural grouping and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species,”³⁷ and identifies seven or eight major civilizations today: Western, Confucian (Sinic), Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, possibly the African. Stating that “fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the cold war as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed,” Huntington focuses particularly on the cultural lines of demarcation between Western Christianity and Orthodox Christianity in Europe, and between the latter and Islam.³⁸ Like many other contemporary analysts, both in the West and Islam, he sees these two civilizations

³³ Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993, pp. 22–49. See also Michael J. Mazaar, “Culture and International Relations,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1996, pp. 177–97.

³⁴ Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations,” p. 22.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

as potentially pitted against each other as a defining feature of an evolving world order.

Other fault lines that contain potential for large-scale future conflict include that between Arab Islamic civilization and the animist or Christian Africa to the south, and that between the Muslim and Hindu civilizations in South Asia. One might also interpret potential conflict between the United States and either Japan or China as a clash between Western and Confucian civilizations. With the recent conflicts in Bosnia, the Persian Gulf, and the Caucasus in mind, Huntington predicts that the next world war, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations.³⁹ A perceived Western hegemony exemplified by NATO, for instance, might engender a hostile Confucian-Islamic coalition (already presaged by transfers of military technology from China to Pakistan, Iran, and Syria). Such an alliance would be in a position to dominate most of the world's energy resources, and would be backed up by nuclear capability not only in China, but in Muslim countries assisted by China.

Huntington's thesis provoked such virulent criticism that he was compelled to pen a rejoinder.⁴⁰ But perhaps the most telling objection was that of the *Economist*, which pointed out that "it is striking that the new wave of self-awareness in the Muslim world has not produced any serious move towards a merger of Muslim states," that "in the Orthodox Christian part of the world, another arguably distinct culture-zone, the recent tendency has been for things to fall apart, not come together," and that "only in Western Europe is there any seriously conceived plan to dissolve existing nation-states into something bigger—and even this European experiment may now be running into the sands." None of this would suggest that the world is "heading for that fearful sounding 'clash of civilizations,'" but rather that global alignments would continue to be determined by the play of interests among nation-states of whatever civilization.⁴¹

The Unipolar Moment and American Hegemony

Contradicting the first three models of the emerging international system is the still-popular notion of an American unipolar dominance. The image was first suggested even before the impressive American performance in Desert Storm in an article by Charles Krauthammer.⁴² But those who argued that the end of the cold war had left the United States in the position of sole super-

³⁹ Ibid., p. 39.

⁴⁰ Fouad Ajami, "The Summoning," *Foreign Affairs*, Sept./Oct. 1993, pp. 2–9; Robert L. Bartley, "The Case for Optimism," ibid., pp. 15–18; Jeanne Kirkpatrick, et al. "The Modernizing Imperative," ibid., pp. 23–24; Albert Weeks, "Do Civilizations Hold?" ibid., pp. 24–25; and Lin Binyan, "Civilization Grafting," ibid., pp. 19–21.

⁴¹ "The Nation State is Dead: Long Live the Nation-State," *The Economist*, Dec. 23, 1995–Jan. 6, 1996, pp. 15–18.

⁴² Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 70, No. 1 (1990–1991), pp. 23–33. A rebuttal to Krauthammer's thesis is offered in Ted Galen Carpenter, "The New World Disorder," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1991, pp. 24–39.

power—and thus made the world unipolar—had first to contend with declinist theories that posited an exhausted America, the geoeconomic assumption that military power was passé, and the “chaos” theorists who saw America as incapable of dealing with the real problems that would define the next age of history, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, local famines and genocides, pollution, and resource depletion.

Krauthammer’s thesis, echoed by others, is summed up in the following excerpt:

The most striking feature of the post–Cold War world is its unipolarity. No doubt, multipolarity will come in time. In perhaps another generation or so there will be great powers coequal with the United States, and the world will, in structure, resemble the pre–World War I era. But we are not there yet, nor will we be for decades. Now is the unipolar moment.⁴³

There is a noteworthy contrast here with the previously discussed and more or less contemporaneous article by Rosecrance. The latter posits a period in which a peaceful multipolar concert will prevail and regulate the world’s high politics, after which it is likely there will be a return to a multipolar balance of power. Krauthammer is, in effect, forecasting the same outcome, but only after an interregnum marked by American hegemony. But in another sense, Krauthammer’s article was a lineal descendant of one by Huntington, in which the latter criticized the widespread assumptions of American decline in the late 1980s, and observed that the anxieties over relative U.S. economic decline vis-à-vis Japan and Europe represented only the latest in a series of such bouts in anxiety.⁴⁴

In refuting the declinist thesis Huntington stressed one point that was also basic to the arguments of Mead, Garten, and Thurow to the extent that they allow for the possibility of a superior U.S.-led economic bloc. That has to do with the versatile nature of American strength. Hence,

In contrast to other countries, the United States ranks extraordinarily high in almost all the major sources of national power: population size and education, natural resources, economic development, social cohesion, political stability, military strength, ideological appeal, diplomatic alliances, technological achievement. It is, consequently, able to sustain reverses in any one area while maintaining its overall influence stemming from other sources.⁴⁵

An American hegemony is also predicted by the “long cycle theory” advanced by George Modelski.⁴⁶ Seeking to explain global patterns of leadership since the Renaissance, he perceived five long cycles of about a century each:

⁴³ Krauthammer, “Unipolar Moment,” pp. 23–24.

⁴⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, “The U.S.—Decline or Renewal?” *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1988–89, pp. 76–96.

⁴⁵ Huntington, “U.S.—Decline or Renewal?” p. 91.

⁴⁶ See in particular, the various writings of George Modelski, particularly his *Long Cycles in World Politics* (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1985), and also Joshua Goldstein, “Kondratieff waves as War Cycles,” *International Studies Quarterly* 29 (December 1985), pp. 411–44, and W.R. Thompson, ed., *Contending Approaches to World System Analysis* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1983). A good review of the long cycle literature is in Richard Rosecrance, “Long Cycle Theory and International Relations,” *International Organization*, Spring 1987, pp. 283–301.

1494–1580: Portugal is the leading power

1580–1688: The Netherlands is the leading power.

1688–1792: Britain is the leading power.

1792–1914: Britain is again the leading power.

1914–1973 (and beyond): the United States is the leading power.

According to Modelski, each of these periods passed through four phases: global war; emergence of the world power; delegitimization of that power; and deconcentration of power. And it is important to note that Modelski believes that each of the previous world powers had dominant navies and acted as the world's commercial hub. Generally speaking, Modelski's analysis runs somewhat parallel to that of Captain A.T. Mahan, with its exposition of the long successive phases of maritime dominance by Portugal, the Netherlands, and Britain, to be followed by the United States.

Modelski, writing in the mid-1980s, believed that the United States' global dominance began to be challenged around 1973, citing the OPEC oil crisis of that year, the collapse of the Bretton Woods economic system, the rise of rival economic powers in Europe and Asia, Soviet achievement of nuclear parity with the ratification of SALT I in 1972, and the expansion of Soviet naval power.

Today Modelski would seem to have been unduly pessimistic. But America's ability to maintain its hegemony will depend greatly on the extent to which it is able to maintain leadership of the now widely heralded Military Technical Revolution or Revolution in Military Affairs (MTR/RMA) made manifest in the Gulf War. Observers differ as to American prospects. Some point out that leadership in new technology is never more than temporary because of rapid diffusion. Others insist that the quantum leap made by the United States in the "systems of systems" approach—integrating space technology, smart weapons, computers, and communications—is beyond the reach of any competitor today. In sum, the "unipolar moment" may last, but only so long as Russia, Europe, Japan, and China are unable or unwilling to replicate the sinews of high-technology warfare pioneered by the United States.⁴⁷

Zones of Peace and Turmoil, or Chaos Theory

The one image of a new international system that dispenses entirely with the centrality of nation-state and traditional measurements of national power and interest is the "zones of peace" versus "zones of turmoil" dichotomy

⁴⁷ Amidst the massive, burgeoning literature on MTR/RMA, among the items most relevant to a discussion of the maintenance of American military predominance, in historical context, are Eliot Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," *Foreign Affairs*, Mar./Apr. 1996, pp. 37–54; Andrew Krepinevich, "From Cavalry to Computers," *The National Interest*, Fall 1994, pp. 30–42; William J. Perry, "Desert Storm and Deterrence," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1991, pp. 65–82; and William Owens, "Introduction," in Stuart E. Johnson and Martin C. Libicki, *Dominant Battlespace Knowledge* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995).

popularized by Max Singer and the late Aaron Wildavsky in *The Real World Order*.⁴⁸ The Singer/Wildavsky model holds that “the key to understanding the real world is to separate the world into two parts,” one part of which, the zone of “peace, wealth, and democracy,” includes Western Europe, the United States and Canada, Japan and the Antipodes, comprising some 15 percent of the world’s population, and the other of which, the zone of “turmoil, war, and development,” includes the lands of the former Soviet Empire, and most of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.⁴⁹ The book’s primary thesis is simply stated:

The political relations among the countries in the zones of peace and democracy will not be influenced by relative military power. Nor will those nations be divided into competing military blocs seeking to balance each other’s power. There probably will be plenty of national and other conflict, but the decisive special characteristic of this conflict is that no one will believe that it can lead to war.⁵⁰

The authors expect permanent peace in the first global zone because “a central pillar of the next world order is that modern democracies . . . do not even seriously imagine the possibility of being at war with one another.”⁵¹ After all, the relative wealth in the democratic areas give them a powerful stake in peace and stability—an argument notoriously made by Norman Angell on the eve of the First World War.⁵²

“Zones of turmoil,” by definition, are by comparison poor, overpopulated, disaster-prone, and virtually ungovernable. In the dire forecast of world-travelling author Robert D. Kaplan entitled “The Coming Anarchy,” he sets out to show “how scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism, and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet.”⁵³ Focusing on West Africa, which he considers

⁴⁸ Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Real World Order* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1993).

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* Some writers insist on a broader construction of these issues under the banner of what has come to be known as “endism.” This is reviewed in Samuel Huntington, “No Exit: The Errors of Endism,” *The National Interest*, Fall 1989, pp. 3–11. Herein, endism is seen to incorporate notions about the end of warfare among civilized and wealthy states, the “war proneness and democracy” thesis and the “end of history” thesis which celebrates the unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism.

⁵¹ The “war proneness and democracy” thesis now includes a fairly wide range of literature. See in particular, Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); *Journal of Peace Research*, Nov. 1992, special section on “Democracy, War, and Peace,” and Melvin Small and J. David Singer, “The War Proneness of Democratic Regimes,” *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Summer 1976, pp. 51–62. Russett, author of the most ambitious and rigorous study of this subject, concludes that the wealth factor is a subsidiary one in explaining the absence of wars between democratic states, overshadowed by the “norms and strategies characteristic of democracy-to-democracy relationships.”

⁵² Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation Between Military Power to National Advantage* (London: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1913).

⁵³ Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” *Atlantic Monthly*, Feb. 1994, pp. 44–76. These themes are expanded upon in Kaplan, *The Ends of the Earth* (New York: Random House, 1996), on the basis of the author’s travels in West Africa, the Middle East, and Central and South Asia. The theme of impending disintegration of many Third World nation-states due primarily to ethnic conflict is pursued in Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Scribner’s, 1993).

a “symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real ‘strategic’ danger, Kaplan points to a terrifying picture that would seem to give the lie to cheerful forecasts of a “global village.”⁵⁴

Perhaps the main points of Kaplan’s work are that national and international borders are being eroded, and that private armies, transnational terrorist groups, and drug cartels are rising to challenge the authority of traditional states and international law. He notes Huntington’s thesis about a coming “clash of civilizations,” but adds to it a thesis of a more disaggregated world steeped in tribal as well as civilizational conflict. Much of contemporary political cartography is therefore little more than “the lies of mapmakers” in that they exaggerate the reality of national boundaries and government control over territories. What is in fact dawning, he warns, is “an epoch of themeless juxtapositions, in which the classificatory grid of nation-states is going to be replaced by a jagged-glass pattern of city-states, shanty-states, nebulous and anarchic regionalisms.”⁵⁵

Interestingly, neither Singer/Wildavsky nor Kaplan posit the specter of a north-south conflict *per se*. That thesis seems to have become passé in light of the political collapse of Marxist-Leninist regimes in the Third World and the intellectual collapse of dependency theorists who predicted north-south conflicts over resources, terms of trade, or immigration. The burden of the chaos theory, rather, is that the wealthy, peaceful nations will increasingly become gilded ghettos—or armed camps—in the midst of a sea of violent, suffering humanity, unable to help the “zone of turmoil” and ultimately unable to remain unaffected by it. Compared to such a vision of demographic and ecological collapse, the vanities of great power competition would seem beside the point.

The Global Village

But perhaps the globe will not fracture, nor entropy dissolve the bonds of all civilization. Perhaps instead the coming age will be the one in which unity—the “global village”—is finally realized. That is the vision offered by theorists who identify the ongoing advances in telecommunications and data processing as the strongest forces in world affairs. They note that popular American television programs and rock music videocassettes can be found in the remotest villages of Africa and Latin America, and that the whole world is adopting the technologies, values, lifestyles, and aspirations of the West. They herald the Internet, stress global interdependence, not only in matters of trade, investment, and raw materials, but with regard to such global issues as environmental pollution, water shortages, weather, and population movements—solutions to which can only be found through global cooperation.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 46.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 72.

Numerous political scientists highlight the evolution of global “regimes” to govern behavior in such crucial areas as nuclear proliferation, the environment, and international civil aviation, and suggest that such trends militate in the direction of world government.⁵⁶ Others identify the increasing dominance of multinational corporations in global affairs, and claim that they are on the verge of transcending the long-dominant nation-state.⁵⁷

As Richard Barnet and John Cavanagh note:

The emerging global order is spearheaded by a few hundred corporate giants, many of them bigger than most sovereign nations. Ford's economy is larger than Saudi Arabia's and Norway's. Philip Morris's annual sales exceed New Zealand's gross domestic product. The multinational corporation of twenty years ago carried on separate operations in many different countries and tailored its operations to local conditions. In the 1990s large business enterprises, even some smaller ones, have the technological means and strategic vision to burst old limits of time, space, national boundaries, language, custom and ideology.⁵⁸

According to Barnet and Cavanagh, “the fundamental political conflict in the opening decades of the new century, we believe, will not be between nations or even between trading blocs but between the forces of globalization and the territorially based forces of local survival seeking to preserve and to redefine community.” That image of the future provides, of course, a stark contrast to those previously discussed under the headings of balance of power, the three-bloc thesis, the clash of civilizations, and chaos theory, since it projects a world where the major fault lines lie not between civilizations, ethnic, religious, or national groups, but simply between those who are part of the new global “web” and those who are not. In a sense it provides an analogy with what has been hypothesized for the Europe of the eighteenth century, wherein it is claimed that the aristocratic elites of the various nations had more in common with each other than with the lower reaches of their respective societies.

Incipient Bipolarity

Although the bulk of current commentators see the current international system trending from a concert and/or American unipolar dominance towards some form of multipolarity—either with or without serious security rivalries—the

⁵⁶ One definition is rendered by Ernst Haas, who refers to “the halting but steady development of convergent norms and rules of behavior in various domains of international activity deemed increasingly accepted as authoritative by many or most of the world's nations.” See his “Why Collaborate? Issue Linkage and International Regimes,” *World Politics*, Apr. 1980, p. 358.

⁵⁷ Richard Barnet and John Cavanagh, *Global Dreams* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994). Similar themes but juxtaposed to the opposing possibilities for the resurgence of ethnic, religious, and civilizational identities, are purveyed in Benjamin Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York: Times Books, 1995). Barber's work somewhat straddles, or goes back and forth between the basic themes of Huntington on the one hand, and Barnet and Cavanagh, on the other.

⁵⁸ Barnet and Cavanagh, *Global Dreams*, p. 14.

eventual possibility of a return to bipolarity cannot be discounted. A new U.S.-Russian rivalry could result from a reversal of current political trends in Russia and a successful attempt by the latter to reestablish some semblance of the old Soviet Union. Huntington's fears about a U.S.-Japan bipolarity have been noted. But above all, current analyses dwell upon a Chinese challenge to U.S. hegemony, a new cold war, and a new containment strategy.⁵⁹ What is more, a bipolar bloc system might well evolve from the current or anticipated multipolar one as a China-Russia bloc faces off against a U.S.-Europe combination, or an all-Asia bloc confronts a U.S.-Europe-Russian one, thus scotching the hopes of "global villagers" once and for all.

The Current Cacophony

The seven images or models of the emerging international system differ radically, but are not in all cases mutually exclusive. It may well turn out—indeed, the odds are it will turn out—that the forces and tendencies stressed by several or all of the models will coexist. For example, there is some overlap between the three-bloc economic model and that positing zones of peace and turmoil. Nor is there necessarily a contradiction between the balance of power multipolarity model and the clash of civilizations—Huntington himself speculates upon possible alliances across the divides of the civilizations. Some pairings of these models are, however, impossible to imagine. The global village and balance of power models provide altogether different interpretations of the emerging system, since they posit diametrically opposed predictions about the role of the nation-state. The global village and clash of civilizations models differ fundamentally in the importance they attribute to cultural divides and the power of technology to erase those divides. The zones of peace/zones of turmoil model projects the end of balance of power politics in the developed (wealthy and democratic) states, but may allow for the continuation of balance of power politics in regional contexts such as the Middle East and Africa.⁶⁰ As Nye concludes,

No single hierarchy describes adequately a world politics with multiple structures. The distribution of power in world politics has become like a layer cake. The top military layer is largely unipolar, for there is no other military power comparable to the United States. The economic middle layer is tripolar and has been for two decades. The bottom layer of transnational interdependence shows a diffusion of power.⁶¹

⁵⁹ This thesis has been popularized of late by Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China* (New York: Knopf, 1997).

⁶⁰ For an analysis of the applicability—or lack of same—of the traditional Morgenthauian realist/balance of power model to the (pre-end of cold war) Third World, see Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," *World Politics*, Jan. 1991, pp. 233–56.

⁶¹ Nye, "What New World Order?", p. 88.

What then might be the implications of these competing models for U.S. foreign policy? Can American policy help to determine or shape the emerging system, and if so, what are the pluses and minuses of the alternative systems for the United States?

In the broadest sense, one might gauge the implications of the possible systems for such general criteria as American power and prestige (inevitably a relative matter), per capita wealth (an absolute matter mostly, but with a psychological component that involves transnational comparisons), security and stability as defined by the absence of wars and threats, and the progress of American values such as global democratization, human rights, and the market economy. For a long time during the cold war, it was a fairly simple matter to identify the basic interests American foreign policy was designed to advance, and thus who stood where on a range of issues. If one knew what the “hawks” thought about one issue, one could usually predict their position on others, and likewise for “doves.” In the past few years, however, the literature on U.S. foreign-policy “schools of thought” has become diffuse and unpredictable as former political allies have fallen out and former cold war antagonists find themselves in agreement on such issues as interventionism abroad, immigration, trade policy, or NATO enlargement. As Alan Tonelson summed up,

In foreign affairs, the old dividing lines are blurring or being ignored, and with good reason. As is clear from any recent op ed page, familiar classifications such as interventionist and isolationist, hawk and dove, realist and idealist, and multilateralist and unilateralist (at least as they have been used since the end of World War II) no longer make much sense, in the absence of the Cold War's defining conditions.⁶²

Tonelson, George Weigel, and others have tried to make some sense of the emerging confusion by devising new typologies and subtypologies to characterize the current spectrum of foreign-policy thinking. Weigel divined a three-way division among “neoisolationists,” “democratic internationalists,” and “realists.”⁶³ His neoisolationists are a strange combination of the old McGovernite left and the new Buchananite right. His democratic internationalists include former Carterites such as Nye and neoconservatives such as Joshua Muravchik. The realists include other former “neo-cons” plus veteran internationalists of the Reagan and Bush variety. Robert Kagan instead perceives a two-way division between realists and internationalists, with the former seen as effectively indistinguishable from isolationists.⁶⁴

Tonelson goes beyond the foregoing typologies to present a more complex “schools of thought” scheme that, in consonance with the new prominence of geoeconomics, involves a matrix of positions on national security and economics. He sees “American conservatism” as split into three principal factions—“conservative realists,” “democratic crusaders,” and “conservative mini-

⁶² Alan Tonelson, “Beyond Left and Right,” *The National Interest*, Winter 1993/94, pp. 3–18 (3).

⁶³ George Weigel, “On the Road to Isolationism?,” *Commentary*, Jan. 1992, pp. 36–42.

⁶⁴ Robert Kagan, “American Power—A Guide for the Perplexed,” *Commentary*, Apr. 1996, pp. 21–31. See also Joshua Muravchik, “Clintonism Abroad,” *Commentary*, Feb. 1995, pp. 36–40.

malists”—that are roughly congruent with Weigel’s categories. But each of these groups falls apart whenever economics (free trade vs. managed trade and economic nationalism) and security (interventionism versus isolationism) are at issue, resulting in at least six “boxes” on an implicit chart. On the left, “interventionists” and “laissez-faire liberals” also seem to comprise both ends of an economics policy spectrum, i.e., some of the former are free traders and others are not, and vice versa.

Daryl Press and Eugene Gholz, of the Defense and Arms Control Group at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology also work with a matrix involving a three-way spectrum running from “military isolationism” to “selective engagement” to “collective security,” and from “economic independence” (autarky), to “free trade,” to “economic influence” (using such influence for leverage overseas).⁶⁵ That produces more possible pairings. Pat Buchanan and Ross Perot, for instance, want to combine economic independence and military isolationism. The Clinton administration (also Samuel Huntington and Richard Lugar) combine selective engagement and economic influence. Finally, Barry Posen and Andrew Ross have provided a spectrum of five general options for an emerging U.S. grand strategy: neoisolationism, selective engagement, collective security, containment, and primacy.⁶⁶ The last two appear to be add-ons to the Press-Gholz spectrum of options on the security side, while international economics policy is here subordinated.

However the current pundits sort themselves out, the question remains: what are the implications for U.S. foreign policy of the several possible new international system types, which models are advantageous, and to what extent might the United States be able to shape the emerging system?

The first, most clear-cut, option would be to attempt to maintain a unipolar dominance by which the United States, as Zbigniew Brzezinski put it, would be “perched on top of the world” with “no rivals capable of matching its comprehensive global power.”⁶⁷ Such an America could presumably maximize its ability to promote its own interests and values, cajole the rest of the world into adopting or at least respecting them, and lead the world toward its preferred models of world order. Those, presumably, would be concert-style security regimes, open commercial regimes, and “global village” cooperation with respect to Third World chaos, the environment, proliferation, and terrorism. Critics, however, are quick to retort that such an American bid for hegemony would not only drain finite American resources, and will, but would also be the most

⁶⁵ Daryl G. Press and Eugene Gholz, “Searching for that ‘Vision Thing’: America’s Foreign Policy Choices,” *Breakthroughs*, Spring 1996, pp. 4–10.

⁶⁶ See Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, “Competing U.S. Grand Strategies,” in Robert J. Lieber, ed., *Eagle Adrift* (New York: Longman, 1997), pp. 100–34. Still another “schools of thought” typology has recently been offered by Alexander Nacht, who in turn derives a matrix of sorts from the recent writings of former U.S. government luminaries Richard Haass, James Schlesinger, Zalmay Khalilzad, and William Maynes. This matrix crosses a “heavy involvement-selective involvement” spectrum with a “unilateral-multilateral” spectrum, focusing more on the security side, and with economics somewhat subordinated.

⁶⁷ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Scribner’s, 1993), p. 87.

powerful impetus to other great nations to balance American power through direct bilateral competition or the formation of opposing blocs.

A policy of primacy could, of course, be largely defensive. Modelski, seeing the United States as the successor to a line of world powers based on a combination of maritime and commercial predominance, advocates a fundamentally defensive strategy characterized as Periclean: "an attitude of watchful waiting, no conquests or interventions, the protection of the security of the home base through invulnerable deterrents, and the cultivation of the 'command' of sea, air, and space as the elements most strategic to a global position."⁶⁸ Such a defensive strategy would shun all "imperial presumption" lest it call forth a grand countercoalition.⁶⁹

To the extent the United States resists the temptation to exploit its "unipolar moment," and accepts the ineluctable drift towards a multipolar system, it would presumably try to minimize the risks inherent in such an international system by nudging the other great powers to embrace diplomacy and eschew coercion. Kissinger concedes the inevitability of such a trend, and recommends that the United States conduct a subtle but forceful balancing diplomacy to prevent domination by a single power of either Europe or Asia.⁷⁰ Brzezinski, by contrast, sees the ongoing dilution of the primacy of the nation-state and predicts that increasingly, "world affairs are shaped by domestic trends that recognize no frontiers and require collective responses by governments less and less able to act in a 'sovereign' fashion."⁷¹ He sees a coming ideological homogenization, and "with a bureaucratically controlled and supranational capitalism becoming the universal social system."⁷² He seems to agree with the proponents of the global village model, albeit with a dominant United States playing the role of "catalytic nation" acting as the "agent of history."⁷³ His basic policy prescription is that Americans get their own (social, economic, cultural) house in order lest they lose the ability to lead the world into the coming universalist era.

In a policy sense, there is indeed little the United States can do to slow down the march towards a "global village." The U.S. government could hardly get into the business of reining in its major multinational corporations or stopping the diffusion of technology and associated global cultural change. Whether it can slow or halt a possible drift towards a three-bloc economic structure is more difficult to say. C. Fred Bergsten and others emphasize the need for the United States to continue pushing for a global free trade regime.⁷⁴ But American

**An American
bid for
hegemony
would invite
competition or
opposition.**

⁶⁸ George Modelski, "The Theory of Long Cycles and U.S. Strategic Policy," in Robert Harkavy and Edward Kolodziej, eds., *American Security Policy and Policy-Making* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1980), pp. 3–19 (15).

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 15–16

⁷⁰ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 813.

⁷¹ Brzezinski, *Out of Control*, p. 92.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

⁷⁴ C. Fred Bergsten, "Globalizing Free Trade," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1996, pp. 105–20.

clout may not suffice to persuade Asia and Europe not to form regional trading blocs, in which case the United States will have to develop further a bloc of its own, whereupon Americans will be even less eager to maintain their security umbrella over East Asia and Europe.

The two models that would pose the most obvious threats to the United States are the clash of civilizations and incipient bipolar models, both of which raise the specter of arms races and large-scale conflict. In the former case, the main threats would appear to be a clash between the West and Islam, the West and a China-led Asian coalition, or a Sinic-Islamic coalition. These dire scenarios are what lurk behind the current debates over human rights and most-favored-nation status for China, the future of the American presence in the Gulf, and U.S. involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace process. For the United States to assume that civilizational conflict is coming and act prematurely would only hasten the clash it seeks to avoid. But to go out of its way to avoid such a clash might amount to appeasement and thus encourage aggressive challenges to American interests.

The zones of peace/zones of turmoil model presents less immediate problems of policy. To the extent it entails a low probability of major warfare with other major industrial nations it allows for modest defense budgets directed only against "regional" threats from an Iran, Iraq, or North Korea. However, smug acceptance of growing chaos, especially if it overtook Latin America, might in time invite serious threats to American security and prosperity in the form of armies of illegal immigrants, refugees, drug cartels, and terrorists. Hence the insistence of Kaplan, Paul Kennedy, and others that such regions cannot be ignored lest their agony overflow into the zones of peace.⁷⁵

The paradox facing U.S. policy is that the more Americans assert their power in hopes of shaping the global environment, the more they may generate resentment, resistance, and results the opposite of those they intend. To do nothing, on the other hand, seems fatalistic, selfish, and short-sighted. What the United States can do is continue to promote democracy, free trade, and a balance of power politics among the major players, fight a rearguard action against the spread of weapons and mass destruction, and attempt to alleviate the suffering of "have-nots" in its own neighborhood. But the larger historical forces driven by technology and demography are beyond the power of any nation to shape. No doubt it is for that reason that while the Bush and Clinton administrations' foreign policy teams have shown little strategic vision, neither have their critics. Systems have their own logic and pace. Nor can one change systems from within.



⁷⁵ Kaplan, *Ends of the Earth*; and Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Random House, 1993).

The U.S. Defense Industry after the Cold War

by Murray Weidenbaum

The U.S. defense industry is adjusting to the end of the cold war far more rapidly and effectively than was generally expected. Many of the changes to date have been painful and the end of the adjustment process is not yet in sight. But while today's national security decisionmakers can count on the presence of a strong defense industrial base, that positive situation cannot be taken for granted in the years ahead. This article offers one economist's evaluation of the challenges facing the U.S. military establishment and the private-sector companies on which it so strongly relies.

To judge the adequacy of the future defense industrial base in an uncertain post-cold war environment is indeed a challenge. It requires dealing simultaneously with a set of paradoxical needs: to develop an international orientation at a time when the nation is focused on domestic concerns, to consider expanding military outlays in a period of budgetary austerity, and to worry about the adequacy of competition for the production of weapon systems when the economy is in the midst of a wave of mergers, consolidations, and downsizing.

This is a tall order, so let us begin with fundamentals. As an ex-defense industry planner, I instinctively start by examining the major threats to the national security. To state the obvious—although it may not be so clear to all Americans—the United States continues to exist in a dangerous world.

The Changing Threats to National Security

The danger to U.S. security is no longer an array of Soviet strategic systems presumably aimed at the nation. Those missiles and bombers may not now be aimed at the United States, but—and this is a crucial “but”—the uncertain control over the technological and military resources developed by the Soviets is far from comforting. Developing countries in Asia have been acquiring a wide variety of high-technology equipment—including SU-27 attack

Murray Weidenbaum is Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor and chairman of the Center for the Study of American Business at Washington University in St. Louis. An earlier version of this article was prepared as an address to the Conference on the Defense Industrial Base, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo., on April 17, 1997.

aircraft, MIG-31 fighters, T-72 tanks, and MI-17 helicopters—from the spin-off nations of the former Soviet Union. More significantly, China is emerging—once again—as a great power, both economically and militarily. Credible sources report that China is buying two or more Russian-made Sovremenny-class missile destroyers armed with SS-N-22 supersonic antiship missiles.¹

Simultaneously, large and indeterminate assortments of terrorists and other troublemakers are developing the capability to do considerable harm to the people of this country and its allies. Americans have to be concerned when they read reports such as the following:

At several naval bases around Vladivostok, about twenty-four highly radioactive reactor cores cut out of dismantled nuclear submarines are either floating in bays or sitting in unsafe ground storage. Guards at the Vladivostok bases frequently go several months between paychecks. Meanwhile, thousands of Chinese traders and entrepreneurs have been drawn to the city. According to one Russian investigator of the loss of nuclear fuel, “Potatoes were guarded better than naval fuel.”²

Biological weapons, which are far easier to manufacture, transport, and disseminate than any other type weapon of mass destruction, are of growing importance in the post-Soviet environment. Anthrax, for example, can be made by a biology student in a lab the size of a microbrewery. A small suitcase can contain enough to kill hundreds of thousands of people. As for the delivery platform, anthrax can be readily sprayed from a crop duster.³

Between 1991 and 1996, about five thousand employees left the Ukrainian Southern Machine Building Plant. That facility specializes in developing and producing SS-18 missiles. During the same period, the All Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics, which specializes in nuclear warhead R&D, also lost about five thousand people. All in all, the numbers of unemployed scientists and engineers

¹ Richard D. Fisher, “Dangerous Moves: Russia’s Sale of Missile Destroyers to China,” *Heritage Foundation Asian Studies Center Backgrounder*, Feb. 20, 1997, pp. 1–14; see also Murray Weidenbaum and Samuel Hughes, *The Bamboo Network* (New York: The Free Press, 1996), pp. 186–95.

² Quoted in “Heading Off a New Nuclear Nightmare,” *Carnegie Quarterly*, Spring-Summer 1996, p. 3.

³ Adam R. Moody, “Proliferation Implications of the Brain Drain,” *Post-Soviet Prospects*, Dec. 1996, pp. 1–4; “New Uses for Intelligence as a Necessary Arm of U.S. Foreign Policy,” *National Security Law Report*, Nov. 1996, p. 15.

in Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union are at a record high.⁴

Reports like these are juxtaposed with news that Libyan and Iranian “university representatives” are stepping up efforts to recruit various categories of scientists. All of this brings to mind the lament of a speaker at a recent conference on national security: “Peace is hell.”⁵

Surely, today’s situation requires a different response than that which was appropriate during the cold war—in terms of intelligence and communication, force structure, planning and strategy, and research, development, and production capability. But that does not necessarily mean a drastically lesser response. The United States needs to be able to deal with a new spectrum of conflicts, ranging from low-intensity and urban warfare, to serious situations of global crime and lawlessness, to conventional confrontations between major national powers.⁶

Viewed in this light, the current practice of cutting back the military equipment and personnel required during the cold war is not the end of the process of adjusting to a changed external environment. Rather, it is the beginning. At a time of tight budgeting, it is of course foolish to devote the limited funding to activities supported more by sentiment for the past than by the needs of the future. While military pork was never fully justified, the “opportunity cost” of such indulgences is higher than ever.

Maintaining an Adequate Industrial Base

Thus the key task is to maintain the capacity to design and produce the military systems and forces needed to deal with future threats. The concern with the defense industrial base is far more than a matter of contract forms, cost controls, and business procedures. It is a matter of maintaining an appropriate and adequate military arsenal in a dangerous world. To restate the challenge facing defense planners: how, at a time of profound downsizing, do they keep the defense industry’s innovative, managerial, and technological strength that is so vital to the national security?

Downsizing in this regard is no euphemism for marginal reductions. The nation faces levels of funding for military research and development and procurement that, in real terms, are much less than one-half of the 1985 numbers. As will be noted below, the comparisons in terms of reduced shares of gross domestic product and federal budgets are even more striking—and numbers alone do not convey the intensity of the problem.

⁴ “New Uses for Intelligence as a Necessary Arm of U.S. Foreign Policy,” *National Security Law Report*, Nov. 1996, p. 15.

⁵ “Law Enforcement & Intelligence,” *National Security Law Report*, Nov. 1996, p. 21.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 1–24. See also *Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1996).

Compounding the loss of much of its traditional military market, the defense industry has had to fend off substantial political pressures to “convert” its resources to civilian markets. Supporters of federal aid for defense conversion opened this “second front” believing that Congress will approve substantial reductions in the military budget only if defense industry jobs are maintained, albeit for civilian work. To call such a belief “mistaken” is not a blanket criticism of diversification. After all, when I left Boeing in the 1960s, it was still primarily a military contractor, with an important but much smaller commercial aircraft division. Today, Boeing is the premier producer of civilian aircraft, with a strong but much smaller defense sector. That change, however, was not forced on the company by government policy, but occurred voluntarily and in response to clear market opportunities.

The more recent conversion pressures that were, in the main, successfully resisted, would have involved large government subsidies and an array of new controls. All this would have been aimed at forcing management to shift attention to civilian non-aircraft markets, which most of these companies have flubbed time and again.⁷ Such dissipation of their limited resources would have left these enterprises in much weakened financial condition. It also would have threatened the technological strength of the defense industrial base.

Fortunately, the major defense companies followed a very different and more sensible set of approaches, each of which reflected tough-minded and realistic management decisions. The result has been a financially stable set of primes, some quite strong in terms of their profit structures. This has been true for most traditional defense contractors, except for producers of conventional ammunition, who have avoided the merger and acquisition trend. Faced with the likelihood of being awarded fewer major contracts in the years ahead, many of the historic primes merged with or acquired some of their traditional rivals. Marriage partners included Lockheed and Martin, then Loral, Northrop and Grumman, and soon will include Boeing and McDonnell Douglas.

These and other important defense contractors eliminated large divisions that were viable but not industry leaders. General Dynamics sold its space systems to Martin and its tactical aircraft business to Lockheed, while acquiring Bath Iron Works. General Motors's Hughes subsidiary is selling its defense electronics activity to Raytheon, which has acquired Texas Instruments's defense unit. Ford's Aerospace, IBM's Federal Systems Division, and Unisys's defense systems operations all went to Loral (on its way to Lockheed Martin). Northrop Grumman acquired Vought Aircraft and Westinghouse's defense work. Boeing bought the military segment of Rockwell (formerly North American Aviation).

Since 1993, approximately \$70 billion of mergers and acquisitions have occurred among the major defense-oriented companies. During this restructuring, the aerospace industry workforce declined from a peak of 1.33 million in 1989 to 806,000 in 1996, a decrease of 39 percent. Coincidentally, the Department

⁷ Murray Weidenbaum, *Small Wars, Big Defense* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 61–68.

of Defense estimates a 39 percent decrease in total defense-related employment between 1989 and 1997—or about 5 percent a year.⁸

Not surprisingly, some serious critics—including the Defense Science Board—bemoan the prospect of declining competition for military contracts, predicting that a reduced number of competitors will bring about higher prices and poorer products. Noted defense analyst Harry G. Summers Jr., represented this position in the extreme, warning that: “By returning to a Soviet-style monopoly supply system, the United States is in danger of unilateral disarmament.”⁹

As a general proposition, of course, competition is good, so more is better than less. However, that traditional approach to military procurement as well as to the antitrust laws is now passé. After all, in the past two decades, the antitrust authorities allowed a host of mergers between active competitors in major civilian markets. In the 1960s and 1970s, comparable corporate marriages probably would have been challenged if not stopped.

Since 1980, many successful mergers have occurred among large banks (Chase Manhattan and Chemical), retail chains (May Department Stores and Associated Dry Goods), communications companies (Bell Atlantic and NYNEX), and manufacturers (Kimberly-Clark and Scott Paper). The civilian economy is much healthier for that consolidation. We have not witnessed the bursts of price increases that might have been expected to accompany the declines of measured competition. Rather, American consumers are enjoying the most benign inflation situation in many years—and with high and rising levels of employment.

The new approach to antitrust enforcement is not one of laxity. Instead it reflects the changing nature of the marketplace, especially the globalization of business and the rise of cross-border competition. The case of the military marketplace is somewhat similar but not identical (let us ignore the possibility of resorting to the hoary national security exemption which some legal authorities would apply to antitrust matters). As shown in Table 1 on the following page, the emerging military market cannot be accurately described as a monopoly, Soviet-style or otherwise. Perhaps the most strikingly unique characteristic of defense procurement is that, even after the current merger wave, production capability will probably far exceed the procurement of defense products.

It is frightening to think of the consequences if the conventional antitrust approach had been applied to the recent wave of defense industry mergers and acquisitions. The result would have been a larger number of financially weak firms—a much greater concern to the national security than Colonel Summers’s speculation about the creation of American “Krupps.”¹⁰ Most of these companies would have lacked the critical mass required to maintain high levels

⁸ See James Kitfield, “Our Shrinking Arsenal,” *National Journal*, Feb. 1, 1997, pp. 210–14.

⁹ Harry G. Summers, Jr., “Operations, Procurement, and Industrial Base,” *Orbis*, Spring 1997, p. 206. See also Erik R. Pages, “The Future U.S. Defense Industry,” *S&S Review*, Winter-Spring 1995, pp. 135–52.

¹⁰ Summers, “Operations, Procurement, and Industrial Base,” p. 207.

Table 1
Key Competitors in the Military Market

MISSILES Raytheon/Hughes Lockheed Martin Boeing/McDonnell Douglas	AIRCRAFT Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Lockheed Martin* Northrop Grumman*
HELICOPTERS United Technologies Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Textron/Bell	SATELLITES Lockheed Martin Hughes TRW Boeing
ELECTRONICS Raytheon/Hughes Lockheed Martin* Northrop Grumman* Litton ITT GTE Harris	NAVAL VESSELS General Dynamics Newport News Litton Avondale

* The managements of Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman have proposed to merge the two companies.

of research and development. Shareholders would not have been the only losers. The national security would have suffered an erosion in the quantity and likely the quality of defense technology.

The reality acknowledged by policymakers is that in the foreseeable future the Department of Defense will be ordering fewer weapon systems from a smaller group of companies than was usual during the cold war era. There may well be a shift in formal emphasis from price competition back to design competition. But, below the surface, technological superiority has continued to be the key factor in the selection of prime contractors on major projects. This conclusion is supported by General Accounting Office estimates showing that "full and open competition" accounts for very small percentages of weapon system procurement (27 percent in the case of aircraft during 1986–1994, and 28 percent in the case of missiles).¹¹ Most important, the competition for the award of contracts for new weapon systems remains intense. As Robert Paulson of McKinsey & Company said of aircraft manufacturing, ". . . this industry will remain very competitive whether there are three hungry competitors or two."¹²

¹¹ *Defense Industry: Trends in DOD Spending, Industrial Productivity, and Competition* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1997).

¹² Quoted in Steven Pearlstein, "Will This Marriage Survive an Antitrust Challenge?," *Washington Post National Weekly*, Dec. 23, 1996, p. 19.

Table 2
Financial Condition of Key Prime Contractors in 1996

COMPANY	SALES		PROFITS		MARKET VALUE
	(IN BILLIONS)	YEARLY CHANGE	(IN BILLIONS)	YEARLY CHANGE	(IN BILLIONS)
Lockheed Martin	\$26.9	18%	\$1.3	98%	\$17.8
United Technologies	23.5	3	.9	21	18.1
McDonnell Douglas	13.8	3	.8	—	14.4
Northrop Grumman	8.1	18	.2	-7	4.3
Boeing	22.7	16	1.1	179	36.7
General Dynamics	<u>3.6</u>	17	<u>.2</u>	9	<u>4.4</u>
TOTAL	\$98.6		\$4.5		\$95.7

Source: Company annual reports.

With major production contracts expected to be few and far between, one helpful change in defense contracting procedures would be a substantial raise in the rates of return on research and development. Military R&D no longer can be viewed as a loss leader. Contractors must be given a greater incentive to devote their resources to R&D even in the absence of large production orders.

Overall, the defense industry is in far better shape than might have been expected from the loss of so much of its basic market. The results are positive when we examine the financial statements of the six major primes—Lockheed Martin, United Technologies, McDonnell Douglas, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and General Dynamics. In 1996, their combined military and civilian sales came to \$98.6 billion, generating \$4.5 billion in aggregate profits. The stock market valued these six companies at an impressive \$95.7 billion (see Table 2).

In light of these good numbers, it is not surprising that despite the massive cutbacks in U.S. defense spending, no plea was heard for taxpayer bailouts of faltering defense contractors. Then-Secretary of Defense William Perry's admonition was good policy but too pessimistic a forecast: "We expect companies to go out of business, and we will stand by and let that happen."¹³

¹³ Quoted in Norman R. Augustine, "The Sound Bite That Bit Us," *Washington Post*, Feb. 23, 1997, Outlook Section, p. 1.

No Chrysler-style corporate loan guarantee program—much less anything like the U.S. Reconstruction Finance Corporation of the 1930s—was necessary, or even requested. This situation may remind the reader of the famous Sherlock Holmes story where the key clue was that the dog did not bark. Similarly, the most important point in military-industry relationships in the post-cold war period has been the absence of crisis.

On the positive side, progress has been made in streamlining the byzantine procurement process, resulting in reduced overhead costs for both buyers and sellers. The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, though far from a panacea, has been a constructive force, as have efforts to eliminate some military standards and to utilize more commercial practices.

More controversial has been the practice of allowing merging firms to bill some of the costs of reorganization as overhead on existing defense contracts. Such costs include severance pay for terminated employees, early retirement incentives, and relocation expenses. The critics refer to this procedure as “payoffs for layoffs.” However, the savings to the government from the resulting efficiencies have more than offset the magnitude of the allowable costs.¹⁴

Perhaps the carrot of reimbursements for these “restructuring changes” could in some way be used to encourage closing down more unneeded production lines. Although a number of defense contractors, such as McDonnell Douglas, have eliminated some excess production facilities, these closures have not been universal. According to recent reports, Northrop Grumman still has all nine plants producing aerostructures, and Lockheed Martin maintains its three original aircraft lines in California, Texas, and Georgia. Some defense analysts have urged the federal government to “buy out” the industry’s excess capacity.¹⁵ Why not instead tie the generous treatment of allowable costs to “biting that bullet”?

Overall, defense factories are reputedly operating at about 60 percent capacity—compared to 83 percent for industry generally. Rather than bearing the expense of maintaining all of the elderly production facilities of the cold war—while resisting the inevitable pressures to keep them busy—it might make more sense to close some down. The review by antitrust authorities of the proposed merger between Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman may provide an alternative opportunity for achieving this objective.

Guidelines for the Future

What about the future? The federal budget for fiscal 1998 envisions further cutbacks in the real level of defense spending. It is not obvious whether that amount is too high or too low. The interaction between the needs estimated

¹⁴ *Defense Restructuring Costs* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, Apr. 1997).

¹⁵ Harvey Sapolsky and Eugene Gholz, “Eliminating Excess Defense Production,” *Issues in Science and Technology*, Winter 1996–97, pp. 65–66.

by defense planners and the economizing efforts of budget officials is inherently a bargaining process involving a series of iterations. Those who have participated in that process know how difficult it is. But the need for sound budgeting of defense is hardly a transient phenomenon. It was noted over a century ago by C.F. Bastable in his classic work on public finance:

To maintain a due balance between the excessive demands of . . . military officials, and the undue reductions . . . sought by the advocates of economy, is one of the difficult tasks of the statesman.¹⁶

To most Americans, \$250 billion of proposed new budget authority for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year 1998 sounds like a lot of money—and it is. Nevertheless, that amount represents a 3 percent decrease in real terms from the 1997 level voted by Congress. The approval of the Clinton military budget would mean continuing the negative trend in funding that began in 1986 and which now is the largest and longest decline in military finance since the end of World War II. The defense share of GDP declined from 7.5 percent in 1971 to 3.3 percent in 1996, while the military share of the budget dropped from 38 percent to 16 percent during the same time period. Meanwhile, the budgetary allocations to social security, medicare, and other “entitlements” have continued to soar and now dominate federal spending, and there are no signs that the upward trend in civilian budgets will be reversed. If anything, it will accelerate in the decades ahead. Thus, the downward pressures on military budgets cannot be expected to abate. Given this set of circumstances, some aggregate perspective is useful.

The overall fiscal outlook for the United States is not very satisfying to any serious analyst of governmental finances. Bipartisan forecasts of balancing the federal budget by the year 2002 are more comforting than are justified by the underlying reality. The worry goes beyond the obvious point that the latest federal budget projects a rising deficit for the next year or two. We can even gloss over the unfortunate fact that the dull knife wielded by the White House and the Congress means that the major cuts in civilian spending will be postponed to the early part of the next century. That is the good news, relatively. The bad news is that, even assuming the federal budget really will be in balance by 2002, huge deficits will face the American people in the years that follow.

The heart of the fiscal challenge is dealing with the built-in long-term increases in entitlement outlays that are bound to occur as the U.S. population ages. While these are not issues with which the military establishment or its suppliers in the private sector can deal, the resulting cutbacks in the defense sector make austerity the order of the day. Soft and marginal areas of spending must be eliminated—no matter the political cost—if any new expansions in military capabilities are to be seriously considered.¹⁷ Given the uncertainty and

¹⁶ C.F. Bastable, *Public Finance* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1895), pp. 67–68.

¹⁷ Meanwhile, Congress seems determined to play politics as usual with the military budget. See Thomas E. Ricks, “Naval Battle: Awarding of Contracts Irks Senate’s Lott,” *Wall Street Journal*, Apr. 21, 1997, p. A20.

the changing nature of the threats to our national security, a shift in military priorities from the old to the new is essential. Inevitably, budget cuts will hit personnel, operations, and maintenance accounts hardest. Nevertheless, production, construction, and even research and development cannot be totally immune from the budget cutting effort. Instead of a simple choice between “readiness” and “modernization,” what is required is a budgetary scalpel aimed at low-priority items in both categories. After all, who is opposed to readiness or modernization?

America can afford to pay a high price for its defense, but does it want to?

In these difficult circumstances, there is something useful that economists can offer defense planners and decisionmakers. Here are some thoughts that may be helpful in responding to the critics, if not now then surely in the future. The weight of economic analysis strongly supports the view that—within the relevant range of debate—this nation can afford whatever level of military outlays it believes necessary. A 10 percent or 20 percent rise in defense outlays surely will not bankrupt the American nation. This widely held professional view is a byproduct of work done some years ago on the economics of arms control and disarmament. The pertinent restraint is not the ability of the economy to produce defense goods and services. Rather, the key limitation is the willingness of society to devote a substantial share of its resources to the purpose of protecting the national security.

Virtually every analysis of the burden of defense spending has concluded that, if necessary, the American economy can handle a much higher level of such spending than it now does. But there is a flip side to all this. The same studies show that the growth and prosperity of the United States do not require even the current level of national security spending.

The past decade has demonstrated quite clearly that, given a relatively short period of adjustment, the American economy can attain reasonable prosperity with a greatly reduced defense establishment. In fact, the overall growth rate likely would be enhanced if a large share of the resources previously devoted to defense were shifted to capital formation. By capital formation economists mean civilian research and development, new private-sector production facilities and equipment, and education and training.

Surely there is no continuing “correct” share of gross domestic product that should be allocated to defense. The ratio that exists at any time is the accidental result of the federal government’s response to a variety of pressures and factors. Because one number can always be divided into another does not necessarily indicate that any functional relationship is present between the two.

Moreover, higher levels of defense spending may not necessarily equal expansion in military strength. Some spending literally goes down the drain. This does not refer to the silly cases of the \$600 toilet seats. They were exercises in cheap politics rather than examples of costly procurement. After all, a commercial airline does not pay any less for a similar piece of equipment (neither uses the toilet seats sold at the local hardware store). What come to mind instead are the many military projects that are terminated after millions

or even billions are spent on them with no significant numbers of operational units to show for the effort.

In any event, dollars matter because they are the most useful, albeit imperfect, way of representing national resources. Within an inevitably limited military budget, achieving a more effective utilization of resources is not a classroom exercise. It means striving to achieve a higher level of national security within a greatly constrained budget. Quantitative economic and fiscal measures can help in that difficult undertaking. But economists will not win friends among the proponents of the programs that are rejected or curtailed during that process.

It is fitting to give Adam Smith the last word because the wily Scot may provide some solace, at least for the long term. In the passage in *The Wealth of Nations* on the expense of defense, the patron saint of the economics profession describes defending the society as “the first duty of the sovereign” and concludes that it “grows gradually more and more expensive, as the society advances in civilization.”¹⁸



¹⁸ Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (New York: Modern Library Edition, 1937), p. 668.

COMPELLING READING

VIVID AND POWERFUL

persuasive

... and here's what else the **New York Times Book Review** had to say about works by FPRI scholars

NYTimes—May 4, 1997—

**PROMISED LAND,
CRUSADER STATE**

*The American Encounter
With the World Since 1776.*

By Walter A. McDougall.

Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. \$26.

"... first-rate book. Mr. McDougall's sensible account of American foreign policy from Washington to Clinton tells it as it is, and as it was."

NYTimes—March 31, 1996—

THE ENDS OF THE EARTH

*A Journey at the Dawn
of the 21st Century.*

By Robert D. Kaplan.

New York: Random House. \$27.50.

"Robert D. Kaplan is an American master of a newish genre that might be called travel writing from hell . . . a connoisseur of malarial marshes, urinous bus stations, flea-bitten hotels and the *louche* charm of the hustlers, fixers and tramps he meets along the way."

NYTimes—September 17, 1995—

TELLTALE HEARTS

*The Origins and Impact of the
Vietnam Antiwar Movement.*

By Adam Garfinkle.

New York: St. Martin's Press. \$24.95.

"'Telltale Hearts: The Origins and Impact of the Vietnam Antiwar Movement' is vigorously argued and brings a new and unexpected point of view to a subject that seemed to have been exhausted years ago . . . Mr. Garfinkle's greatest contribution to understanding Vietnam is his gut sense that the subject has been abandoned too long."



Foreign Policy Research Institute

For more information contact Alan Luxenberg, FPRI, 1528

Walnut Street, Suite 610, Philadelphia, PA 19102-3684.

Tel: (215) 732-FPRI or Fax: (215) 732-4401.

Israel's Abiding Troubles in Lebanon

by Adam Garfinkle

Between the signing of the Hebron accord on January 15, 1997, and the various troubles in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process that began in earnest in March, much Arab-Israeli diplomatic activity focused on restarting the moribund Israeli-Syrian track. Virtually all of the impetus for this activity has originated in Israel and, while there has been scant sign of progress so far, the Netanyahu government still persists with it. In mid-June yet another attempt was made to interest the Syrians in talks through Miguel Angel Moratinos, the European Union's special Middle East envoy—again to no avail.

Why is the Israeli government interested in such a revival when by any reasonable estimate the prospect for a major agreement with Syria is so slim? Some have argued that Israel wishes to make a deal with President Hafiz al-Asad before his deteriorating health becomes a matter of “final status.” Others cite U.S. pressure to move farther and faster with Syria. But the real answer lies in the Israeli government's preoccupation with the situation in southern Lebanon. That is the only place that has regularly taken a toll of Israeli soldiers' lives in recent years, and where the Israeli air force and navy too have maintained combat-ready high levels of activity. And it is agreed universally that, because of Syria's effective suzerainty over Lebanon, Israel's only path out of that unhappy country runs through Damascus.

The Origins of “Lebanon First”

The early months of 1997 do not mark the first time that the Netanyahu government turned its attentions to southern Lebanon and Syria. Its first diplomatic initiative, it may now be dimly recalled, had nothing to do with the Palestinians but with the Lebanon-Syria nexus. Called “Lebanon first” both by the Israeli government and the attentive media, the idea was to kickstart the stalled Israeli-Syrian negotiations by focusing on the situation in Lebanon. The need was pressing. In April 1996, just six weeks before the Israeli election, southern Lebanon had experienced one of its largest flareups in recent years. Hizballah had shelled northern Israel, leading to the virtual evacuation of the town of

Adam Garfinkle is the executive editor of *The National Interest* and director of the Middle East Council at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Kiryat Sh'mona, leading in turn to Israel's Operation Grapes of Wrath, the terrible tragedy at Qana, and to another episode of high-wire U.S. diplomacy, this one aimed at reestablishing an August 1992 cease-fire brokered by then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher.¹

The basic problem for Israel in the spring of 1996—and still today—is simple enough. Hizballah has grown stronger militarily, showing itself to be increasingly capable of killing Israelis and Southern Lebanese Army (SLA) soldiers, while at the same time escaping disproportional injury to itself. In 1996, twenty-six Israeli soldiers died in the security zone, and about fifty Hizballah guerrillas were killed. The former number is not much higher than in the previous two years, but the latter number is much lower due largely to technical innovations that Hizballah has achieved with Iranian help. It has become harder for Israeli soldiers to detect roadside bombs thanks to new fake-rock disguises fabricated for them, and harder to capture those who plant and operate them for they have learned to detonate the charges from much farther away than before.

Hizballah has also improved its level of tactical sophistication, anticipating and ambushing Israeli reactions to Hizballah-initiated fighting. It is quickly learning how to attack convoys instead of isolated patrols thanks in part to the acquisition of Russian AT-4 Spigot guided missiles via Iran.² Hizballah has even embarrassed the Israeli military in the buffer zone—on one occasion pushing an Israeli platoon out of its base. All of this led Yoel Marcus to write in *Ha'aretz* in early February that “Hizballah is now in full control in the field. Our soldiers are constantly on the defensive.”³

Hizballah's growing prowess has helped turn the tables in the crucial intelligence competition, and defectors from the SLA now provide more information on Israeli and SLA activities than Israel's Lebanese agents provide on Hizballah's activities. Each arm of change has reinforced the other to the point that, for some time now, the only persuasive rationale for Israel's staying is that withdrawal would bring the terrorists and their *katyusha* rockets closer to the border, endangering civilians.

This is the circumstance the Netanyahu government inherited in June 1996. Aside from tolerating the status quo, Israel has only two basic options. The first is to enlarge the security zone to push Hizballah beyond missile range of the border. But virtually no one in Israel favors creeping deeper into the entrails of Lebanon—this having “been done” already, and with very ill and well-remembered effects. The second is to withdraw under the condition—negotiated or implied—that the border remain calm thereafter.

¹ A United Nations encampment at Qana was the site of an Israeli artillery attack in Apr. 1996 in which nearly 100 Lebanese Shi'a refugees were killed. Israeli officials regretted the incident, which they explained as an error. Most Arabs rejected that explanation outright, and Qana remains a much-invoked symbol in the Arab world and in the Arabic press.

² Reported in *Foreign Report*, Mar. 26, 1997, p. 2.

³ Marcus quoted in Al J. Venter, “Recent developments in the Levant preclude peace,” *The Middle East*, Mar. 1997, p. 14.

The phrase “negotiated or implied” suggests in turn that there are two ways of effecting a withdrawal. A withdrawal undertaken with “implied” conditions means that Israel would withdraw unilaterally after letting it be known through the ample reliable channels on hand that any attempt to take military advantage of the withdrawal would be met with a sharp and disproportional response. Such a message’s target would not only be Hizballah, clearly, but also the Syrian and Iranian governments, both of which have actively aided Hizballah activities for several years.

Such a policy, much discussed in Israel following the early February helicopter crash that killed seventy-four Israeli soldiers on their way to southern Lebanon, need not be nakedly unilateral. There is a legal instrument at hand for implementing it—United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 425 of 1978, which followed the first major Israeli military foray into Lebanon—Operation Litani.⁴ UNSCR 425 was never fully implemented; it was not respected by Israel at the time of passage because of the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s presence in the area. Ever since, too, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), created by UNSCR 425, has looked upon the Israeli occupation and the guerrilla war against it as making it impossible to enforce UNIFIL’s full mandate. But, as several observers have argued, if UNSCR 425, which specifies contact between Israeli and Lebanese officials, were reactivated at Israel’s behest, it might be possible for UNIFIL to deploy to the border where, among other things, it could protect roughly two thousand SLA soldiers and their families from retribution. Concern for SLA allies is clearly one of the main sore points making Israel’s adoption of any unilateral option difficult. Anything that promises to allay the problem, even if not of particular military or strategic significance, is nevertheless of great political importance.

It is not entirely clear what the Syrian or the Iranian attitude toward such a shift in Israeli policy would be. But even were they both to oppose it, they may not be able to do so successfully, either diplomatically or on the battlefield. It would be hard for them to argue publicly that Israel should not do what all Lebanese factions insist it do; and it is much harder, to say the least, to wage attrition warfare against Israeli troops that are not present in Lebanon than against those that are.

Nonetheless, the unilateral withdrawal option does have a steep downside. Whereas attrition warfare against Israeli soldiers would be more difficult, attrition and terror against Israeli civilians living in the upper Galilee would be much easier.

More generally, the notion of trusting a United Nations peacekeeping force to do serious deterrent business in a place where real enemies really want to kill one another did not wear well in Bosnia, nor has the U.N. role in the Middle East been particularly successful over the years except in those cases where antagonists wanted the border to remain quiet. For these reasons and others,

**Unilateral
withdrawal
from southern
Lebanon is a
nonstarter.**

⁴ Also pointed out in *Foreign Report*, Feb. 13, 1997, pp. 1–2.

even those Israelis who are relative doves when it comes to the prospects of real peace with Syria—including, for example, Itamar Rabinovich, Israel's former ambassador to the United States during its most recent Labor Party rule, its chief negotiator with the Syrians, and one of Israel's leading experts on Syria and Lebanon—mostly reject the unilateral withdrawal option. So does the popular Likud Defense Minister, Yitzhak Mordecai. It is then, for any practical political purpose, a nonstarter.

The Likud Proposal

While both the present Likud government and the Labor government before it reject an “implied” withdrawal from southern Lebanon, they have done so with a difference. The Labor government insisted on negotiating “prior understandings” with Syria, as Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin put it at the time, and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's conditions for negotiations were demanding. Rabin, and after him Shimon Peres insisted on a probation period of about eighteen months between the calming of the border and an Israeli withdrawal. Israel also sought proof that the Lebanese army—not Syrian forces in Lebanon—were capable of handling Hizballah. Finally, Israel insisted on a link between its withdrawal and formalization of its relationship with Lebanon.

The backdrop to all this, of course, was the Syrian-Israeli negotiation over the future of the Golan Heights. As Labor saw it, a settlement in Lebanon that would have bolstered the power of the Lebanese army and government had to reduce Syria's influence there, though not decisively so. But as Rabin used to put it, Israel was prepared to withdraw from “95 percent” of Golan in exchange for peace and normalization with Syria. Aside from a Golan agreement being considered in Israel's interest on its own terms, the further calculation was that if Syria got most of what it wanted “at the margin” of negotiation, so to speak, with respect to Golan, Israel would get most of what it wanted with respect to southern Lebanon. Moreover, if, as Israel hoped, most of Syria's thirty-five thousand soldiers in Lebanon were to be removed, they would then leave in the context of the overall agreement as Israeli soldiers came down from Golan. Thus would a military logic have joined and supported a political one. It all made good sense. There was only one problem: Syria would not agree.

The Likud attitude toward a deal on Golan, and by extension with respect to southern Lebanon, has differed considerably from Labor's. Many members of that camp want no deal at all over Golan. Some, including the prime minister, have concluded that the best of all possible worlds is a partial Israeli withdrawal in return for a more formal commitment to mutual non-belligerence, and a postponement of questions about full peace, final borders, and political normalization to another, perhaps distant day. No one in the Likud camp is prepared to go to Rabin's “95 percent,” let alone to Peres's 98 or 100 percent return of Golan to Syria. And it seems most unlikely that Syrian President

Asad would accept a Likud proposal offering much less on Golan than the Labor proposal before it.

The Likud's pessimism about the prospect for peace with Syria is bolstered by a different interpretation of Asad's motives from that held by its Labor predecessor, and it is a logic that explains reasonably well why Syria refused to accept Labor's generous offers. Unlike the Labor government's principals, who believed that Asad had made a "strategic decision for peace" and was just dickering over details, Likud principals believe that peace is not Asad's primary goal. They believe instead that he focuses on continuity in the Alawi domination of Syria and all but formal annexation of Lebanon as an integral part of pan-Syrian nationalism. In this view, peace with Israel is not worth the price if it jeopardizes these higher priorities—and it likely would, they think, for normalization would force a kind of Syrian glasnost that might be fatal to Alawi rule.

Given this view of Syrian priorities, the Likud government upon taking office designed a "negotiated" withdrawal strategy that reversed the valences of the earlier Rabin-Peres proposals. As communicated to Syria through Washington in June of 1996, its main features were threefold: Israel would not demand a probation period; there need be no link between an Israeli withdrawal and a formalization of Israeli-Lebanese relations; and the Lebanese military would not be ultimately responsible for controlling Hizballah—the Syrian military in Lebanon would. This meant, in turn and very importantly, that Israel was not seeking the withdrawal of the bulk of Syria's military presence in Lebanon.

Looking strictly at the Lebanese theater, the Likud's offer to Asad had to be more appealing than Labor's. Israel was prepared, in essence, to enable Syria to achieve the end of the Israeli security zone in southern Lebanon without having to reduce its own power there. Israel was also ready to acquiesce to the long-term Syrian political role in Lebanon, partly because the government had concluded that Syrian armed forces—not those of Lebanon—could most reliably control Hizballah. Among other things, this would have to seem to Syria a major vindication of having backed and protected Hizballah all these years.

Relatedly, Likud strategists may also have reasoned that, while Syria funnels weapons from Iran to Hizballah—including some thirty planeloads in a ten-month period in 1996-97—it does this not only to retain its own leverage over Hizballah, but also to limit Iranian access. In other words, were Syria not the funnel for weapons to Hizballah, the supply and nature of Iranian military support for it might be still more extensive and lethal to Israel. Indeed, Iran has complained to Syria about the limits it puts on Iranian activities in Lebanon, and the Iranians are reportedly scouting out bases in Cyprus as a means to circumvent Syrian control should Tehran wish to do more, or Damascus wish to do less, than is being done against Israel at present.⁵ One may reason that, given the weakness of the Lebanese army, Syrian leverage over Hizballah

⁵ See Tzvi Bar-el, "What's So Urgent for Asad?" *Ha'aretz*, Jan. 29, 1997, p. B1.

through its weapons deliveries amounts to a lesser evil for Israel than all other likely alternatives.

Syria's Calculus

However appealing the Likud proposal on Lebanon was in Syrian eyes, Asad again did not bite. This led the prime minister to complain:

I find myself in a Kafkaesque situation . . . in which the Israeli prime minister announces that he wants to leave the territory of an Arab country, Lebanon, and the Syrian government, and with it the Lebanese government, opposes such a withdrawal. In the Middle East there have been a lot of strange things, but I have never seen anything as strange as this.⁶

And yet, the reasons for Syrian reticence are not hard to divine, and the Likud's own hardheaded assessment of Syrian motives suggests what those reasons might be. Syria sees Lebanon, among other things, as one of the very few levers it has by which to influence Israel. It is also a means to maintain a reasonably useful relationship with Iran, which is necessary to promote Syrian interests, vis-à-vis its conflicts with Iraq, Turkey, and the Kurds. In all these conflicts Iran is a Syrian ally of convenience based on concrete interests and make no mistake: thanks to Syria's 360-degree geopolitical agenda, Iranian decisions typically have at least as much impact in Damascus on a day-to-day basis as do those of the United States or Israel.

Nor has Asad paid much of a price, at least since 1982, for using Lebanon as a lever against Israel. When it serves Syrian interests to create trouble for an Israeli government, or to make a "statement" with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian or the Israeli-Jordanian relationship, the use of southern Lebanon as a megaphone has been practically free. Israel's military responses there over the last several years, large and small, have not hurt Asad a bit. On the contrary, every Israeli military response in Lebanon—which has targeted only Lebanese and twice fomented major refugee crises—has worked to strengthen Syria's hand. Israel's tactics have weakened the Lebanese government and driven it to Damascus for help, and these same tactics have occasionally generated crises of sufficient gravity to bring the U.S. secretary of state to Damascus, thereby bolstering Syrian prestige and overall leverage.

The success of any Israeli diplomacy with regard to southern Lebanon depends on understanding correctly what President Asad wants and is willing to give up to get it. This is no easy challenge, not least because what often appears to outsiders as Asad's cunning may instead be a fluctuating indecision driven by the pull of incompatible goals. The best guess when it comes

⁶ Netanyahu's remark came at the graduation ceremony of the National Security College, as quoted in *Jerusalem Report*, Sept. 5, 1996, p. 12; he has since repeated it several times, including in a Feb. 25 BBC interview (aired Feb. 28) by David Frost.

specifically to Lebanon is that Asad wants to maintain Syrian control short of outright annexation. It might be thought, therefore, that Israel's presence and influence in the south is something that Syria should wish to erase. But that is not so—Syria in fact benefits from Israel's predicament in the security zone in several ways.

First, Israel's presence has the general effect of weakening those forces in Lebanese politics most desirous of and best able to limit Syrian influence there in the long run. Second, Israel literally creates a physical space for the concentration of Hizballah activities, the collateral effect of which is to provide both Syria and Iran with a playground within Lebanese territory. Third and most obvious, if and when Israel leaves Lebanese soil, the bedrock justification for Syria's military presence there leaves with it—not that Asad will be moved to withdraw Syrian forces on that basis alone.

Moreover, Asad has no particular need to control southern Lebanon and Hizballah directly, and is leery of the cost of doing so. One piece of evidence for this is that Asad seems prepared to let his army, and especially its officer corps, use its position in Lebanon to make money, because this keeps them supportive of the regime. This is something of no little import given the problems Asad has experienced in recent months with his own extended family's avaricious, corrupt, and unpredictable ways.⁷ Asad is willing to do this, evidently, even at the cost of hollowing out the military capabilities of those forces. After all, no army focused on smuggling drugs and guns, real estate speculation and construction, and running protection rackets can fight effectively. The point is that while Syrian forces could take on Hizballah and win, doing so would relieve Israel of a discomfort that is useful to Syria and at the same time disturb many corrupt but comfortable relationships that have their definite political uses for the Syrian leadership.

President Asad also wants a good relationship with the United States, no doubt. Such a relationship would open up credits and loans, and is desirable generally in authoritarian political cultures like the Syrian one for the usefulness that great power patronage affords in the task of cowing domestic opposition. A better relationship with Washington could also function as an assurance that the United States would restrain Israel *in extremis* should Syria and Israel come to blows, and it could help to secure a deeper American acquiescence to Syria's position in Lebanon. But President Asad has so far not been prepared to do the things necessary to realize those good relations, such as stopping support for terrorism (including Kurdistan Workers Party [PKK] terrorism directed against Turkey), stopping his military in Lebanon from large-scale gunrunning and drug dealing, or negotiating seriously and realistically with Israel.

Asad may well want peace with Israel, too, for all anybody knows, if only because he may deeply crave the return of Golan to Syria. Still, while this

**Syria could
take on
Hizballah, but
why relieve
Israel of its
discomfort.**

⁷ See Guy Bechor, "Al-Hama Will Not Be Repeated," *Ha'aretz*, Jan. 5, 1997, p. B2.

is a widely assumed proposition in Israeli and American policy circles, it is not altogether obvious that an Alawi regime cares so very much about a place Syrians know as Joulán, where no Alawis live. Or President Asad may not really desire peace with Israel for other reasons, not the least of them being that a treaty will not obviate the many ways that Israeli and Syrian geopolitical interests collide, but would help normalize Israel within the region. Put another way, for Syria a juridical peace with Israel would provide an asset to a country with which it is bound to be embroiled in competition.

But even if Asad does desire peace with Israel, he cannot desire it enough to jeopardize regime stability and continuity and, given the closed nature of Syrian society, it is not fanciful to juxtapose the two interests. This seems the best explanation of Asad's behavior that has now gone on over many years and through differently minded Israeli governments: that while he is willing to play at peacemaking with Israel, he has proven unwilling to give up anything of significance actually to make peace, or to accord the matter any great urgency. Asad has become the ultimate peace processor, and may remain so as long as he is never forced to sacrifice anything of significance.

The Missing Link in Israel's Approach

Neither Labor's effort to solve Israel's Lebanon problem through a broad strategy of a Golan deal linked to a Lebanon settlement, nor Likud's use of a narrower Lebanon first approach, has worked, or shows any sign of working. Short of approaching a negotiated solution in a different way, Israel is left with either tolerating the status quo or risking withdrawal without prior conditions. But Israel refuses to entertain the latter route even as the status quo, so-called, becomes more and more perilous. Hizballah has now reportedly acquired hundreds if not thousands of Iranian missiles with a range of 40 km, in other words, weapons that can strike as far away from their launch points as Acre and Safed.⁸ That puts over two hundred thousand Israeli civilians within missile range. Recent reports also claim that Hizballah has received Stinger anti-aircraft missiles from Iran.⁹ Clearly, a few dozen Stingers in the hands of trained operators could sharply increase Israel's costs in southern Lebanon.

What has been missing from both Labor and Likud strategies of negotiated withdrawal—and what an “implied” withdrawal would also certainly require—has been a big stick to accompany its carrots, for nothing any Israeli government does on this negotiating front will work as long as Syria's pain quotient remains comfortably low.

What can be done? Several possibilities come to mind, none of them pleasant or to be undertaken lightly—but then there is nothing pleasant or

⁸ So reported Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Amnon Shahak to the Knesset Foreign Affairs Committee on Aug. 13, 1996.

⁹ See “Stingers for Hizballah?” *Foreign Report*, Mar. 13, 1997, p. 3; and Bill Gertz, “Russia Sells Missiles to Iran”, *Washington Times*, Apr. 16, 1997, p. 1.

light either about Israel's deteriorating predicament in its Lebanese security zone. Israel might attack Syrian military forces in Lebanon instead of Lebanese civilians the next time Hizballah manages to kill Israeli soldiers or rocket Israeli towns. It could employ its air force to napalm or defoliate the marijuana fields in the Bek'a Valley that, though less extensive today than in years past, still constitute a mainstay of the Syrian black market economy in Lebanon. It could support more actively Turkish efforts to resist Syrian support for the PKK. It could undertake, along with the United States and France, a pointed public campaign to enforce the 1989 Saudi-brokered Taif accords to return Lebanese sovereignty to the Lebanese. If all that is not sufficient, it could try secretly to arm and organize, through third parties if necessary, Syria's one-million strong Kurdish community. It could also ask that American consulates in Syria be shut down so that President Asad's cousins can no longer be rewarded with government-sponsored shopping tours of the United States.¹⁰ Still other possibilities might occur to Israeli, U.S., and perhaps Jordanian and Turkish intelligence professionals who understand such matters.

In fine, Israel will not be able to negotiate away its pain in southern Lebanon without credibly threatening to increase Syria's pain there. The current Likud government has a much greater degree of inherent credibility in that regard, not only because Ariel Sharon and Rafel Eytan are cabinet ministers in it but also because Asad believes that the Likud does not really want peace with any Arabs, especially Palestinians and Syrians. Indeed, the major movement of Syrian troops in the summer of 1996 into more robust defensive positions after the failure of Israel's "Lebanon first" proposal may well have owed something to Syria reasoning that it was being set up for military reprisal.

Should a new arrangement over Lebanon be forged either through violence or the palpable Syrian fear of it, then a "partial Golan withdrawal in return for non-belligerence" sort of negotiation might get somewhere after all over the next three years. But short of changing the current Syrian calculus so that it can inflict harm on Israel through Hizballah without suffering anything in return, it is hard to see any compelling reason why President Asad should take risks and pay prices in order to save Israel from its southern Lebanon problem—a problem, as he no doubt sees it, that Israel itself created from its own hubris in a previous Likud era. The self-described lion of Syria has been called many things, but philanthropist is not one of them.¹¹

If Israel is not willing, for whatever reasons, to raise Damascus's pain threshold when the opportunity presents itself, it can still fall back on unilateral "implied" withdrawal, putting its hope in Hizballah's capacity for common sense despite its enhanced military capabilities, and in a reinvigorated UNIFIL mission. Given Israel's political experience with the United Nations over the years, not to speak of its recent failure in the Balkans, this would be a tough sell, to put it mildly. But otherwise there is only the deteriorating status quo, which carries

¹⁰ Suggested to me by a former State Department official who shall remain anonymous.

¹¹ Asad means lion in Arabic and it is the president's adopted name, not his given one.

an ever heavier political price for the present government. Even for an Israeli leadership that has been notoriously slow about coming to the diplomatic point, it must be clear that the time for a decision is at hand.

Implications for U.S. Policy

It should be clear too that should Israel act to end the current impasse, one way or the other, the United States would be wise to help out. A solution to the southern Lebanon mess could redound not only to the benefit of the peace process, but also to the eventual restitution of genuine Lebanese sovereignty over its national territory. Both are plainly in the American as well as the Israeli interest.

The U.S. position of standing behind Israel's failed negotiating strategies can be no more successful than those strategies themselves. It follows, therefore, that should Israel choose a more muscular approach to solving this problem—whether conditionally in the context of an implied or more actively in the context of a negotiated withdrawal—the United States should not automatically oppose it. Indeed, several ancillary but still significant U.S. interests might be served by it, such as putting Hizballah out of the drug-running and currency counterfeiting business.

There is no question that such an Israeli approach would pose delicate diplomatic problems for the United States, especially acute ones if it occurred at a time when Israeli-Palestinian ties were unstable, as they are today. That alone suggests that Israel would be wise to stabilize and advance the Palestinian track as best it can before starting such a wheel in spin to the north. But for all the short-term grief it would probably provoke, the United States should not oppose by reflex the limited use of force to knock the southern Lebanon problem into positive motion. Indeed, it may be the only way out of the present dilemma in which Israel, Lebanon, and the United States are ensnared.

This is not to say that the U.S. government should encourage such an Israeli conclusion, particularly in the absence of any reasonably clear transgressions coming from Damascus. The mess in southern Lebanon is principally an Israeli problem, not an American one, and should not be construed as proprietary American business. But circumstances do suggest that a reflexive American opposition to all forms of violence in the Middle East (except those that it itself occasionally undertakes, of course) is not the right attitude to adopt in this case. After all, the United States itself deploys a very intrusive military presence near and over Iraq, and when Iraq acts provocatively, the United States has sometimes responded with force, and rightly so. Israel should not be deprived preemptorily of a similar option, especially now that it should be clear to all concerned that every other diplomatic path has been trodden, and has led nowhere.



Correspondence

American Anti-Communism

To the Editor:

Professors Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh, in their response (Spring 1997) to my analysis of their book, *The Amerasia Spy Case*, assert that I “spin a theory that the Justice Department had no case because there was no espionage.” What in fact I wrote was that Justice Department officials did not think they could *prove* espionage, as the authors themselves admit in their response when they write that “the FBI was never able to determine if he (Philip Jaffe) had passed on material to a foreign agent.”

As for John Stewart Service, the Foreign Service officer whom Joe McCarthy accused of being a “card-carrying” Communist, “While there is no evidence that Service was aware of Jaffe’s machinations,” the authors write, “he was involved in a plot to leak damaging material on Chiang Kai-shek at the behest of Lauchlin Currie, later revealed to have been a Soviet agent.”

A plot? Sounds sinister. In fact, as the authors point out in their book, “Few in Washington were aware of how chaotic the situation in Chungking had become (in 1945), much less what a strong position the Reds were in,” and Service was eager to get the information out. Was it a crime to tell the American people the truth about the corruption of the Nationalist Chinese government and the growing strength of the Communists? Was it unpatriotic? I hardly think so.

Messrs. Radosh and Klehr also accuse me of “using the *Amerasia* case to prove that allegations about espionage and a coverup were partisan and demagogic tricks.” Not quite. The Soviet Union was engaged in espionage, and it was a threat. I will argue, however, that many of the right-wing politicians and journalists who claimed to be interested in rooting out communists were in fact more interested in rooting out Democrats and uprooting the New Deal.

As for William Rusher, I noted in my correspondence that among the errors and omissions in his review essay, “The Vindication of American Anti-Communism” (Fall 1996), was his statement that *Amerasia* had been published by the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR). He replies that “Frederick Vanderbilt Field, a wealthy communist, owned 50 percent of the stock of *Amerasia* and was for more than three years chairman of its editorial board.” In *The Amerasia Spy Case*, Radosh and Klehr note that “by 1941 he (Field) had given up his financial support of the magazine” (p. 43). That is four years before the *Amerasia* case broke.

Correspondence

Mr. Rusher also says that the Senate Judiciary Committee's report on the Institute of Pacific Relations stated that *Amerasia* "was so closely linked into the IPR system that the IPR family ordinarily treated it as simply another of their own publications." The committee's report was actually as venomous and unfair as the McCarran subcommittee's inquisition upon which it was based. In any event, it is not clear to me what the Field and IPR connections have to do with the alleged coverup and whitewash by the Truman administration of the *Amerasia* affair.

Leonard Boasberg
Philadelphia Inquirer

Review Essays

NATO Germany and Pragmatism's Finest Hour

by Harvey Sicherman

The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992. By James A. Baker III with Thomas M. DeFranks. (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995. 687 pp. \$32.50.)

Germany United and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft. By Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995. 493 pp. \$35.00.)

American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider's Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989-1992. By Robert L. Hutchings. (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. 456 pp. \$39.95.)

The Dawn of Peace in Europe. By Michael Mandelbaum. (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996. 207 pp. \$19.95.)

In January 1989, I was working as a consultant to the State Department, my principal task being to write the Senate confirmation testimony for incoming Secretary of State James A. Baker III. After reviewing my initial draft, one of Baker's confidantes took me aside. He understood, he said, that the statement had to give considerable weight to American interests in Europe. Nonetheless, the new administration was convinced that "the real action" would be in Asia. Europe, he declared, was "old hat" and not much would change there.

There was indeed to be real action in Asia. It came to be called the Tiananmen Square massacre and afterwards the Bush administration did very little with China. Meanwhile, in less than a year the "old hat" that was Europe transformed the entire international landscape as the collapse of the Soviet position in Germany presaged the end of the cold war and indeed of the USSR itself. All American—and Western—assumptions about the shape and future of international politics were swept away and the rest, as they say, is history.

And what history! German unification was about many things, but above all it was about surprises. The first was the peaceful nature of the change.

Harvey Sicherman is president of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He worked as Special Assistant to Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. (1981–82), consultant to Secretary of State George P. Shultz (1988), and served on Secretary of State James A. Baker's Policy Planning Staff (1990–91).

Europe was the most heavily armed continent in the world. Its twentieth-century statesmen had distinguished themselves for fatal miscalculations, twice wrecking the continent with world wars that set new standards of barbarism. But this occasion offered a brilliant exception to the rule. The second surprise was the complete lack of preparation in Washington and all NATO capitals for these events. No one in 1989 expected Germany to be unified so swiftly. Lack of preparation, however, did not paralyze the U. S. government. Instead it was to be pragmatism's finest hour as George Bush and his administration brought the cold war to a soft landing.

The third surprise was the performance of the principal players in the drama, especially those on the Western side. While Mikhail Gorbachev had a reputation for imaginative maneuvers, his counterparts in Bonn and Washington had heretofore been reckoned as solid but dull expositors of the conventional wisdom. Helmut Kohl was a cautious politician who reveled in local politics; George Bush, equally cautious, disdained "the vision thing." What an opportunity for François Mitterand, a man of heightened political sensibility, or Margaret Thatcher, the Iron Lady of the Falklands War and an early enthusiast for Gorbachev, to play outsize roles. Yet in the event, they proved less influential and even marginal to the case.

These surprises and their consequences still affect us. The sudden unification of Germany in NATO and the peaceful end of the Soviet empire reverberate strongly in the current debate over NATO expansion. Meanwhile, diplomats labor to erect a new European "security architecture," the flaccid successor to Harry S. Truman's "free world," Charles de Gaulle's "*Europe des patries*," Gorbachev's "Common European Home," and Bush's "Europe Whole and Free."

Each of the books under review grapples with these surprises and their consequences. Three offer accounts of the end of the cold war, while the fourth draws upon these events to discuss the future of Europe. One observation, however, should be made about all of them. This is history but not popular history. While one catches an occasional whiff of the street, the authors are all veterans of the conference room. Their accounts reflect a pale light: state papers rustle, computers clack, discussions are slow and banal, and carefully reviewed memoranda are stacked upon not so polished tables. One longs even for the sound of a quill scratching out Churchillian flourishes and vividly recording great events. But no matter. At least the pages of these particular histories are not tinted with blood.

Let us begin with Secretary of State Baker's massive tome, *The Politics of Diplomacy*, covering his tenure 1989–92. Baker came into office renowned for skillful tactics, among them his judicious—and successful—cultivation of a "good press" until it became clear that Bush would lose the 1992 election, whereupon the media became markedly critical. Baker never claimed a profound knowledge of foreign affairs, but he had a deep understanding of his president, enjoyed "schmoozing" the Congress, and picked his inner circle of advisers on merit rather than political background. He worked best when given the goal

posts; within limits set by others, he knew how to get things done. Mrs. Thatcher, with her practiced eye, called him a “fixer.”

The Baker memoirs are done in the modern style, aided by a team of researchers and written in part by that contradiction in terms, a “ghost” with a name—Thomas M. DeFranks. They did a good job, and the secretary’s smooth voice rings true throughout. As in all such memoirs, the reader will not find the author anxious to discuss his mistakes. Secretaries of state tend to be proud, and by the end of their terms quite tired of critics. It is the smiley, wily Baker—he likes to win and almost always does—that we encounter in his memoirs.

**Washington’s
worst fear was
a deal with
Moscow
unifying
Germany
outside NATO.**

Baker nonetheless gives a good account of the Bush administration’s views on both the Soviet leadership and the surprising turn of events in Germany. Bush was no great fan of Gorbachev and he suspected that perestroika was hardly intended to weaken the Soviet Union or strengthen the United States. He feared that Gorbachev’s “new thinking” and flashy initiatives were designed to weaken western solidarity and unlike his predecessor, would have no truck with such flighty notions as the abolition of nuclear weapons. He would encourage Gorbachev to reduce tensions but looked to deeds to prove the case. Bush’s National Security Council (NSC) experts seconded his cautious approach.

Baker had no quarrel with any of this but an early trip to Europe exposed him to the worries of America’s allies. They feared that Gorbachev’s “vision thing” would undermine NATO faster than perestroika might loosen up the Warsaw Pact. These fears were greatest in West Germany where foreign policy was managed by Hans Dietrich Genscher of the Free Democrats, the small but pivotal coalition partners of Kohl’s conservatives. Genscher was suspected quite rightly of “Genscherism”—a tendency (like that of former Chancellor Willy Brandt) to pursue an *Ostpolitik* that did not shrink from the Atlantic Alliance’s ultimate diplomatic horror: a deal with Moscow that unified Germany at the cost of breaking its links with NATO. It followed that U.S. diplomacy could not take a back seat lest Gorbachev’s initiatives tempt Genscher.

Baker soon persuaded Bush that caution required a rhetorical float and his speech writers gave the president a phrase (first launched in February 1989 by Baker himself) to serve as his theme: “Europe whole and free.” Bush thereby put Gorbachev’s policy to the test as to whether or not it advanced this outcome (“Whole and free” was better than Gorbachev’s “common European home” because the latter implied America’s exclusion). Baker also spent considerable time with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, assuring him that the United States would meet the “new thinking” Soviets halfway if certain things changed on the ground: e.g., arms control, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Cuba, and terrorism. It takes some intellectual effort in 1997 to recall that while Gorbachev’s USSR may have sounded different from Brezhnev’s in 1989, its external policies still largely resembled “old-thinking.”

Baker’s early and extensive discussions with Shevardnadze in the summer of 1989 informed his pragmatic search for “points of mutual advantage,” as

elucidated by Baker in a major speech that fall. The strategy was to take Gorbachev's high flying rhetoric and pull it down into a series of incremental moves that would amount to genuine change. Baker relates several conversations with the Soviet foreign minister that leave one with the sense that perestroika and glasnost were already slogans of dangerous ambiguity. Baker constantly reassured him that the United States did not intend to "destabilize" the USSR but inquired nonetheless into such delicate topics as the nationalities issue and the lack of perestroika in, for instance, the Baltic States and East Germany. Shevardnadze, embarrassed by a huge miner's strike which Gorbachev bought off with empty promises, offered only a sense of improvisation and a deepening distraction.

Baker professed himself heartened by the Soviet response to his "points of advantage" approach and began to see Moscow as a place where a familiar kind of politics might be played. The perestroikists needed to be shored up against the notion that their reforms were softheaded, wrongheaded, or futile. He therefore censored an effort by Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates to state an idea then ascendant in the CIA: that the perestroikists would be overthrown. Hence, Gorbachev was a bad bet. Baker writes that this may have been the case but it was unwise to say so publicly. Besides, Baker knew well from his experience in the Reagan administrations, during which both Haig and Schultz had been undercut by the NSC and Department of Defense, that this sort of turfman'ship had to be stopped at the outset. He therefore pulled rank, quashed the speech, and continued to bet on Gorbachev.

While Baker hastened to "lock in" change before Gorbachev lost power, the Soviet reformer himself was unlocking change beyond any imagined.

The Soviets Miscalculate

The opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, which took Baker by surprise, had been preceded by a Gorbachev-orchestrated coup against the old-time East German Stalinist Walther Ulbricht. Moscow could hardly insist that perestroika was the salvation of the USSR yet continue to prop up old-style Stalinist regimes throughout the Warsaw Pact. But the Kremlin shared Western illusions about the real state of affairs in East Germany. The Soviet leader thought that a "little Gorbachev" in East Berlin could turn the situation around without recourse to bloodshed. And what was the situation? The German Democratic Republic (GDR) was disintegrating as its most skilled citizens sought to escape. Communist reformers in Hungary pulled the plug in May 1989 by opening their historic border with Austria; this invocation of the old Habsburg dual monarchy led to a stampede of German "tourists" intent upon flight to the West. Announcing that Moscow would not interfere (i.e., use military force) to settle Berlin's troubles, Gorbachev turned the GDR's fortieth anniversary celebration in early October into a wake for Ulbricht. Shortly thereafter, a former Stasi boss named Egon Kranz was hoisted into Ulbricht's place and given the task of reestablishing faith in the GDR's future. But instead of relieving the

pressure, the opening of the Berlin Wall trebled the flow of emigrés. The GDR was being brought down not by those who stayed to protest but rather by those who left.

It was not very long before Baker was contacted by Shevardnadze and Gorbachev, both of whom invoked the magic word—"destabilizing"—to prod the Americans. Evidently, Moscow wanted Washington to get Bonn to restabilize the GDR. This confronted the United States with two essential issues: (1) did the United States really want German unification; and (2) if it did, could it be brought about peacefully in the face of Soviet opposition? Bush provided the answer to the first: yes, if a united Germany remained in NATO. This was straightforward enough. If the United States opposed unification it would have become a coguarantor with the Soviet Union of the division of Europe, destroyed its reputation in Europe for fidelity to its promises and, not least, should have propelled the Germans in Moscow's direction. But by insisting that Germany be unified in NATO, Bush also reaffirmed what many Americans tend to forget now that the cold war is over: NATO was formed both to prevent another German war in Europe, and to deter Soviet aggression. In short, a unified Germany would serve U.S. interests only if it *were* in NATO.

Bush's convictions were not equally shared. It may be said that when the Berlin Wall was opened the Americans looked through the breach and saw the future while the Europeans looked through the breach and saw the past. Baker (and Bush) were twice disturbed by the intrusion of history. The first disturbance came when America's oldest (and most difficult) ally France puzzled high officials unversed in European balance of power politics. President Mitterand suddenly visited Moscow in December 1989. Unbeknownst to Americans this invocation of the pre-1914 Franco-Russian alliance against Germany was reinforced by Mitterand's message. For he and Prime Minister Thatcher let Gorbachev know that they sympathized with a strategy to delay German unification. The second intrusion occurred when the reformist Polish government raised the issue of the Polish-German border, a complicated matter given that the German families expelled when the Soviets extended the Polish border westwards in 1945 were a strong political constituency in Chancellor Kohl's party.

All of this encouraged Gorbachev to urge a revival of the Four Power regime that technically still held residual rights in the absence of a final settlement after World War II. But the Four Power regime was poison to Bonn, symbolizing as it did the negation of German sovereignty and the treatment of the Federal Republic as if it were still full of defeated Nazis. Kohl himself had attempted to preempt a revival of the "four" through his "ten-point" speech of November 28, 1989, that offered virtual functional integration of West and East Germany, a plan deeply disturbing to Moscow and a surprise to Washington. This diplomatic puzzle became more acute because events on the ground were moving so swiftly. The GDR hastily scheduled elections for March 18, 1990, and no one doubted that pro-unification forces would win, adding political pressure to growing de facto economic integration. Moscow would soon face a choice between chaos and military intervention, both of which spelled disaster for Gorbachev and the West alike.

In Washington, NSC staff experts and State's European Bureau wanted to do nothing at all. Fearing the Four Power scheme and Genscherism, they thought that if Washington only let events take their course all would be well. Baker archly disputes this idea; in his mixed metaphor, it was a "recipe for a train wreck." His Policy Planning Staff under Dennis Ross, however, developed a novel solution to the puzzle: the so-called "two plus four" mechanism. The idea was to give Gorbachev (and everyone else) a formula whereby the GDR could be safely buried, diplomacy synchronizing with events on the ground. Thus, the Four Powers would be summoned not to retard unification, but specifically to "facilitate" the merger of the two Germanies.

A Near Disaster and a Pragmatic Victory

Baker broached the plan to Genscher, who liked it. But at this crucial moment two issues were conflated with near disastrous results. First, as Baker's narrative makes clear, he had to struggle with the NSC (and his own European Bureau) for Bush's mind, largely because the NSC staff continued to believe that the Four Power mechanism would fatally damage U.S. relations with Bonn and that the entire scheme reeked of Genscherism, i.e., the Soviets would exploit it to avoid a unified Germany in NATO. Genscher himself stoked these suspicions when on January 31, 1990, he gave a surprise speech (unseen by Kohl) rejecting German neutrality but also the GDR's incorporation into NATO's military structures—a proposal his apologists later claimed was a mere testing of the waters.¹ Genscher also suggested that NATO abjure *any* expansion eastward, no matter what happened to the Warsaw Pact.

Second, there was a serious stumble in Moscow when Baker discussed both the two plus four procedure and the end game—a single Germany in NATO. Baker's own account stresses that he found Gorbachev "receptive" to the procedural formula: "I pocketed his assent quickly and quietly" (p. 205). One's admiration for the secretary's persuasiveness is diluted, however, when, twenty-eight pages later, Baker reveals that he had been saying to everyone including Gorbachev that "NATO jurisdiction" would not apply to the GDR, a formulation that, in Baker's words was "creating potential confusion."

This suggests that for a very brief moment the Soviets may have had the best of all possible opportunities: a Germany politically constrained by NATO from an independent policy and a NATO militarily constrained by agreement with the USSR from defending all of Germany. A diplomacy that effectively wrecked NATO would more than compensate Moscow for the loss of the GDR.

¹ See Frank Elbe and Richard Kiessler, *A Round Table With Sharp Corners: The Diplomatic Path to German Unity* (Nomos, 1996); and Thomas Riese, "The Cold War's Endgame and German Reunification," *International Security* (Spring 1997).

By the time of the Ottawa Summit of February 14, however, Baker had not only straightened the lines but drawn them in directions not nearly so much to Moscow's liking. Here Bush had intervened in the form of a letter to Kohl before his meeting with Gorbachev (which occurred a day after Baker's) that stressed U.S. support for unification strictly within NATO. Backtracking on his previous language, Baker spoke of a GDR covered by NATO but with military restrictions designed to assure the Soviets that Eastern Germany would not become a major NATO military base. With this controversy temporarily laid aside, Baker was now free to concentrate on the "two plus four" procedure itself.

The United States was fortunate that at such a vital juncture Bush and Baker had a remarkably strong and trusting relationship. A president less sure of his secretary of state would have been inclined to heed the NSC. Instead, at Baker's behest, Bush double-checked by speaking to Kohl directly during the Ottawa Summit to make sure that he supported the "two plus four." As for Baker, a secretary of state less sure of his president would not have launched the scheme so confidently even as he contested the NSC. The country was also fortunate to have General Brent Scowcroft as the president's National Security Advisor. He was determined not to allow bureaucratic disagreements to wreck policy and his role throughout remains an unsung but heroic part of the story.

In the event, the "two plus four" negotiations led to a temporary restriction on the extension of NATO to the GDR while Soviet troops were stationed there. They also set permanent restrictions on the placement of foreign troops and nuclear weapons in the former GDR, and on the German army's size (375,000). Nonetheless, NATO's integrated command structure covers a unified Germany today; the alliance did "move east" with Soviet consent. As we shall see, however, some continue to claim that the United States offered a kind of promise to the Soviets that NATO would not expand beyond Germany.

Overall, Baker portrays a steadily more successful policy, largely conceived and executed under his leadership (the President intrudes occasionally in a supporting role) and carried forward by the rapid weakening of Moscow's position. Germany was reunified peacefully, according to the Baker story, because Washington and Bonn were determined to unify Germany in NATO, Washington was clever enough to give Gorbachev a choice (through the "two plus four") other than chaos or force, and Gorbachev himself was unwilling to risk war to preserve the GDR. Mitterand and Thatcher proved largely irrelevant because they failed to grasp that the GDR was beyond salvage, that unification could not be stopped, and that neither the Frenchman's subtlety nor the Englishwoman's willpower could alter those realities. Yet at the end of this triumphant story there is a disquieting note. The Soviets did not use the "two plus four" sessions to settle the issue of whether they would accept a united Germany in NATO. Rather, they remained strongly opposed well into July 1990, even as they demanded NATO declarations and restrictions to "prove" that the Alliance was no longer fighting the cold war. Instead the final deal was done on July 14–15, 1990, by Kohl and Gorbachev together at Stavropol (jokingly called Stavrapallo, after the German-Russian Rapallo treaty of 1922). It involved

a massive German payment to house and feed the departing Soviet troops once they returned to Russia, continuing economic aid thereafter, and the promise of special relations between Germany and the USSR. Bush and Baker were “informed” about this deal after the event. Despite all the good feelings, the Russians had crudely pushed aside the other midwives at the moment of Germany’s rebirth to claim a “special” paternity.

All Secrets Bared

The second insiders’ account, that by Zelikow and Rice, promises to provide a definitive record of the American, German, and Russian diplomacy that led to “Germany unified and Europe transformed.” To this end, Philip Zelikow, a career diplomat and Condoleezza Rice, a professor of Soviet studies at Stanford who served on the Bush NSC, secured “unlimited access to all relevant documents” at the State Department and the White House, as well as “the relevant intelligence documents.” Given the stringent rules that now make it virtually impossible—in the name of ethics—to use such documents after one has left the federal government, this book may be the first and last of its kind. For such an achievement, the authors owe a great deal to Robert Zoellick, counsellor to the secretary of state and a Baker confidante, whose name is prominently associated in the text with the “two plus four” diplomacy.

Given all the citations and broad range of American, German, and Soviet sources, Zelikow and Rice promise a cornucopia of information even for those who participated in the events. The authors are acutely aware that some of their sources remain classified and that they may be suspected of bias because of their views. They point out, however, that most of their sources are already public (“secret” American diplomacy has long been a contradiction in terms). They also take protection in a straightforward narrative style that relies on the steady accumulation of events for its drama. There are many famous names and several well wrought political sketches of the personalities involved.

The authors have found a decent balance in their depiction of the Bush-Baker relationship. Bush’s vital role as the man who set the goal posts—German unification in NATO—and the tone—no gloating over the Soviet defeat—is well described, as is Baker’s tactical agility, confidence in Bush, and astonishing capacity to run multiple meetings. The two made a happy marriage even to the point of not needing fully to explain to each other what they were doing; a kind of “short-hand” often characterized their exchanges and this may have confused their aides, especially the White House set. But events were moving very fast: only about nine months elapsed from the unthinkable to the reality of a united Germany in NATO.

The reader will find the going difficult when, for the sake of the record, Zelikow and Rice give biographies of the birth, brief life, and often messy deaths of various interagency exercises and the papers they produced. We also meet a cast of lesser characters such as the aides, assistants, assistant secretaries, and counsellors who author memoranda, chair meetings, attend conferences,

and only occasionally leaven their interminable talk with a bicker or snicker. Churchill once said that those with one eye on history were apt to suffer restricted vision. These were people keenly aware of the history they were making, but fortunately it was all happening so fast they had little time to posture. Nor should one lose sight of this reality. None of their plans or ideas would have come to much unless their superiors acted on them. Bush and Baker were very much in charge.

Zelikow and Rice are not boastful, although they find American deeds overall to be quite satisfactory. They are able to add numerous insights such as:

Bush's critical decision to commit a large number of U.S. forces permanently to NATO even as he offered reductions in current levels. This was part of the negotiations with the Soviets over conventional force limitations, an act simultaneously reassuring to both Germany and Moscow.

The role of the late Manfred Wörner, a former German defense minister who as Secretary General of NATO came up with the idea of a "special military status" for the GDR in NATO.

A pervasive doubt that the Germans would resist a Soviet offer of peaceful unification in neutrality (i.e., outside of NATO).

The difficulty in gauging Soviet strategy, afflicted as it was by murky Politburo politics, the Lithuanian revolt (May 1990), and the Kremlin's insatiable financial demands.

Zelikow and Rice admit that the NSC had a substantial disagreement with Secretary of State Baker over the "two plus four" scheme, that they opposed his timing, and that he prevailed once President Bush was assured that Chancellor Kohl supported it. They also record very carefully the controversial Baker-Gorbachev meeting in February 1990. They relate Baker's argument to Gorbachev that the Soviet Union would be more secure with a united Germany in NATO, complete with American troops, than with a neutral Germany that might acquire nuclear weapons. And they reproduce verbatim this exchange:

Gorbachev: "Any extension of the zone of NATO is unacceptable."
"I agree," Baker replied.

Then a remarkable revelation: "Neither Baker nor the NSC staffers accompanying him (Gates and Rice) had fully appreciated the legal significance of Genscher's formula (no extension of NATO's jurisdiction) for the defense obligations (Articles 5 and 6) of the North Atlantic Treaty." Once apprised of the implications through the Bush letter to Kohl, which stated that the former

GDR might have a “special military status” within NATO, Baker, to quote Zelikow and Rice, “promptly began edging away” from the formula “he had just offered to Gorbachev” (p.184).

This account has been cited as proof that Gorbachev was misled by Baker into believing that if he signed on to the “two plus four,” the Soviets would not face the expansion of NATO beyond the inner German border or beyond a united Germany. In fact it shows nothing of the sort, and the Soviet leaders fought until the very end against NATO membership for a united Germany. On this score the authors see the real breakthrough coming on May 31 when, in the White House, Gorbachev agreed that a united Germany could choose its alliance affiliation, a right granted every state (in theory) by the 1975 Helsinki Accords. While the Americans could hardly believe their ears, the Soviet leader’s aides physically recoiled in disbelief.

Zelikow and Rice remain puzzled about the *whys* and *whatevers* of the concession. Was it an accident committed by a trapped rhetorician? The Soviets had never had any difficulty before in asserting the rights of nations to choose and then asserting that only one choice—like Soviet elections—was possible. Mitterand’s interpretation of this bombshell was that Gorbachev intended to pursue his agenda in the arena of domestic German politics rather than international diplomacy. And perhaps he was right, for the Soviet leader’s policy thereafter combined demands for a NATO “reform” that would include official bloc to bloc relations (clearly intended to shore up the Warsaw Pact) and a direct approach to Bonn intended to create a special relationship (resulting in the Stavropol agreement).

What emerges from the Zelikow and Rice account, therefore, is a clear picture of the choices: the German-American choice to “hurry up unification,” dictated by the GDR’s disintegration; the American choice to insist on NATO membership, qualified by assurances to the USSR that precluded the GDR as a home for nuclear weapons or large NATO deployments; and Gorbachev’s unwillingness to risk war over the survival of the GDR. Could the Soviets have done better? The evidence suggests that if Gorbachev had reached the same conclusion as Bush and Kohl about the speed of unification, he might indeed have tempted the Germans into a kind of neutrality. The best moment for that was mid-February 1990, before Bush weighed in and Baker retracted on NATO “jurisdiction.” The Soviets’ own delaying tactics, however, let the moment slip until, by May, it was already too late.

What you See Depends on Where You Sit

Robert Hutchings’s book, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account*, like Baker’s, covers much more ground than German unification, but as a Slavic expert he focuses on the end of the cold war and its implications for European security. The author writes well, charming the reader with a sly and confidential tone, and winking as if to say, we both know that diplomats wear not only striped suits but stuffed shirts. Beneath this pose,

however, works a serious fellow whose prescriptions for an “interest-based” foreign policy are every bit as broad as Baker’s.

Hutchings served first in Bush’s NSC then later as an advisor to Deputy Secretary (later Secretary) of State Lawrence Eagleburger. He asserts boldly that the supposedly “vision-impaired” Bush White House sported a real grand strategy behind its “aw shucks” mannerisms. Moreover, he argues that the White House and other agencies concerned with foreign policy, such as State, worked well together and were relatively free of the backbiting of the earlier Reagan years. For both these reasons, he asserts that the Bush presidency was not only a takeover, but a makeover.

The book offers a fine account of the excitement and confusion that marks all new administrations, even one as experienced as the Bush-Baker team. His descriptions of the interagency system with its premium on time wasting and tale bearing will leave the reader astonished that anything is ever achieved. As a sometime speech writer he also appreciates the value of having policy experts who are able to draft speeches, thereby relieving government of the terrible (and sometimes terrifying) quarrels that occur between diplomatic theologians aghast at the heresies of the ignorant wordsmiths and aspiring poets confounded by the pettifoggery of the policy wonks. Hutchings does not say it in so many words, but much more policy is said to exist than actually exists in Washington. Frequently it falls to a poor speech writer to spin a rhetorical web bringing together disparate actions, always prefaced by an assertion that it had all been thought out before.

Bush and Baker eventually settled on government by the few at the top, but not before a hilarious experiment. Hutchings describes with some amusement the “strategic review” which solicited answers from the bureaucracy to a select set of questions. It was preposterous on its face: an administration just elected by a landslide was asking the civil servants, in effect, “what do *you* think we should do?” Four months and untold man-hours later, the bureaucracy’s reply was: “We’re not sure, what do *you* think we should do?” The result was then described with a straight face as a new policy: “status quo plus.” Fortunately by that time policy had been made by other means, often to the exclusion of the professionals fussing over the reviews.

Hutchings claims that the Bush grand strategy was to press Gorbachev carefully for real change, shore up the Western alliance through mutual agreements, bring Congress into the act and spare policy the in-fighting of bureaucracy. Deflating “Gorbymania” was essential to this end, and Hutchings argues that the long “pause” in U.S.-Soviet transactions imposed by the new administration was a conscious ploy. I recall that pause well, but I also recall that after the futile interagency solicitations, the pause threatened to become paralysis. Complaints at home and abroad were already mounting over the slowness of it all. Baker’s speeches in fall 1990 were intended to regain some initiative when the German crisis broke.

Hutchings claims that the United States, more than its allies, foresaw great impending change in Europe and he cites several articles (by himself and others) to prove it. I was not so sure. It was easy enough to see in perestroika

great potential change, but then the Soviets had cycled more than once since 1917 between reform and repression, detente and aggression. The Americans were probably better prepared to deal with the suddenness of it all because we were less burdened by a sense of European history: this was a strength because it made us light on our feet, but also a weakness because we did not always understand the sentiments of our allies. We can all agree with Hutchings, however, that no one forecast the speed of the change, especially in Germany.

As might be expected, Hutchings's White House leads, shapes, forms, and determines policy throughout. Bush is hyperactive and Baker a "walk-on," the exact reverse of Baker's own account. Hutchings's review of "two-plus-four" is the sketchiest of the lot (the idea seems to float up from the mists of interallied discussions), and relegates the NSC-State argument in large part to a footnote.

Hutchings does deal in detail with the Germany-in-NATO issue and stresses (correctly in my view) Bush's essential role in steadying a goalpost dangerously shaken by Genscher's concessionary proposals and Baker's comments on NATO jurisdictional limits. He provides no evidence whatsoever that after mid-February the president ever suggested that NATO extension would be forsworn after reunification (although that was Genscher's position). Moreover, he goes into detail on the changes the Soviets sought from NATO so that it could be depicted as a "transformed" and less hostile alliance. These included "outreach" to members of the Warsaw Pact, a device the Russians believed would codify the "pact to pact" structure they wished to preserve. This was an error on their part but it surely offers no evidence that Gorbachev operated on the basis of a promise never to open NATO to additional members.

To sum up the Hutchings story: the United States was surprised primarily by the speed of German unification. It came about peacefully because American policy, orchestrated by Bush and the NSC (with State in supporting tactical roles), offered the Soviets a new deal for German unification within NATO; Gorbachev was still strong enough to accept the deal but either too weak or too wise to use force to prevent unification itself. Hutchings tells us rather more than Baker about the British and French illusions that rendered their diplomacy ineffective. He also finishes on a disquieting note. For the United States, having grasped that the key to the end of the cold war was the liberation of Central and Eastern Europe from Soviet control, then failed to draw the logical conclusion to the effect that the key to Europe's future lay in the consolidation of that region for peace and democracy.

The epilogue to this otherwise cheerful exposition, therefore, is a litany of how two administrations fumbled both the "architecture" of European security and the Balkans War. Bush stayed too long in the belief that Gorbachev and the Soviet Union would last. In any event domestic politics soon sapped the administration's will to lead abroad, contributing to its ineffective Balkan policy. Clinton and his people were indecisive fumlbers. This is where Hutchings would like to recreate the finest hours of a pragmatic "interest-based" foreign policy, that, as he remembers it, combined a quick brain, a firm hand, and light feet. The expansion of NATO to stabilize Central Europe and close that playground at last to bungling Great Powers and evil ideologues would be for him the

right move at the right time. American leadership, the essential cure for European disorders, would thus be confirmed and entrenched.

The Dawn of Peace in Europe

What for Hutchings is a sound step forward, however, is for Michael Mandelbaum a grotesque error. Mandelbaum, a professor at Johns Hopkins University and a prolific writer on foreign affairs, confesses that he was a true believer in NATO expansion until somewhere on the road to Prague, Budapest, or Warsaw—or was it Moscow?—he experienced a revelation. Mandelbaum is a superior writer and debater, and his formidable skills are much in evidence as he condemns NATO policy.

Mandelbaum begins with a short and compelling argument for NATO's survival as "reassurance." Its historic role of keeping "the Germans down, the Americans in, and the Russians out," remains, albeit under more relaxed circumstances. Mandelbaum recognizes that uncertainty about Russia's course might argue for such "reassurances" to be extended eastward, but he argues strenuously nonetheless that such expansion is more likely to revive Russian imperialism than to hedge against it. He claims that by taking in Central European states, NATO would violate its promise made at Ottawa in 1990 not to expand if Russia consented to a unified Germany in NATO (p. 63). The West would thus be guilty of humiliating and isolating Russia, repeating the allied blunder after World War I, which produced Weimar Germany and then the revanchist Nazis.

These arguments suffer from palpable exaggeration. There is no evidence for the "promise" supposedly made at Ottawa. The "two-plus-four" diplomacy concerned a united Germany in NATO; there was no discussion of other countries. And, whatever Baker said to Gorbachev before Ottawa, it was superseded by Bush and Kohl. Those spreading a tale of the broken promise that befuddled Soviet leaders, intoxicated by good fellowship, forgot to get in writing will have to do better than this.

If there was no specific promise about NATO, was it still nonetheless a reasonable Russian expectation that NATO would not "take advantage," as Bush promised, of Russia's retreat? Only if you believe that Moscow is entitled to resent NATO's intrusion into its sphere of domination, temporarily vacated because of weakness. But this exposes Mandelbaum to a contradiction: if the Russians still regard the Warsaw Pact area as their sphere, then the peoples living there have good reason to fear that a recovered Russia will make a fresh attempt to compromise their independence, in which case NATO membership now is good insurance against the future.

Finally, the West's treatment of post-cold war Russia hardly resembles that of Weimar Germany. NATO does not occupy Russian territory, exact reparations, or ban Russia from world councils. Quite the reverse: the Western powers are giving economic aid to Moscow, indulging Russia's central Asian

“sphere of influence” and, as the recent “G-8” summit illustrates, treating Russia as a power out of proportion to its real economic and military capabilities.

The most important question raised by NATO expansion is whether Russia will find the post-cold war European security structure in its long-term interest. Mandelbaum recognizes that this is at best a speculation, and he describes recent Russian behavior hardly reassuring to its neighbors. He seems compelled nevertheless to exaggerate the extent to which German unification in NATO was the product of Russian consent, hence legitimate, while expansion is not.

In fact, the Russians “consented” to German unification in NATO when they concluded that they could not prevent it without war, not because they wanted it. Since then, Moscow’s preferred European security architecture is the overpopulated ballroom of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), where no one dances without consent, while action is to be found in bilateral relationships decided ad hoc. Put more simply, the Warsaw Pact having died, they prefer NATO to retire and perhaps the Americans with it. This is not (yet) in the cards.

Can Russia, therefore, live with NATO, even a NATO that takes in former Warsaw Pact members? Having lost its empire so abruptly and not yet gained a stronger Russia in the process, Moscow is already resentful of the West. But the Russians are realists. Boris Yeltsin seems to have concluded that opposition to expansion is not worth breaking off with the West. He even restored the more radical economic reformers to his government on the eve of NATO expansion, reminding everyone that the Russians are perhaps shrewder in their priorities than their would-be Western defenders, who, after all, do not have to live in Moscow. But the gamble for the West in expanding NATO is much less risky than Mandelbaum would have us believe. After expansion Russia will not be able to resume its imperial career to the west without encountering NATO some distance east of the German border. But is this a bad thing for us—or, for that matter, for them?

The Wilsonian Legacy in the Twentieth Century

by Francis J. Gavin

The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson: American War Aims in World War I. By David M. Esposito. (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1996. 176 pp. \$45.00.)

The Wilsonian Impulse: U.S. Foreign Policy, the Alliance, and German Unification. By Mary N. Hampton. (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1996. 192 pp. \$55.00.)

Francis J. Gavin recently completed his Ph.D. in History at the University of Pennsylvania. He is a 1997–98 John M. Olin Postdoctoral Fellow in National Security at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.

To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order. By Thomas Knock. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 416 pp. \$30.00; [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995] \$16.95, paper.)

Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century. By Frank Ninkovich. (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1994. 436 pp. \$49.95; \$19.95, paper.)

America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century. By Tony Smith. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994. 484 pp. \$45.00; \$16.95, paper.)

What was Woodrow Wilson's legacy to the practice of American foreign policy and grand strategy? Throughout most of the cold war period, the scholarship on this question was divided into fairly straightforward categories. The first group, whose viewpoint might be labeled liberal internationalist, saw Wilson as a "prophet and pivot of the twentieth century,"¹ who guided the United States out of isolationism towards a role on the world stage which was designed to transform international politics. These scholars shared Wilson's belief that autocracy, closed economies, and the pursuit of realpolitik had poisoned international relations and made war more likely. They lamented the failure of the world fully to embrace Wilson's vision of a world made safe for democracy through collective security and national self-determination.

A second group, known as "realists," took a diametrically opposed view. They echoed George Kennan's harsh criticism of a U.S. foreign policy that had been "moralistic and legalistic" and had tried to portray the Americans as "more wise and noble than we really were."² For realists, Wilson's attack on power politics was wrongheaded. War was far more likely to occur when considerations of power were ignored. Wilsonian attempts to transform world politics were bound to fail because of a simple truth: the international system is an anarchic and ruthless arena where states compete for scarce security and have only limited incentives to cooperate. It is resistant to change. Even when states do cooperate, relative gain considerations and concerns about cheating prevent collective security systems from preventing aggression. So according to this realist perspective, Wilsonian efforts to promote democracy and national self-determination can do little to guarantee stability in international relations.

A third interpretation, most ably articulated by Gordon Levin, suggested that Wilson's foreign policy was largely motivated by economic aims. This provocative view depicts Wilsonianism as a program to advance America's interests through the promotion of a liberal capitalist world order.³ But Levin's framework never really captured the imagination of foreign-policy specialists,

¹ Arthur Link, *Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace* (Arlington Heights, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, 1979), p. 128.

² George Kennan, *American Diplomacy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 169.

³ N. Gordon Levin, Jr., *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968).

and for most of the postwar period, the debate over Wilson's legacy has largely focused on the clash between liberals and realists.

This manichean dispute was so compelling because it reflected fundamental disagreements about the nature of man and the world he inhabits.⁴ Because of its belief in an essentially good and malleable human nature, the liberal view held out hope for the eventual elimination of war through education and reform. History had demonstrated that progress was possible. If states and their civil societies could be recast so that they reflected the will of their citizens, and if democratic governments could come together to punish lawless states, then poverty, hatred, and political inequality would disappear and the major causes for conflict be eliminated. Realists, on the other hand, preferred to see man and the world as they are, not as they should be. Man is not perfectible. The composition of national governments has little impact on issues of war and peace. Politics is the clash of opposing interests, in an arena which discounted moral principles. This is especially true of international politics, where no sovereign existed to enforce laws. For both realists and liberals alike, Woodrow Wilson became the modern lightning rod for an age-old debate, a fact that helps to explain why opinions on his character, politics, and legacy have been so strongly held and so fiercely debated. After World War II, opinions about Wilson often mirrored feelings about the origins and course of the cold war. The argument over Wilsonianism, like arguments over the origins and course of the cold war, were highly politicized and left little room for compromise.

Why is there now a renewed interest in Wilsonianism and its impact on modern world politics? Is there really anything about Wilson and his legacy that was not already known? Is it possible that the intensity of the debate between liberals and realists obscured the true meaning of Wilsonianism? This is certainly the sense one gets when considering the new spate of books. Each one challenges some aspect of the conventional understanding of Wilson and his impact on American foreign policy, and—with the exception of Knock—each implicitly or explicitly challenges the validity of the realist-liberal divide in U.S. foreign policy.

One possible explanation for this reassessment of Wilson may come from the sense, produced by the sudden end of the cold war and the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union, that neither liberalism nor realism (nor, obviously, Marxism) were, by themselves, convincing frameworks to explain American grand strategy in the twentieth century. There is the impression that promoters of both frameworks were caught off guard by the dramatic events of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Realists certainly expected geopolitical competition but not a complete collapse of the Soviet Union, and liberals vastly underestimated the impact of military factors such as the Reagan buildup in bringing the bipolar conflict to an end. If liberals and realists were wrong about the cold war, maybe

⁴ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), pp. 3–4.

they were wrong about Wilson and the impact of his ideas on twentieth-century American policy.

For many students of American foreign relations, neither realism nor liberalism alone seems a wholly satisfactory guide to how America should engage an increasingly complex world during the twenty-first century. Perhaps some hybrid of the two, or even a radical departure from both realism and liberalism, are necessary to make sense of America's role in the world. This cannot be done without coming to terms with Wilson and his legacy. As Ninkovich argues, "our intuitive sense of Wilson's centrality to the story of twentieth-century American internationalism is correct."⁵

This might explain why, for the most part, these new works replace the stark duality with a far more complex and nuanced portrait of Wilson the man and Wilsonianism the ideology. Gone are the simple caricatures of a president driven to simple-minded messianism by his Presbyterian faith. Instead, Wilson is portrayed at different times as a sophisticated observer of international relations, a keen balancer of military means and political ends, a geopolitician grappling with the seemingly insoluble dilemmas of a chaotic, modernizing world. Woodrow, we hardly knew you!

If liberals and realists were wrong about the cold war, maybe they were wrong about Wilson.

Even Wilson's harshest critics have changed their tune. In the past few years, realists such as Henry Kissinger and George Kennan have dramatically revised their portraits of Wilson and his legacy. In his book, *Diplomacy*, Kissinger is now full of praise where he once threw scorn. Wilson's "was an astonishing achievement," his appearance a "watershed." His foreign policy legacy has survived while "history has bypassed the reservations of his contemporaries."⁶ Kennan's conversion seems even more astounding:

I now view Wilson . . . as a man who like so many other people of broad vision and acute sensitivities, was ahead of his time, and did not live long enough to know what great and commanding relevance many of his ideas would acquire before this century was out. In this sense, I have to correct or modify, at this stage of my own life, many of the impressions I had about him at an earlier stage.⁷

Have Wilson and his legacy been misunderstood until now? Do we need to redefine what we mean when we use the term "Wilsonian"? The historiography on Wilson is enormous, and in a brief review, there is no way to answer these questions or do full justice to the complexity and originality of these new works, especially *America's Mission* and *Modernity and Power*. Smith has done an immense amount of research to fill an enormous gap in the literature of twentieth-century U.S. foreign relations—describing the history of

⁵ Frank Ninkovich, *Modernity and History: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

⁶ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).

⁷ See Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 379–80, fn. 50.

America's promotion of democracy worldwide—and has produced a book which will be discussed and debated for some time. And Ninkovich's thesis—that Wilson presciently merged concerns about power, civilization, and world opinion to create a unique and powerful response to the dark forces of modernity—is perhaps the most provocative and original new interpretation of American foreign policy to emerge in years.

Instead, let us explore the claim of strong ideological links between Wilson's world view and that of the policymakers who followed him, especially during the cold war. More importantly, let us investigate some of the challenges that these new interpretations of Wilsonianism present to the much maligned doctrine of realism. Some of the challenges, like Knock's, are direct, and fall under the traditional differences between liberals and realists. But others offer something more challenging if indirect: a view that Wilson and his legacy were something different than what we have previously understood. In short, it is proposed that Wilson and the principles associated with his name are not the opposites of traditional realism, nor are they the product of simple idealism. What is suggested is that Wilsonianism, as a framework to guide American foreign policy and grand strategy, actually defines and protects U.S. national interest far more effectively than traditional realism, and amounts therefore to a sort of "meta-realism."

These are important arguments. Far more is at stake than Wilson's standing among diplomatic historians. How we understand Wilsonianism impacts not just our understanding of the Versailles, the treaty fight, and American policy during the interwar years, but, as these new works emphasize, our view of the whole course of twentieth-century American foreign policy, including the origins, course, and end of the cold war. Furthermore, students of international politics cannot escape the prescriptive elements of their scholarship. If we praise Wilsonianism and condemn realism, we are asking policymakers to reject one type of foreign policy and embrace another. Hence, it is all the more important we understand the true nature of Wilsonianism, its impact, and its value as a framework to guide future policy.

Wilsonianism as Meta-realism?

Realism dictates that a government's first responsibility is to use whatever tools are necessary, including diplomacy, the threat of force, and even war itself to advance the national interest. The realist defines national interest as the search for security and survival in a dangerous and uncertain world. But is it possible that traditional realists define the national interest too narrowly? The new interpretation of Wilsonianism suggests that the greatest challenge to American security in this century may not have been how to respond to shifts in the global balance of power, but rather to the revolutionary political, economic, and social changes unleashed by modernity. Radical political responses to nationalism, mass politics, and industrialization created unstable and aggressive states which threatened to contaminate the international system and make the

world dangerous for U.S. values and interests. These contaminants had to be quarantined or destroyed if the American way of life was to survive.

What if Wilson promoted democracy, self-determination, and the League of Nations, not out of ideological conviction, but out of a calculation that such a policy was really in America's long-term national interest? Perhaps Wilson was not inspired by messianic idealism, but a fear that a disordered world, absent massive U.S. intervention, would eventually become a geopolitical nightmare that America would be unprepared to meet, save by resorting to means (a garrison state) that would subvert core American values. Wilson, these works suggest, was the first modern statesman to understand that new means and new methods had to be used to secure the increasingly hard-to-define national interest.

Of the works reviewed, only Thomas Knock retains the pure liberal and realist distinction, and in fact sharpens it, by pointing out that Wilson's "progressive internationalism" had strong idealistic roots and was significantly different than other versions of internationalism current in Wilson's time. Knock's book is an excellent chronicle of the intellectual roots of the League of Nations. The idea for the League came well before the Versailles conference, and its brief popularity within the United States was made possible by Wilson's embrace of a dynamic political coalition of the American left and liberal left during the 1916 elections. Knock convincingly demonstrates the intersection of domestic and international concerns which drove the coalition and informed both Wilson's reform legislation of 1916 and his New Diplomacy in 1917.

Knock does little to hide his sympathy for the progressive internationalist belief that the war had been caused by European imperialism, militarism, and balance of power politics. He criticizes Wilson for moving his European diplomacy away from its progressive internationalist roots as the war went on. This shift, combined with Wilson's wartime suppression of civil liberties, alienated much of the coalition of socialists and liberals by the time of the Senate Treaty fight. For Knock, the defeat of Wilson's idea of a League of Nations with strong U.S. participation was defeated long before the president returned from Versailles.

How does Knock assess Wilson's legacy? Again, he finds himself alone among the authors reviewed. Wilson's vision essentially died with him, at least among policymakers. Knock sees little continuity between Wilson's internationalism and the hardheaded globalism embraced by cold-warriors such as Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles. "If Wilson was the father of internationalism, then his children—those who fashioned Cold War *globalism*, as distinct from internationalism—were in the main, illegitimate."⁸

David Esposito, by contrast, conflates elements of idealism with a higher brand of realism in his depiction of Wilsonianism. "Where there are ideals, there is, of course, self-interest."⁹ Furthermore, *The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson*:

⁸ Thomas J. Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 272.

⁹ David M. Esposito, *American War Aims in World War I* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996), p. 4.

American War Aims in World War I contends that Wilson had a coherent grand strategy which tailored America's military effort to its war aims. Of course, this has not been the standard view. It has often been argued that if the United States were actually fighting a war to defend its neutral rights, then it should have relied on naval strength and material aid to the French and British armies rather than on the building of a large American army for use on the Western Front. Esposito contends that neutral rights was just a pretext Wilson used to intervene massively in the war to prevent a German victory, an outcome which would have grievously harmed U.S. national security. Invoking something Esposito calls a "preemptive national defense," Wilson viewed Imperial Germany as a lawless state bent on hegemony, hence geopolitical danger, not messianic idealism, motivated his projection of enormous American power to Europe.

Tony Smith's *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* has a twofold purpose: first, to recount the history of American efforts to promote democracy worldwide during this century, and secondly, to assess how those policies have contributed to "the surge in the number, the strength, and prestige of liberal democratic governments worldwide at the end of the twentieth century."¹⁰ Smith contends that American efforts to spread democracy have been inspired by more than idealism. In fact, the rise of stable democratic nations around the globe was (and is) clearly in America's best national interest. And Smith unapologetically extols an American policy which, though at times self-centered and poorly thought out, played an enormous role in bolstering the type of peace-loving democracies whose stability and social harmony make for a much safer world.

For Smith, the promotion of Wilsonian values may have been the most effective element of America's national security policy during the cold war. Smith argues that Wilson understood the potential dangers unleashed by the tremendous forces of modernism, particularly mass politics driven by nationalism and class conflict. If these forces were not contained and channeled into stable liberal democracies they could create unstable, aggressive states that would poison the international system. It was by no means inevitable that modernity would usher in a liberal democratic order with some sort of intractable Hegelian process. Liberal democracy had strong competitors in the battle: fascism and communism. Americans could not just stand back and hope that the hand of history produced pluralistic governments modeled after their own. They had to take an activist approach, supporting and protecting democracies where they took root and battling against the alternative political philosophies offered up by modernity. In this vein, Smith argues that America's most impressive foreign policy triumph this century may have been democratizing the two most warlike societies in modern history, Germany and Japan. A century from now, this may seem a more impressive achievement than defeating the Soviet Union in an overly militarized, bipolar conflict.

¹⁰ Smith, *America's Mission*, p. xiii.

Mary Hampton, in *The Wilsonian Impulse: U.S. Foreign Policy, the Alliance, and German Unification*, contends that the realist explanation for American policy in Europe during the cold war is inadequate. Hampton is one of a growing number of political scientists who are interested in the impact that ideas have on foreign policy making. Previously, this new approach has focused on international institutions, and in particular, the impact of Keynesian thought on what is often called the Bretton Woods economic order. Hampton uses this framework to study American political and military policy towards Germany during the postwar period. Hampton claims that a cluster of ideas, which she tags "the Wilsonian impulse," moved postwar policymakers to abandon power politics in Europe and seek a transatlantic system based on a community of Western nations. Because of a set of historical lessons which Hampton dubs the "Versailles remedial," U.S. policymakers decided to avoid a harsh treatment of Germany and instead include a democratic Federal Republic within the alliance as an equal. Hampton claims that this policy was validated by the peaceful reunification of Germany in 1990, an outcome she does not believe would have been possible if purely realist policies had been pursued during the cold war.

The Wilsonian impulse prompted postwar policymakers to abandon power politics.

Ninkovich's Wilson is not the optimistic idealist one usually encounters, but a dark, pessimistic geopolitician. *Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century* argues that Wilson "was no slave to the idealistic world view with which he has been so closely identified." Instead, Wilson was the first American statesman to articulate a strategy to confront the terrifying dilemmas of modernity which confronted the international system. Realism may have been the appropriate response for pre-industrial monarchies focused on dynastic struggles, but in an age when war was so destructive that it was no longer a rational tool of politics, balance of power politics would no longer do.

Ninkovich argues that the world Wilson found was not self-equilibrating, but was instead best understood by the metaphor of the domino theory. This metaphor described a tightly linked, interdependent world where even the smallest conflagration could spark "open-ended and uncontrollable" escalation. It did not matter how the dominoes were aligned or whether the first to fall was in the center or at the periphery. Once the chain reaction began, it could not stop itself, and ultimately the last domino, the United States, would fall as well.

For Ninkovich, Wilson was the first American statesman to recognize that to ensure the safety and security of the United States itself, the whole dynamic of the domino process had to be stopped. Since traditional forms of power could not be opposed to power without "bringing down upon the world the most frightful consequences",¹¹ Wilson had to rely on new tools, in particular, that of world opinion.¹² This dependence on world opinion helps to explain

¹¹ Ninkovich, *Modernity and Power*, p. xiv.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. xiii.

the almost obsessive concern that post-Wilsonian leaders showed for the credibility of American commitments, an obsession which makes little sense to Ninkovich in a purely realist paradigm. Concerns about credibility and world opinion were responsible for the cold war policy of “symbolic interventionism” in such otherwise marginal areas as Korea, Vietnam, and even Berlin.

Collectively, these new works suggest that Wilson influenced his presidential successors far more than has been previously acknowledged. Furthermore, they offer a vision of Wilsonianism that would seem to incorporate and protect the long-term national interest more effectively than realism. Equally important, Wilsonianism as depicted by these authors would appear to address the dilemmas and limits of power in the modern world in a way realism does not. But are their claims justified?

Realism, Democracy, and the Dilemmas of Power

The first thing to point out is that it is difficult to argue on any grounds that Wilson's policies were a success in his own time. The criticisms of Wilson's attempts at neutrality, his wartime strategy, and his bungling at Versailles are well known and need not be repeated here.¹³ It need only be pointed out that three great democracies, led by Wilson's America, dictated the most unstable great power peace in history, in large part because they failed to come to terms with the importance of power in international relations. The heart of the Versailles system was destroyed by 1924, irreparably damaged by France's inability—in the absence of American and British support—to compel Germany to abide by the terms of the treaty.¹⁴ Wilson's grand strategy, assuming he had one as the term is normally understood, was an abject failure.¹⁵ A policy which recognized the importance of “keeping Germany down and America in,” and which addressed the economic needs of post-World War I Europe, would have produced a far more stable order.

But the more interesting claims raised by these books have to do with Wilson's legacy, which they all judge to be highly beneficent. The first claim involves the connection between the global spread of democracy and American self-interest. That the promotion of democracy is a wise and noble undertaking would seem self-evident. Americans are proud of their values and institutions and sense that the whole world would benefit if American-style democracy and liberal capitalism were embraced by other nations. But there are many times when the promotion of democracy will clash with America's self-interest. Would

¹³ See, most recently, the chapter on Wilsonianism in Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State. The American Encounter with the World Since 1776* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997).

¹⁴ Stephen A. Schuker, *The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1976).

¹⁵ For an excellent critique of Wilson's grand strategy and wartime foreign policy, see Lloyd E. Ambrosius, *Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1991).

U.S. national interest be served by democratization in Saudi Arabia? Few in an otherwise “Wilsonian” State Department would admit it, but the answer is no. What about America’s policy towards Tito’s Yugoslavia after his break with Stalin? Tito headed a brutal communist police-state which violated basic human rights and viciously attacked the Catholic Church. Exiled Yugoslav democrats were shunned by the American government and prevented from using the Voice of America and other instruments of anticommunist propaganda. But Yugoslavia was a geopolitically important “enemy of our enemy.” Buttressing Tito, though in many regards distasteful, was understood to be far more important than promoting a democratization process which would destabilize and weaken a nominal ally and shift the balance of power in Europe against the United States.

For Smith, there was no greater success story in twentieth-century American foreign policy than the democratization of postwar Japan and Germany. But was it democratization which secured America’s national interest in these countries? Imagine, for instance, a postwar democratic Japan shorn of the American military presence and security arrangement. The likely result would have been far greater instability in East Asia and no guarantee at all that Japan would ally with the West. So what if America had to choose between an autocratic Japan firmly allied to the West, or a democratic but neutral Japan? Realism, with its concerns about the balance of power, would dictate the former, and from a policy perspective, that would have been the correct choice. This question may take on greater importance in years to come as America reassesses its military posture in East Asia.

The same question applies to Germany after the war. Was it more important from the point of view of U.S. national interest that West Germany became democratic or that it be firmly attached to NATO? In the elections of 1949, Social Democrat Kurt Schumaker nearly won the chancellorship with his party running on a platform calling for German neutrality. Such a neutral or “nationalistic” West Germany might have pursued a strategy similar to that of the Weimar Republic and played the Western alliance off the Soviet Union in order to achieve unification without tangible political or military restraints. Such an outcome, which was certainly possible in a democratic West Germany, would have struck at fundamental American interests no less than the “democratization” of Iran following the fall of the Shah devastated American strategy in the Gulf. Clearly, there may be times when the promotion of democracy and the national interest will clash, a fact fully understood by realists.

In fact, despite the claims of Hampton, Smith, and even Ninkovich, it could be argued that American policy towards Germany during the postwar period is one of realism’s greatest success stories. After the Second World War, the United States faced enormous political, economic, and military difficulties in Europe: a powerful Soviet Union seemingly determined to dominate the whole continent, a divided and resentful Germany that was sure to be a source of danger in years to come, a weakened Western Europe, lacking the confidence and strength necessary to stabilize Europe, and an American populace unwilling to make a large military commitment in Europe. But in the two decades following

the war, the United States struggled to come to terms with the seemingly insoluble problem of rebuilding and defending Western Europe while keeping Germany in line and not provoking the Soviets. This involved confronting the seemingly intractable dilemma of marshaling German power for the Western alliance without allowing such power to be used independently. This problem was made all the more difficult by the fundamental changes to the international system produced by the nuclear revolution. This struggle had little to do with Wilsonian concerns about world opinion or democratization or even the spread of American values. It had to do rather with the distribution of military power in Central Europe.

The post-1945 story, as told by the realists, had many successes, especially the 1954 accords which set up a NATO system that could “keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” By 1963, more than fifteen years of effort had resulted in the outlines of a stable peace settlement in Europe. The Soviets accepted the status quo in Central Europe and especially West Berlin in exchange for America’s guarantee that Germany would remain non-nuclear. West Germany was anchored in the Western alliance, unable to act independently, but thankful for American military protection.

This settlement established a stable balance of power in Central Europe which removed much of the threat of war. There were certainly mistakes along the way—Eisenhower’s tacit policy of nuclear sharing with the allies, including West Germany, comes to mind—but the whole process was driven by calculations of military and political power by sober-minded American statesmen. The status quo became stable because each side recognized the other’s interests and because the Western alliance and Soviet bloc balanced each other militarily. That is exactly how balance of power politics is supposed to work. This is not to deny the importance of ideas on policy making or the cultural roots for definitions of national interest. But in a dangerous world, where the only universal language is power, what might be called the discipline of responsibility prevents, or should prevent, policymakers from taking risks in the name of ideology.

What about the further claim that traditional realists do not understand the limits of power in the modern world? This is a theme in all of the works reviewed but it is most effectively argued in *Modernity and Power*. In Ninkovich’s words, technology had become so devastating that the real issue became “how to employ that power without starting a major war.” Hence, new means of statecraft had to be invented and the cold war is best understood as “the ongoing attempt to work out neo-Wilsonian solutions to a nightmarish set of problems first defined by Wilson.”¹⁶ For Ninkovich, the first great challenge came in Korea, thanks to which, the Truman administration

was forced to confront head-on a central issue of the cold war . . . the centrality of symbolism and its effect on world opinion . . . Henceforth, the kind of geographic

¹⁶ Ninkovich, *Modernity and Power*, p. 166.

ranking of American priorities that Kennan had in mind . . . was impossible to enforce because problems of perception, will, and world opinion could not be geographically localized.¹⁷

In order to bolster world opinion, maintain Western morale, and strengthen the credibility elsewhere, aggression had to be met. But aggression had to be met without launching World War III. Hence the origins of “symbolic interventionism.”

But were traditional realist concerns really absent in policy making over Korea? In the critical period of 1950 through 1953, U.S. policy in Korea and throughout the world was acutely responsive to changes in the military balance. The decision not to escalate the war during the winter of 1950–51 was driven largely by a sense of Western weakness vis-à-vis the Soviets. Self-restraint was also driven by the kind of “geographic ranking of American priorities” which Ninkovich claims were no longer operative. It was the wrong war, against the wrong enemy, at the wrong time not because war had become unthinkable, but because NATO was not yet prepared to fight a global war against the real enemy, Russia. By 1953, the situation had changed dramatically. As a result of the NSC-68 inspired buildup, the United States dramatically increased its military capabilities, acquired nuclear superiority, and began to rearm Western Europe. This change in the military environment shaped U.S. political decisions. By late 1952 and early 1953, American policymakers were far more willing to escalate in Korea, even if that meant the use of atomic weapons, and to risk global war with the Soviets. That threat of escalation was precisely what helped to bring the war to an end. Nor was such boldness limited to Korea. U.S. policy in Germany, Indochina, and Iran were all far more assertive by late 1952 and 1953 because of the favorable shift in the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union.¹⁸

It should be emphasized that during this time period total war was not in fact ruled out, as would have been the case were “Wilsonianism” driving policy. No responsible American policymaker wanted a global war. But if the Soviets were bent on world domination, or at least on expelling U.S. power from Asia and Europe, then war was inevitable, and the United States needed a military posture sufficient to prevail and ensure its survival as a functioning society. Indeed, if Russia should prove incorrigibly aggressive, then putting off a showdown with it might be dangerous.¹⁹ The military policy of the United States during the 1950s and early 1960s was simply not driven by symbolism or world opinion, but by cold calculations of Soviet intentions and capabilities. Evidence even exists that strategic nuclear preemption was not completely ruled out until late 1963.²⁰

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 191.

¹⁸ For a far more detailed explanation of how the shifting military balance impacted American policy making, see Marc Trachtenberg, “A ‘Wasting Asset’ American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949–1954,” in *History and Strategy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991).

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 147.

²⁰ NSC Meeting, Sept. 12, 1963, National Security Files, box 314, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston.

This issue bears on Ninkovich's "obsession with credibility" which he claims made no sense under a traditional realist perspective. Why make commitments to Korea, Vietnam, and Berlin when their loss would have so little impact on the balance of power? According to Ninkovich, this "symbolic interventionism" in peripheral areas was necessary to bolster the Wilsonian solution of world opinion and avoid the dreadful day when America was forced to choose between global war and capitulation. Examining American decisions in Korea, Ninkovich claims that "with traditional balancing systems no longer available" to check expansion, failure to act "would have thrown open to doubt the American commitment to the Wilsonian world view—the credo in credibility—with the result . . . that it would have been necessary to reexamine totally cold-war policy." These commitments on the periphery were meant to arrest the domino process before it threatened more important American interests elsewhere, particularly in Central Europe.

Ninkovich is correct to point out that the destructive power of modern weaponry complicated postwar international politics. But did this new military environment force American policymakers to replace traditional realism with Wilsonianism during the cold war? In fact, the heightened dangers of the nuclear age made a realistic understanding of new threats, capabilities, and intentions more important than ever before. Policymakers and strategists alike understood that the thermonuclear revolution made total war an absurdity. But they also recognized that the best way to prevent a global war was to be prepared to use nuclear weapons if absolutely necessary. The problem of deterring the unthinkable could not be separated from the problem of how best to use nuclear weapons in case the unthinkable occurred. Eisenhower, for example, instinctively understood the "dilemmas of deterrence" when he contended that America had to be ready to "push its whole stack of chips into the pot" during the Berlin Crisis if the Soviets were bent on humiliating the United States. Eisenhower—who realized that no one could "win" a nuclear war—recognized that demonstrating resolve was a key element of power politics.

The issue of resolve and credibility have always been important to realists. In many ways, the nuclear age made the balance of resolve as important, if not more important, than the balance of objective military factors. Strategists like Bernard Brodie, Albert Wohlstetter, and especially Thomas Schelling demonstrated how the "art of commitment" and strategies which manipulated risk altered how policymakers thought about the balance of power and made decisions about war and peace. Crises could become competitions in risk taking, a model that could go far to explain the Berlin crisis. The key point here is that policymakers' "obsession with credibility" can be explained without embracing a Wilsonian framework. Nor is a Wilsonian framework necessary to explain the interdependence of American commitments during the cold war. As Schelling explained,

we tell the Soviets that we have to react here, because, if we did not, they would not believe us when we say we will react there . . . The reason we got committed to the defense of Berlin, and stayed committed, is that if we let the Soviets scare us out of Berlin we would lose face with the Soviets themselves . . . It would be bad enough

to have Europeans, Latin Americans, or Asians think that we are immoral or cowardly. It would be far worse to lose our reputations with the Soviets . . . Our deterrence rests on Soviet expectations.²¹

Conclusion

These criticisms should not detract from the fact that these works are important contributions to our understanding of the legacy of one of the most perplexing and complicated presidents of the twentieth century. All of the works are compelling and worth reading. Smith and Ninkovich especially, should be on the shelf of any serious scholar of U.S. foreign relations. But reports of the demise of realism have been exaggerated of late, and Wilsonianism, however defined, cannot define the national interest or serve as a blueprint for policy more effectively than realism. The dramatic changes of the modern world have not eliminated the need to worry about the balance of power. The awful destructiveness of modern weaponry has not divorced the use of force from international politics. In fact, these changes make cold, calculated, “realistic” assessments of international relations all the more necessary. Peace and stability are more likely when considerations of power are taken into account in policy making. When ideology or morality drove American foreign policy during the twentieth century, the result was often failure. Realism is the most prudent policy for the modern world because on the big issues, as Ninkovich quotes Dean Acheson saying, “we can be wrong only once.”²² As for Wilson himself, perhaps his best epitaph flowed from the pen of the first modern realist, Machiavelli: “Men always commit the error of not knowing where to limit their hopes, and by trusting to these rather than to a just measure of their resources, they are generally ruined.”²³ This hard-learned lesson may have been Wilson’s most lasting legacy.

²¹ Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influences* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 55–56.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 119.

²³ Machiavelli, *Discourses* (2, 27), quoted in Smith, *America’s Mission*, p. 345.

Russian Foreign Policy in Search of a Nation
by Yaroslav Bilinsky

Vom Sowjetimperium zum eurasischen Staatensystem: Die russische Aussenpolitik im Wandel und in der Wechselbeziehung zur Innenpolitik. Ausgewaehlte Beitrage von Boris Meissner (From the Soviet empire to the Eurasian system of states: Russian foreign policy in transition and in its relation to domestic politics. Selected contributions by Boris Meissner). By Boris Meissner. Edited by Dieter Rauschning and Alfred Eisfeld. (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1995. 368 pp. 128 German marks.)

Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire to Nation-State. By Nicolai N. Petro and Alvin Z. Rubinstein. (New York: Longman, 1997. 347 pp. \$45.00.)

From Empire to Anarchy: Post-communist Foreign Policy and International Relations. By Mette Skak. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996. 340 pp. \$55.00, cloth; \$18.95, paper.)

Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A minority faith. By Andrew Wilson. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 300 pp. \$15.95, paper.)

After the close reelection of an unwell President Boris Yeltsin in 1996, questions about the basic thrust of Russian foreign policy can no longer be ignored. This summer's NATO summit in Madrid saw formal invitations to join the alliance extended to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, but previously voiced Russian objections to the expansion raised a critical question for the United States and its allies: does the Kremlin merely aim to establish hegemony over its immediate neighbors, or is it rebuilding a full-fledged Russian empire?

The study of post-1991 Russian foreign policy goes far beyond the usual academic concern over whether a tenable national interest exists and who defines it. What, in fact, is the Russian nation? Does it comprise all the citizens of the present Russian federation? Or is it much broader, embracing the federation's citizens as well as the approximately twenty-five million ethnic Russians who live outside the federation, both in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and in the three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia? Or does the Russian nation include all Russian-speaking people in the former Soviet Union, which may increase the number to as many as thirty million? Given the large Russian-minority populations in Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, and Moldova, to name only the Western successor states of the USSR, are Russian efforts to reintegrate the CIS and the Baltic states into a real federal state a legitimate pursuit of national interest? And if so, will Moscow feel compelled to extend Russian hegemony over East-Central Europe in order to

Yaroslav Bilinsky, Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Delaware, has taught Soviet and post-Soviet foreign policy. He is the author of *The Second Soviet Republic: Ukraine after World War II* and articles on Sovietology and post-Sovietology.

safeguard the new “states of Eurasia”? Will the twenty-first century see a return to the atmosphere that prevailed in 1949 when the Soviet Union developed and tested nuclear weapons?

Hegemon or Imperial Power?

The four books under review here deal with Russian foreign policy and the accompanying questions directly and indirectly. The first is a festschrift dedicated to Professor Boris Meissner on his eightieth birthday by the members of the Goettingen Study Group, which he has chaired for thirty years. It is a selection of eleven of Meissner's articles published from 1983–95, with a conclusion written especially for this book by Meissner. His familiarity with Russian foreign policy comes from firsthand experience as a West German diplomat stationed in Moscow in the 1950s. Meissner has since taught Sovietology at the Universities of Kiel and Cologne and has continued to advise the German chancellor—for instance, during the negotiations on German reunification.

Regrettably, Meissner's volume lacks an index, which would have helped the reader to trace the many actors and events he touches on. The first third of the book covers the Soviet period, while the remainder is devoted to Russia's foreign policy and its interplay with Russian domestic politics, phenomena that are of greater concern today. In general, Meissner's articles read like detailed political and diplomatic commentaries on relatively recent events. Well-ordered and almost exhaustive evidence makes them eminently persuasive. (Zbigniew Brzezinski once commented that Meissner had his files arranged with the precision of an officer of the German general staff.)

One of the best articles on the post-cold war period is Meissner's analysis of “The Two Baselines of Russian Foreign Policy.” In it, he briefly sketches the “Eurasianist” conception, then that of the “neo-Slavophiles”—who, on balance, have sided with the “Eurasianists”—and lastly deals with the “Atlanticists,” best personified by Andrei V. Kozyrev, the former Russian minister of foreign affairs. Meissner documents Kozyrev's and Yeltsin's capitulation to their critics among the ranks of the Eurasianists and the neo-Slavophiles since the spring of 1992. Although Yeltsin won the popular referendum in April 1993 (with a small majority) and prevailed in the bloody confrontation with his parliament in October 1993, Eurasianist pressure forced him to adjust Russia's foreign policy to the right. Indeed, vis-à-vis the states of the CIS, Russia has become more hegemonic. In the space of one year, from 1992 to 1993, those states went from the status of good neighbors to candidates for a firm confederation under Russian leadership. Russia also claimed it should be recognized as the main peacekeeper throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union, something that both the United States and Great Britain ostensibly rejected. More ominous still, since late 1992 Russia has asserted that it has the right to intervene in other states to punish violations of the rights of ethnic Russians, or even Russian speakers. While this punishment would preferably take the

form of diplomatic and economic sanctions, Moscow did not rule out the use of military force.¹

In other articles Meissner analyzes the changes in power relations within the CIS; details the end of Soviet hegemony in East-Central Europe and the beginning of a would-be-hegemonic Russian policy toward the very same states; and documents Yeltsin's vacillations on Poland's entry into NATO.² But the most important piece in this volume is Meissner's new study of Yeltsin's foreign policy in the interplay of domestic and foreign politics, which comes with its own extensive bibliography.³ He points out that Yeltsin thanked the Russian armed forces for their help against his parliamentary opposition by endorsing a new military doctrine in November 1993. That doctrine called for developing collective security arrangements in the CIS and coordinating military and defense policies between individual CIS states and Russia—in short, emphasizing the rapid reintegration of the CIS.

**Moscow does
not rule out
using force to
defend the
rights of
Russians
abroad.**

Meissner also criticizes Kozyrev for simultaneously praising Russian cooperation with the United States when Washington chose to offer the Partnership for Peace Program rather than full-fledged membership in NATO to East-Central European states, and stressing the need for Russian leadership in the “near abroad,” a term Kozyrev sometimes extended to include those same East-Central European states (pp. 334–35). Kozyrev warrants further criticism in Meissner's book for advocating harsh measures (delays in trade pacts and the extension of credit) to punish states that resisted Russia's expanding influence, particularly states that did not grant the *Volksrussen* (ethnic Russians) dual citizenship or otherwise honor their human and citizenship rights. Meissner's allusion to *Volksrussen* is deliberate: Hitler used the concept of *Volksdeutschen* to break up Czechoslovakia, destabilize Poland prior to September 1939, and implement other similarly aggressive policies. To make sure that the casual reader understands the parallel, Meissner deftly paraphrases Kazak president Nursultan Nazarbaev who, while rejecting the proposal to give double citizenship to what would have constituted more than one-third of Kazakstan's citizens, said that Kozyrev's words recalled Hitler's policy of expansion (p. 335).

While Kozyrev did support a more aggressive policy vis-à-vis the “near abroad,” he rejected ultranationalist rhetoric such as that of Vladimir Zhirinovsky as “irresponsible and dangerous” and publicly vowed that Yeltsin's domestic and foreign policy would remain unaffected by pressure from the far Right (p. 336). But after the parliamentary elections of December 1993, in which Zhirinovsky's party had an unexpectedly strong showing, Yeltsin tacked further right again by advocating “the decisive pursuit of Russian national interests, by force of arms, if absolutely necessary” (p. 337).⁴ If Meissner is correct, even the

¹ See Meissner, *Vom Sowjetimperium zum eurasischen Staatensystem*, pp. 135–71.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 173–218, 219–58, 297–332. In particular, see the joint declaration by Presidents Lech Walesa and Boris Yeltsin on pp. 309–10.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 333–53.

⁴ This and all subsequent translations are by the reviewer.

replacement of Kozyrev with Yevgeny Primakov as foreign minister did little to change the direction of Russian foreign policy. As Meissner notes in passing, two policy papers issued by the Foreign Intelligence Service while it was still headed by Primakov not only opposed NATO's enlargement but accused Western countries of trying to prevent Russia from regaining its old position as a world power (p. 338).

While he deplores the antagonistic tone evidenced in these papers and elsewhere in the Kremlin, Meissner acknowledges Russian trepidation as expressed by Vladimir Lukin, the former Russian ambassador to the United States and twice chairman of the Duma's Commission on Foreign Affairs, and others. They argue that NATO enlargement makes Russia feel threatened and could further foment nationalism in Russian domestic politics. That, in turn, could have negative consequences for East-West relations. But Meissner notes that the perception of a threat is not one-sided:

To the very same extent, this also applies to the feeling of being threatened in east-central and south-eastern European states. [Those feelings] are particularly pronounced in the Baltic States, which is the result of the consistent propagandistic attacks and threats from the Russian side, to which those states are opposed (p. 345).

Nor is Russia entirely secure within its own borders. Meissner speculates shrewdly that the brutal attack on Chechnya was in part intended to prevent Ruslan Khasbulatov, an ethnic Chechen and once Yeltsin supporter turned bitter enemy, from setting up a new power base in his homeland. However, what was supposed to be a quick clash leading to a decisive victory backfired and became a drawn-out struggle highlighting the Russian military's weaknesses. In the process, Moscow violated the self-determination of peoples provision of the Russian constitution and broke international law by ignoring the collective right of self-determination as stated in the U.N. human rights conventions (p. 340).

Turning to institutions, Meissner finds that Yeltsin pried the "power structures" out of the Russian cabinet and built up the Security Council into the main decision-making organ in the government. (The Security Council is a relatively new structure, having been established in 1992 with Yeltsin himself as the first chairman.) The prime minister and chief of staff of the presidential office are permanent members of the Security Council, as is the minister of defense. Since 1994, permanent members have gone on to become the president of the Council of the Russian Federation's upper chamber (Vladimir Shumeiko) and the speaker of the Duma (Ivan Rybkin). Based on this evidence, Meissner concludes that a leadership structure similar to that of the old Soviet Union is emerging in post-cold war Russia: "The Security Council actually fulfils the role of the Politburo, and the Presidential apparatus that of the old Central Committee apparatus. The Government must again occupy itself with the economy" (p. 339).

Overall, Meissner sees Russia's role in the CIS as that of a hegemon rather than a new imperial power, and he proposes an accordingly moderate course for the future. He recommends that Russia be allowed to integrate the

CIS countries economically, and that Western countries assist in this process by sharing their experiences from the formation of European Economic Union. At some point a special relationship between NATO and Moscow should be established and Russia should be drawn into a kind of NATO membership (p. 345). Ultimately, Meissner argues, the CIS will remain a confederation because the restoration of the Soviet Union has not become a goal of official Russian foreign policy (p. 347).

Perhaps the most revealing statement in the entire volume, however, can be found in the next-to-last article. In 1994, the Russian journal *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'* held a discussion on Russian foreign policy. During that discussion, V.T. Tretiakov, the editor in chief of the influential *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, argued that Moscow should openly declare the restoration of the Soviet Union to its former frontiers (excluding the Baltic states) to be an aim of Russian foreign policy. Such an unabashed restorationist foreign policy, Tretiakov said, would be more honest than the present false "semi-imperial foreign policy" (pp. 331–32).

Pragmatic Policy

Russian Foreign Policy is an outstanding, up-to-date work by Alvin Z. Rubinstein, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania, and Nicolai N. Petro, an associate professor at the University of Rhode Island. Rubinstein's first textbook on *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union* appeared in 1960, and he has since built a reputation as a respected and prolific author of books on Soviet and post-Soviet foreign policies. Like Meissner, Rubinstein has also been an advisor to his government, as well as an academic statesman.

They have accomplished an admirable feat in producing a volume that is sufficiently clear to be accessible to undergraduates, yet scholarly enough so that it is still useful for graduate students. In previous works, Rubinstein has always demonstrated an ability to condense decades of diplomatic history into short spaces. In this volume, Russian domestic and foreign policy from the Middle Ages through 1985 fits into ninety pages, while still retaining all the highlights. The two key analytical chapters are chapter 5, which deals with the search for the Russian national interest, and chapter 6, which essentially concentrates on Russian national identity, even though it is entitled "Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States." Other chapters cover functional topics (security issues and international organizations), Russia's relations with specific areas (Europe, Asia, the Third World, and the Middle East), Russian-American relations, and conclusions about the country's policy. A brief postscript, "The 1996 Post-Election Epilogue," is also welcome. Readers of this journal, however, will be less interested in the scope of the book than in its image of Russian foreign policy.

If Meissner's work presupposes substantial knowledge of both Soviet and post-1991 Russian foreign policy, then rewards its readers with perspicacious comments on selected aspects of that policy, Petro and Rubinstein present the

whole picture. They do so in a generally restrained and judicious style that is occasionally buoyed by optimism, as seen in their conclusion to the chapter on Russian-European relations:

In the next century, if democratic institutions survive in Russia and the western CIS states, it is quite possible that Europe as a whole will gradually move away from the current bipolar legacy that pits West against East (with Central Europe as a convenient buffer zone) to a single, free trade and security zone envisioned by the Charter for a New Europe. . . . Provided that Russia is not artificially isolated, the natural economic and political developments on the way in the rest of the continent should do much to make Russia an integral part of Europe (p. 188).

In general, Petro and Rubinstein believe that Russia has already been an integral part of the West in the twentieth century (p. 288). Unlike Meissner they do not consider the Eurasianist school threatening, but side with policy analysts Andrei and Sergei Kortunov of Moscow in equating Moscow's shift away from Atlanticism with "pragmatism" (p. 315).

Included in their analysis of Russian policy under Yeltsin is an excellent in-depth look at the institutions that shape foreign policy, from the presidential administration, to the Duma, the media, think tanks, and even civic and religious organizations. In contrast to Meissner, Petro and Rubinstein write: "The Security Council cannot be equated with the Soviet-era Politburo" (p. 108). Their argument that the council lacks the supreme control once exercised by the Politburo focuses on evidence of dissent: within weeks of the attack on Chechnya, the president's own Analytical Center produced public opinion polls critical of the invasion. Moreover, numerous leaks of secret information to the press bespoke a certain discord within Moscow (p. 108).

The decision-making process in the Russian Federation is certainly less secretive and leakproof than it was in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, bad policy can still be approved. The Security Council made just such a policy decision in December 1994, and it was not effectively reversed until September 1996—and then only by the initiative of a perennial outsider, General Aleksandr Lebed. (However, on account of this and other "misdeeds" Lebed was soon cashiered.) An admitted critic of Yeltsin, Sergei Kovalev, who formerly served as the commissioner on human rights and went to Grozny to witness the invasion firsthand, said that the decision to invade Chechnya was made in "a typical [Soviet] nomenklatura fashion," with the members of the Security Council anticipating the unstated wish of their political boss and voting accordingly.⁵ The truth probably lies somewhere between Petro and Rubinstein's interpretation and that of Meissner and Kovalev. But everyone can agree that Moscow doggedly tried to implement a disastrous strategy until the bitter end, when the impossibility of achieving a military and political victory became obvious to everybody.

⁵ Sergei Kovalev, speech delivered at the dedication of the Sakharov Archives, Brandeis University, Waltham, Mass., Nov. 15, 1996.

One of the best chapters in the Petro-Rubinstein volume is that on national interest. It begins with a rendering of the classic 1950s debate on the topic as epitomized by professors Michael Karpovich of Harvard and Samuel Sharp of American University—a brilliant touch—then proceeds to a brisk discussion of foreign policy making in both the Soviet Union and Russia. National interest is thus defined instrumentally (it is whatever the leaders and their advisors say it is), which is still a sensible approach to take.

Equally important and precise is the chapter on Russia's role in the CIS. Whereas Meissner proposed an economic reintegration based on the European Union model, Petro and Rubinstein forecast a gradual overall reintegration of the CIS states, with the Baltic states perhaps permitted a role of quasi neutrality or quasi submission such as Finland had in relation to the USSR from 1945 to 1991 (p. 122). The economic performance of the Soviet successor states, with the exception of Estonia, has been poor, and Russia, for all its instabilities, is a major economic power holding a near-stranglehold on the supply of energy. That alone could encourage reintegration. But Petro and Rubinstein also accept Moscow's claim that ethnic Russians living outside the Russian Federation have been frequently mistreated, and that Russia has the right to defend their rights (p. 123). The authors thus implicitly support a more active regional role for Russia than Meissner does. New demographic censuses scheduled for the end of this century should either confirm or reject the figure of twenty-five million Russians residing outside Russia and thereby take a step toward settling the debate over Moscow's right to disregard other countries' sovereignty and intervene on those Russians' behalf. In some countries (for instance, in Ukraine) ethnic Russians have been living very well; in others (such as Estonia and Latvia) they have been treated less than kindly, but not necessarily illegally in terms of international law.

Regardless of their own predilections, Petro and Rubinstein are objective and sensitive to other viewpoints. Their conclusion to the chapter on Russian-CIS relations is a model of judiciousness:

As these nations become more prosperous and self-reliant . . . it is likely that their interests will begin to diverge. On the other hand, if Russian policy is seen as excessively intrusive, or if economic improvements do not come about quickly enough as a result of greater integration, Russia's strategy of putting intense pressure on its neighbors to reintegrate is likely to encounter stronger resistance. In either instance, however, Russia will continue to play a very important role in the domestic and foreign policies in the former Soviet republics for many years to come (p. 128).

Emerging from Anarchy

Meta Skak, an associate professor of political science at the University of Aarhus, Denmark, pursues two goals simultaneously in *From Empire to Anarchy*, making the book difficult to assess. Skak's work is a university textbook that undertakes "an effort of synthesis" in the new academic field of comparative postcommunist foreign policy analysis (p. vi). At the same time, the author

wants to share her insights on contemporary Russian foreign policy, the diplomacy of independent Lithuania, and that of Hungary. So part of the volume comprises a well-documented, if somewhat argumentative, survey of the theories of communist and postcommunist rule, while the other part is a shrewd analysis of the many pitfalls that plague the making of Russian foreign policy, and the surprisingly fewer weaknesses attendant on the formulation of Lithuanian and Hungarian foreign policy. When it comes to Russian foreign policy, Skak is an admitted pessimist, which distinguishes her work from that of both the moderately critical Meissner and Petro and Rubinstein (p. 66).

The provocative word “anarchy” in the title has a dual meaning. In terms of international relations theory, anarchy describes the emergence of new sovereign states from under the supranational Soviet empire and the resulting opportunities for armed conflicts and wars. But on a more general level, Skak sees anarchy throughout the states of the CIS (but not in the more mature and viable Baltic states, however). Her negative judgment of the “nonBalts” rests in part on empirical observations but may have been made partially a priori as well. Skak also presupposes “praetorianism” in the evolving CIS, labeling it a “syndrome of immature modernity.” She uses Samuel Huntington’s definition of a “praetorian society,” calling attention to the “absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining and moderating group political action” (p. 11).

Despite this pessimistic stance, she sees potential redemption for the East-Central European countries and the Baltic states—and possibly for Russia and the western CIS states as well—in the prospect for “reintegration” into European institutions, which could help quell the anarchy in the former Soviet empire. (Skak uses the term “reintegration” only in relation to European institutions; she does not refer to Russian reintegration efforts within the CIS.)

Lithuania, in particular, has a strong commitment to reintegration, a policy the author clearly favors. In Russia, however, reintegration is considerably less popular. Skak caustically describes how an alliance of ambitious parliamentarians, military officers, opinion makers, and journalists has undermined the Russian Atlanticists, or in her terminology “reintegrationists” (pp. 176–77). Readers should not let her tone detract from the substance of her words, for she makes some astute comments. Her point that “the [political] game is biased in favor of praetorian forces, who in the specific context of post-communist Russia feel the need to distance themselves from Gorbachev’s political legacy,” is well taken (pp. 177–78). Or consider her shrewd observation that “most analysts appear to exaggerate the danger represented by Zhirinovsky and in this way underestimate the power of others” (p. 180).

Although the Atlanticists are clearly losing ground, Skak does not foresee the return of a full-fledged Russian empire. Instead, like Meissner and Petro and Rubinstein, she predicts that Russia will be satisfied with hegemony, but with a peculiar twist:

The operational goal is not to re-establish the Soviet Union, but rather to turn the previous internal empire into something resembling the old external empire on the basis of a formal military alliance or the like—a new Warsaw Pact as it were and turn

the CIS into an international organization that is also of economic significance. Although the international community has failed to give Moscow the go-ahead to act as gendarme which it wants, its policy is not without success. To depict the Russian political mind as anti-Western is misleading, rather the Russians want to have their cake (empire) and eat it too (re-integration [with the West]) (p. 190).

Still, this hegemony has limits. Skak takes Moscow to task for practicing “semidemocracy” and “semi-empire” and criticizes Russian foreign policymakers who dress in dinner jackets when they visit the far abroad and don flak jackets and bypass their own Foreign Ministry in the “near abroad” of the CIS (p. 191). While these conclusions may not satisfy all theoretical purists, they provide ample food for thought for policy-oriented scholars.

A Diminishing Minority?

Andrew Wilson of the University of London (although when he wrote this book he was still identified as a senior research fellow at Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge University) has produced a monograph that deals with

**Ukraine looks
like a ripe
plum for
picking.**

Russian foreign policy only indirectly vis-à-vis Ukraine. His handling of the topic is therefore less comprehensive than that of the other authors under review here. Instead, he gives an impassioned but ultimately unpersuasive argument that systemic weaknesses bedevil Ukrainian domestic politics and economics. Through Wilson’s eyes Ukraine looks like a ripe plum ready to be picked by Russian policymakers who, he implies, watched from the sidelines as the country deteriorated after gaining independence in 1991.

To prove that Ukrainian-speaking and strongly pro-independence ethnic Ukrainians are a minority in their own country (hence the subtitle, “a minority faith”), Wilson boldly, and perhaps recklessly, relies heavily on the results of several surveys conducted in 1991–94 by Valerii Khmelko of the Kyiv Mohyla Academy, in part with Wilson’s assistance. Khmelko’s surveys sampled only eighteen thousand adults out of a total national population of about fifty-one million. True, Wilson would have been ill-advised to base his argument on the last Soviet census of January 1989 which was conducted under the Soviet policy of linguistic and ethnic assimilation. But to draw, as he does, major political conclusions from whether interviewees chose to have the interview in Ukrainian or Russian may be the riskiest course of all:

More recent surveys, focusing . . . on language of convenience and competence, have indicated that Ukrainophone Ukrainians make up only 40 percent of the adult population, whereas 33–4 percent are Russophone Ukrainians and 20–1 percent Russophone Russians (p. 22).

Wilson’s case is stronger when he analyzes the relative drop in President Leonid Kravchuk’s percentage of the popular vote from 61.6 percent in December 1991 to 45 percent in July 1994. In 1991 Kravchuk ran as a moderate Ukrainian

national communist against the ethnic Russian and pro-Russian Federation candidate Volodymyr Hryniiov, who was born outside Ukraine but found a political base in the Kharkiv region. Hryniiov received only 4.2 percent of the popular vote in that election, while three clearly ethnic nationalist candidates (Vyacheslav Chornovil, Levko Lukyanenko, and Ihor Yukhnovsky) combined received 29.5 percent. But when Kravchuk ran as a Ukrainian nationalist in 1994, his old national communist constituency delivered only 15 percent of the popular vote to him, not nearly enough to overcome the 52 percent majority for former prime minister Leonid Kuchma, who ran on a pro-Russian, antinationalist ticket. Clearly the pro-Russian outlook has increased in appeal.

Wilson is also on safer ground when he analyzes the gains of the leftist antinationalist parties in parliament following the unusually protracted elections of 1994–96. But from the perspective of 1997, he appears to have overinterpreted the evidence of nationalist setbacks in 1994. Since his election, President Kuchma has staunchly defended Ukrainian territorial integrity against Russia, as Wilson himself implicitly acknowledges toward the end of the book (p. 200). Moreover, the leftist plurality in parliament was unable to prevent the adoption of a “compromise” (i.e., moderately nationalist) constitution on June 28, 1996. Not by coincidence, the adoption preceded the second ballot in the Russian presidential election.

It is unfortunate that Wilson’s antipathy toward the nationalist Ukrainians shades his argument. For instance, in his introductory chapter, Wilson mentions the Russophone Ukrainian writer Gogol but not the Ukrainophone poet and national leader Taras Shevchenko, although both of them lived in the nineteenth century. Shevchenko was the greater artist, but he has to wait his turn to be presented in the second chapter, among the leaders of the Ukrainian nationalists. Also, throughout the book Wilson either avoids the term Russification or puts it in quotation marks. The explanation for his judgment is buried in the footnotes. In the crucial first chapter he writes around the word: “The city tended to acculturate the peasant rather than the other way around” (p. 20). In the corresponding footnote he explains that “the term ‘Russification’ has been avoided because it implies a prior loyalty to Ukrainian language and culture, which may not necessarily have existed” (p. 214, n. 105). But what language did Ukrainian peasants speak before they settled in the cities? Realizing that he may have gone too far, Wilson yields somewhat in the middle of the book when he writes that “only Belarus has suffered a greater degree of ‘Russification’” (p. 147); a more accurate footnote follows, recognizing that “many Russophone Ukrainians have indeed been deprived of access to their native language and culture” (p. 256, n.3).

Wilson’s saving grace is his detailed analysis of Ukrainian domestic politics. His evidence drawn from both nationalist and antinationalist sources is so rich that readers can use Wilson’s material to reach their own conclusions. A sketch of Russian foreign policy would have been very useful in this book, however, for Moscow’s policy significantly influenced Ukrainian domestic politics and was anything but restrained.

Conclusion

Russian foreign policy toward the CIS states and Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia has become exceedingly assertive, partly for lack of countervailing pressure from the West and partly because many of those states are vulnerable targets. In the fall of 1995, a shock wave ran through the international diplomatic community when the Institute for Defense Studies in Moscow—with Anton Surikov, the military strategist of the USA-Canada Institute as spokesman—advocated the “stationing of nuclear weapons in Belarus, putting troops in the Baltics if they try to join NATO and bombing oil fields in Azerbaijan if Moscow does not get a slice of the profits.”⁶ A more moderate policy paper, commonly associated with Sergei Karaganov, the head of the prestigious council on Foreign and Defense Policy in Moscow, was published later, but still before Yeltsin’s reelection. That paper favored an enlightened, informal reintegration of the CIS but did not rule out the use of force to prevent other powers from dominating the territory of the former USSR and to preclude the formation of coalitions hostile to Russia, including those that oppose Russian actions in the former USSR.⁷ The latter would certainly encompass the three Baltic states.

And what actions do these policies, moderate or otherwise, give rise to? In Ukraine, Russia has repeatedly asserted claims to the entire Black Sea Fleet, the Crimea (with a portion of the Ukrainian mainland), and the attractive port of Sevastopol in particular. In February 1997, the liberal governor of Novgorod, Boris Nemtsov, suggested that Russia should establish control over Sevastopol by encouraging Russian businesses to buy up property and firms in the city. “Historical justice should be restored by capitalist methods,” he argued.⁸ Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov, another potential presidential candidate, has also been active in trying to reclaim Sevastopol. And in Odessa, Russian interests managed to delay construction of a modern oil terminal near the city by using environmental demonstrators and running a well-financed candidate, Alexei Kostusev, against incumbent mayor Eduard Gurvits. Gurvits eventually prevailed and Kostusev was run out of town (he retreated to Russia), but in the meantime an oil terminal was built in the environmentally unsafe Russian port of Novorossiisk—without any protests from “environmentalists” or challenges to the local mayor.⁹ Were those normal measures of economic competition, or was something else involved? The four books under review go a long way toward deducing what Moscow may be doing behind the scenes, but the final answer still rests with Moscow itself. That answer may be an unsettling one indeed.

⁶ “Washington Whispers: Back in the USSR,” *U.S. News and World Report*, Nov. 13, 1995, pp. 37–38.

⁷ “Vozrodit’sia li soyuz: budushchee post-sovetskogo prostranstva” (Will the Union be reborn: the future of the post-Soviet space), *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, May 23, 1996, excerpts translated in Scott Parrish, “Will the Soviet Union Be Reborn?” *Transition*, July 26, 1996, pp. 32–35, 62.

⁸ “Russian Cities Bail Out Black Sea Fleet,” Open Media Research Institute, *OMRI Daily Digest*, Feb. 20, 1997, from *Komersant-Daily*, Feb. 18, 1997. The author is grateful to Dr. Peter J. Stavrakis, Deputy Director of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, for bringing this item to his attention.

⁹ Peter Voitsekhoysky, “The Odesa [Odessa] oil terminal: construction goes on and on,” *Ukrainian Weekly*, Dec. 1, 1996, pp. 2, 19.

On May 31, 1997, after the foregoing books were reviewed, the long-delayed "Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership" was signed in Kyiv (Kiev) by Russian president Yeltsin and Ukrainian president Kuchma. The treaty is ambiguous at best and a merely tactical arrangement at worst—it does not change the reviewer's conclusion. See Roman Woronowycz (Kyiv Press Bureau), "Ukraine, Russia Sign Long-Awaited Bilateral Treaty," *Ukrainian Weekly*, June 8, 1997, pp. 1, 4, and editorial, "Ukraine and Russia Agree," p. 6.

—Yaroslav Bilinsky

The Unwinnable War on the Drug Trade

by Patrick Lloyd Hatcher

Unintended Consequences: Illegal Drugs and Drug Policies in Nine Countries. By LaMond Tullis. (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1995. 229 pp. \$45.00.)

The Andean Cocaine Industry. By Patrick Clawson and Renssalaer W. Lee III. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996. 276 pp. \$35.00.)

Narco-Diplomacy: Exporting the U.S. War on Drugs. By H. Richard Friman. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996. 170 pp. \$29.95.)

Snow Job? The War Against International Cocaine Trafficking. By Kevin Jack Riley. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1996. 303 pp. \$34.95.)

Global Habit: The Drug Problem in a Borderless World. By Paul B. Stares. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996. 171 pp. \$24.95.)

Drugs in the Western Hemisphere: An Odyssey of Cultures in Conflict. Edited by William O. Walker III. (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1996. 242 pp. \$45.00 cloth; \$16.95 paper.)

Drug abuse in the United States long predates the twentieth century. In fact, early Freudians initially sang the praises of cocaine as a wonder drug for use in psychoanalysis and therapy, and peddlers of patent medicine and elixirs had no difficulty finding unwitting customers for their nineteenth-century potions. Kevin Riley, author of *Snow Job*, admits to his astonishment when he discovered that early bottlings of Coca Cola contained small but potent doses of cocaine, and that by 1885 pharmacists and door-to-door salesmen routinely hawked the

Patrick Lloyd Hatcher is a retired Army intelligence officer and received a Ph.D. in History from the University of California, Berkeley. His most recent book is *North Atlantic Civilization at War: The Battles of Sky, Sand, Snow, Sea, and Shore* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997).

drug to sufferers of hay fever, sinusitis, and chronic fatigue. Hence, by the time playwright Eugene O'Neill penned the heartbreaking autobiographical drama *Long Day's Journey Into Night* about his mother's morphine addiction, it was already an all-too-familiar American story. All this came about, of course, through a lack of basic knowledge, but once out of the bottle, the narcotic genie could not be put back even after his baneful effects were well publicized and his chemicals outlawed. Instead, hard and soft drugs of all varieties strengthened their grip on the fringes of mainstream American society until, as author Paul Stares indicates in *Global Habit*, the flower children of the 1960s came openly to celebrate the liberating qualities of now-trendy drugs and rock stars intoned the creed, "I believe in chemistry."

To measure the impact of the drug culture on American culture at large one need only contrast the 1960s Broadway musical *Hair*, whose chorus assured the audience that in the dawning Age of Aquarius one could lose all inhibitions with the aid of drugs and free love, with the musical hit of the 1990s, *Rent*, in which the main characters are dying of drug overdoses and sexually-transmitted diseases. The Age of Aquarius became instead the Age of Anxiety, and hippie dreams turned into nightmares for Generation X within a popular culture increasingly torn between denial and despair.

Nothing illustrates the baby-boom generation's confusion regarding its casual embrace of drugs better than President Clinton's own statements about marijuana. As a candidate he said that he had smoked, but not inhaled pot. More recently, he told an MTV audience that he wishes he could have inhaled, prompting a *Time* magazine cover story that observed, "The President's sneaking snickering (MTV) line—a kid still putting one over on his parents—suggested the boomer's ambivalence about pot and a kind of time-warping refusal to see it or themselves honestly."¹ At the core of the debate remains the question of whether users of soft drugs such as marijuana tend to graduate to hard drugs such as cocaine and heroin. The consensus among the authors under review is sometimes, not always—and for psychological even more than for physical reasons. As Riley notes, Hollywood's glitterati lend both categories of drugs a positively glamorous image. To be sure, some die of the hard stuff—like teen star River Phoenix who was found convulsing on a sidewalk in front of a Los Angeles night spot. Others are busted by police, such as film actor Robert Downey, Jr., who was arrested in July 1996 as he sped through Malibu in a truck containing a pharmacopeia of illegal drugs and weapons. But the publicity won him a December 1996 spot with Diane Sawyer on the highly rated program "Prime Time Live." Downey confessed that drug use was as casual around his house as drinking white wine with Thanksgiving dinner, and that he had started on drugs before he had reached the age of eight.²

¹ Lance Morrow, "Kids and Pot: Marijuana Use Among Teens Is Up, But Baby-Boomer Parents Aren't Sure What To Do," *Time*, Dec. 9, 1996, p. 29. See also "The Battle Over Marijuana," *Newsweek*, Feb. 3, 1997, pp. 20–27.

² Liz Smith, "Robert Downey, Jr., Comes Clean on TV," *San Francisco Chronicle*, Dec. 4, 1996. See also "Downey and Out," *Time*, July 8, 1996, p. 75.

A Clear and Present Danger

Not surprisingly since they have written serious scholarly works about it, all six authors reviewed here regard the international drug trade as a clear and present danger to the U.S. national interest and even security. LaMond Tullis, for instance, relying on United Nations sources, places illicit drug trafficking ahead of the oil industry in total cash volume and second only to the international weapons trade. He cites evidence to the effect that U.S. consumer expenditures on illegal drugs in the late 1980s amounted to more than \$100 billion and perhaps as much as \$300 billion per year, a sum exceeding the gross domestic product of eighty-eight countries worldwide. As a result, the big narcotics cartels are able to marshal resources, technology, and weapons—and purchase official compliance in countries where drugs are harvested, processed, transhipped, and consumed—on a scale that dwarfs the resources of drug enforcement agencies. What is more, the governments in the wealthy consuming nations are handicapped by their need to pursue their counternarcotics campaigns in great part inside the relatively poor producing countries, which lack the ability or even the incentive to assault the drug magnates and destroy their lucrative “cash crops.” None of the authors, therefore, are optimistic about the campaign against the illicit drug trade, and find little evidence to the effect that the American “war on drugs” has had any discernible effect on the supply of cocaine, for instance, into the United States.³

Instead, as Riley notes, the number of Americans who had tried cocaine as of 1981 was already fifteen million, and has been growing steadily as more and more young people enter the market. Polls of the class that graduated from high school in 1991 revealed that the percentages of youngsters who perceive harm in, or express disapproval of, cocaine have started once again to decline, a trend that in the past has always gone hand-in-hand with increased usage. Even the conservative *U.S. News and World Report* has called the antidrug campaign an unwinnable war akin to Vietnam.⁴ Finally, and most horrific, is the undeniable evidence of close links between drug merchants and international terrorists from the fearsome Sendero Luminoso in Peru's coca-growing region to the separatist terrorists in Sri Lanka, U.S.-supported Contras in Nicaragua, anti-Soviet *mujaheddin* in Afghanistan, Chechen gangsters in Russia, and Indochinese whom first the French, then the Americans, employed during the Vietnam War. Stares goes so far as to nominate French and American intelligence agencies as joint godfathers to Southeast Asia's infamous Golden Triangle syndicates. In countries torn by civil war and attendant economic distress, drug production and smuggling are tempting sources of income for insurgents and

³ The phrase “war on drugs” is no empty metaphor. A retired army general, Bary R. McCaffrey, is director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, which plans in cooperation with the Pentagon to stage “regular visits to the Peruvian jungle by scores of Navy Seal and Green Beret trainers.” See Clifford Krauss, “Pentagon to Help Peru Stop Drug-Base Shipping on Rivers,” *New York Times*, Feb. 3, 1997.

⁴ Richard J. Newman, “Unwinnable War: U.S. Military Force is Already Well Committed to the War on Drugs,” *U.S. News and World Report*, Dec. 4, 1996, pp. 40–41.

peasants alike, and the violent, internationally connected terrorist networks are uniquely suited to conduct the illicit global trade.

Drug Rings as “Anti-States”

The near impossibility of curtailing, much less eliminating, the flow of illegal drugs across the borders of rich countries committed to free trade was already in evidence during the first half of this century when Germany and Japan, not the embryonic Third World, were the sources of much of the world's narcotics. In *Narco-Diplomacy* H. Richard Friman resurrects the little-known (and largely futile) Anglo-American efforts to combat German production and Japanese trafficking, concluding that U.S. counternarcotics diplomacy in South America today will fair no better. Several of the authors in fact demonstrate that however good its intentions, American policy can have hellish unintended consequences in target countries. For instance, Riley cites the case of a foreign aid project intended to build hard-surface roads and so open the interiors of Peru and Bolivia to economic development and new agricultural settlement. Its effect, however, was to provide drug smugglers with easier egress from their fields and processing plants. In the case of Colombia, Patrick Clawson and Renssalaer Lee recount in *The Andean Cocaine Industry*, the narco-gentry control estates of such size as to make a medieval lord envious and make common cause with their own supposedly hostile government in Bogota against indigenous leftist guerillas. With whom, therefore, should U.S. drug agencies align themselves? There is no good answer.

**Colombia's
drug cartels
launder as
much as a
billion dollars
a day.**

More importantly, as Tullis points out, the fantastic wealth of the cartels allows them to deploy global satellite communications, fax machines, e-mail, cellular telephones, sophisticated encryption systems, and electronic means of laundering money that is estimated at a billion dollars per *day*. Colombia's Medellin and Cali drug cartels have become, in Tullis's evocative phrase, veritable anti-states that exist entirely outside of domestic or international law and are inimical to civilized life.⁵

Where does the electronic drug money go? It often finds its way to financial centers in northern Italy where, in per capita terms, cocaine use is the highest in Europe and a money-laundering Lombard League employs postal money orders, travellers' cheques, and certificates of deposit from nonbank (and hence less regulated) financial institutions. Clawson and Lee tell a story reminiscent of Francis Ford Coppola movies about the Ecuadorian freighter *Cinta* docked at the Italian port of Livorno. Its hold carried a container of frozen fish at the bottom of which lurked 526 kilograms of

⁵ As strange as a James Bond caper, the U.S. government charged an owner of a Miami striptease club, Ludwig "Tarzan" Fainberg, with acting as middleman for Colombian drug lords attempting to purchase a Soviet-vintage nuclear powered Piranha-class submarine for use in drug transport. Hiding behind an Israeli passport did not help Fainberg, who was refused bail after the judge read the thirty-count indictment. See "Miamian Held in Plan to Buy Soviet Sub for Colombian Drug Gangs," *San Francisco Chronicle*, Feb. 7, 1987.

cocaine. This was a Cali-connected shipment to powerful allied families based in the Sicilian town of Corleone [*sic*]. But complications arose when Italian customs officials detained the fish because they were found to contain unhealthy levels of mercury. To salvage the deal the smugglers bribed the officials while the putative owners of the fish promised to deliver them to starving people in Bosnia as a humanitarian gesture. The cargo was then loaded onto trucks supposedly bound for Bosnia via Trieste. Instead, the trucks made a long detour south to Rome, where the traffickers extracted the cocaine. Only then did the cargo of fish, now rotten as well as contaminated, make its way to Trieste.

William Walker's *Drugs in the Western Hemisphere* takes the reader on similar odysseys by way of tracing the progress of drugs from Mexico through Honduras to the Andes, then over to Cuba and finally into the United States. Faithful to his perception of the drug war as a case of "cultures in conflict," Walker describes how ancient, and arguably beneficial, is the native Andean practice of chewing the leaves of the coca plant, *el coquero*. But similar practices, exported to the streets of American cities and pushed on children, can be devastating. As an African American from North Carolina attests: "I smoked reefers and used a little cocaine when I was nine years old." He was a dealer by his teens.

Walker, himself a teacher, lays stress on demand-reduction efforts rather than on wasteful "wars" on foreign suppliers. He especially recommends showing American youth films such as Frank Sinatra's *The Man With the Golden Arm*, Gene Hackman's *The French Connection*, Al Pacino's *Scarface*, and Harrison Ford's *Clear and Present Danger*. But soft propaganda from the film industry hardly seems credible so long as Hollywood itself feeds Americans' appetites by example and titillating depiction. In fact, the new breed of California bootlegger sports, not bib overalls and rubber boots, but designer jeans and Gucci loafers, or else tries himself to cook up methamphetamine (known as speed, crystal, crank, tweak, or ice) in kitchen countertop chemistry sets. Neighborhood explosions attest to such household brews gone bad. To be sure, most hard drug production is carried out in more or less modern Mexican factories (druggies in fact refer to NAFTA as the North American Free Tweak Association), but the biggest market remains the United States where methamphetamine overdoses rose 125 percent from 1993 to 1995, accounting for 10 percent of all overdose deaths in the nation.⁶

Today California is at the center of the debate over legalization thanks to its Proposition 215 authorizing doctors to prescribe marijuana. Citizens there (and in Arizona) approved the measure in November 1996, and the Clinton administration, citing "family values," threatened to file suit to block it.⁷ Will Proposition 215 open the back door to legalization of marijuana and other drugs? And would that have pernicious effects on American society? Most of

⁶ Sabin Russell, "S.F. Drug Conference Warns Speed Kills," *San Francisco Chronicle*, Dec. 3, 1996.

⁷ See Jerome P. Kassirer, "Federal Foolishness and Marijuana," *New England Journal of Medicine*, Jan. 30, 1997, p. 336.

A Report from the Frontline

Sharing the Secrets. Open Source Intelligence and the War on Drugs. By J.F. Holden-Rhodes. (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997. 235 pp. \$55.00.)

While the accompanying review essay was in press yet another book on the international drug trade appeared. *Sharing the Secrets* is written by a veteran military intelligence and Special Operations officer who served on the frontlines in the U.S. Southern Command's war against the Andean cocaine cartels. Given its price and its dry, bureaucratic style the book will probably find few customers apart from libraries and government agencies, but the author's message could not be punchier. It is, to cite a 1987 report by the Office of Technology Assessment, that "The Nation's drug interdiction efforts suffer from a clear lack of direction," that "responsibilities of the Federal drug interdiction agencies are fragmented and overlapping," that "data on drug smuggling . . . are inadequate," and that "there is no clear correlation between the level of expenditures or effort devoted to interdiction and the long term availability of illegally imported drugs in the domestic market" (pp. 33-34).

According to the author, the causes of the failure range from indifferent or intermittent presidential attention to the drug scourge, rivalry and lack of coordination among drug-fighting agencies at the federal, state, and local levels, and above all a futile "internationalist" approach dependent upon extradition of criminals, income replacement in producing countries, sanctions, and negotiated cutbacks in coca production—none of which can work inasmuch as Latin American governments lack either the incentive or ability to cooperate effectively. The only solution, therefore, is to take the "war on drugs" rhetoric seriously and turn the job over to a centralized military command relying on open-source intelligence about the production and movement of narcotics and on military force to prevent their arrival in the United States. Cordons of radar and airborne and seaborne interdiction units, and dragnets-in-depth on highways near the Mexican border (the conduits for 70 percent of smuggled cocaine) could sharply reduce the flow of drugs into the United States without attenuation of Americans' own civil liberties.

Holden-Rhodes repeatedly refers to the Vietnam War, arguing implicitly that the infiltration of drugs is not unlike the infiltration of South Vietnam by the communists, and that the current war on drugs reflects many of the flaws of American strategy in Vietnam. But that analogy is bound to lead critics of the author's approach to ask whether militarization, Americanization, and escalation of the war on drugs will win through to the light at the end of the tunnel, or merely ruin American relations with its neighbors to the South. Whatever one's predilections, that would seem a debate worth having, for no one can deny that all prior U.S. drug "strategies" scarcely deserve the name.

—The Editor

the authors under review think not. As Riley indicates, marijuana is the most widely used illicit drug in the United States: roughly twenty million Americans smoked it at least once during 1991 despite the fact that nearly one-fourth of the nation's drug-fighting budget is spent on attempts to restrict its supply. In other words, those who wish to smoke pot already do so, while the funds spent on its control might be better spent reducing demand for hard drugs.

An Unwinnable War

So what is to be done? The only demonstrably successful methods for combatting narcotics verge on the totalitarian. For instance, ever since the British subverted the society of coastal China in the nineteenth century through their importation of opium no Chinese leader was able to rid his people of that curse—until, as Stares recounts, Mao Zedong launched a comprehensive anti-opium campaign that included land reform designed to eliminate poppy cultivation and propaganda to alter radically public attitudes toward consumption. Communist power and indoctrination also drove the notorious Shanghai-based drug triads (secret societies) to Hong Kong or further abroad, and put remaining drug dealers to death. Now Hong Kong has to reverted to Chinese control, and speculation is rife as to where the drug gangs will flee next. Not to Singapore, for there, too, the sentence for drug pushing is summary execution.

In America, the prevalent culture of hedonism and individualism, and understandable fears about the impact on civil rights, prevent such draconian measures to end drug dealing and consumption. That is why American efforts have focused on the supply rather than demand side. But as Clawson and Lee document and eloquently argue, American efforts abroad stand little chance of success. Between 1981 and 1995 the federal government spent \$125 billion on drug control programs and made virtually no progress. To be sure, only a miniscule 4 percent of that money was devoted to international programs, but the other burden of *The Andean Cocaine Industry* is that the fate of the drug cartels in places like Colombia and Peru will depend far more on their local government's efforts than on anything the United States can do. Unfortunately, those local governments are not inclined to do much—and not because the drug trade is too lucrative to shut down. Rather, cocaine accounts for no more than 4 or 5 percent of the gross domestic product of Peru or Colombia. The real reasons are that those South American (not to mention Southeast Asian) governments are too weak, and their countries too vast and rugged, to “invade” their own hinterlands and impose law and order on the anti-states in their domains. Secondly, eliminating the drug trade is not a high national priority to governments beset by poverty, unemployment, and left-wing insurgencies and terrorism (only 8 percent of Colombians name the drug traffic a serious national problem). Thirdly, those governments rightly believe that drugs are a North American problem: no one is forcing the gringos to snort coke, so let Washington deal with it. Finally, there is a perverse self-defeating aspect to government

wars against the producers of drugs: the more effective they are in reducing supply the more they drive prices up and attract new players into the industry.

The only alternative to draconian measures at home or anodyne drug wars abroad is legalization. It would immediately cut the foreign connection, since all drugs could be produced and marketed much more efficiently inside the United States itself. The U.S. government could then redirect its drug-fighting budget to education aimed at potential users and to succor the truly wounded of the war, the homegrown addicts of hard drugs.⁸

But whatever decisions Americans make with regard to their failed prohibition of illicit drugs, these authors all argue forcefully that drug abuse threatens the very future of American society. Its accidental appearance in the nineteenth century has debilitated the United States throughout the twentieth, and made imperative some sort of twenty-first-century solution.



⁸ William Carlsen, "Admissions for Heroin At Record: San Francisco Hospitalizations Highest in State, Nation," *San Francisco Chronicle*, July 10, 1997.

Orbis

A Journal of World Affairs

Volume 41 1997

Published for the Foreign Policy Research Institute

by  JAI PRESS INC.

Greenwich, Connecticut • London, England
Copyright © 1997 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute
except where otherwise noted.

Orbis

A Journal of World Affairs

Editor
WALTER A. McDOUGALL

Manuscript Editor
JILL GARNER

Contributing Editors
BRUCE D. BERKOWITZ
PAUL BRACKEN
PATRICK CLAWSON
MARK FALCOFF
MICHAEL RADU
HARVEY SICHERMAN
VLADIMIR TISMANEANU

BOARD OF EDITORS

STEPHEN E. AMBROSE
University of New Orleans

PAUL BALARAN
*Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace*

ALVIN H. BERNSTEIN
Marshall Center

RICHARD K. BETTS
Columbia University

HENRY S. BIENEN
Northwestern University

PAUL BRACKEN
Yale University

ELIOT A. COHEN
*The School of Advanced
International Studies,
Johns Hopkins University*

STEPHEN P. COHEN
*University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign*

L. GORDON CROVITZ
Hong Kong

ARTHUR CYR
*Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations*

PETER DUIGNAN
The Hoover Institution

MARK FALCOFF
*American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research*

ALTON FRYE
Council on Foreign Relations

ALEXANDER GEORGE
Stanford University

COLIN S. GRAY
University of Hull

PAUL HOLLANDER
*University of Massachusetts
at Amherst*

IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ
Rutgers University

ZALMAY M. KHALILZAD
RAND Corporation

CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER
The Washington Post

EDWARD N. LUTTWAK
*Center for Strategic &
International Studies*

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM
*The School of Advanced
International Studies,
Johns Hopkins
University*

KENNETH MAXWELL
Council on Foreign Relations

JOSHUA MURAVCHIK
*American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research*

STEPHANIE G. NEUMAN
Columbia University

WILLIAM E. ODOM
Hudson Institute

RICHARD PIPES
Harvard University

BARRY R. POSEN
*Massachusetts Institute of
Technology*

PETER W. RODMAN
*Nixon Center for Peace and
Freedom*

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN
University of Pennsylvania

ROBERT A. SCALAPINO
*University of California
at Berkeley*

RICHARD F. STAAR
The Hoover Institution

SHIRIN TAHIR-KHELI
*Foreign Policy Research
Institute*

MARC TRACHTENBERG
University of Pennsylvania

STEPHEN VAN EVERA
*Massachusetts Institute of
Technology*

GEORGE WEIGEL
*Ethics and Public Policy
Center*

SAMUEL F. WELLS, JR.
*Woodrow Wilson Interna-
tional Center for Scholars*

Editorial Assistants: Jessica Landrey, Kavita Patel, Alexandra Shaw

Articles appearing in *Orbis* are indexed and/or abstracted in *ABC Political Science*; *Academic Index*; *America: History and Life*; *Articles 1st*; *CARL UnCover*; *Contents 1st*; *Current Contents: Social and Behavioral Sciences*; *Historical Abstracts*; *International Political Science Abstracts*; *(Newspaper and) Periodical Abstracts*; *Public Affairs Information Service (PAIS)*; *Social Science Citation Index (SSCI)*; *Social Science Index*; *U.S. Political Science Documents*.

ORBIS
INDEX TO VOLUME 41
Articles, Authors, and Subjects

"America's Stake in Russia Today" (Rubinstein): Wi 31–8

"American Military Capability Gap, The" (Chan): Su 385–400

"Are U.S. Forces Overstretched?": Sp 175–76

Asher, David L.: "A U.S.-Japanese Alliance for the Next-Century," Su 343–74

Belarus: and NATO, Fa 556–560

Berkowitz, Bruce D.:

"Information Technology and Intelligence Reform," Wi 107–18

"U.S. Strategy in the Wilderness Years," Sp 299–308

Bilinsky, Yaroslav:

"Russian Foreign Policy in Search of a Nation," Fa 642–653

Billington, James H.: "The West's Stake in Russia's Future," Fa 545–553

Boucher, Marc T.:

"A Quebec Perspective," Su 445–60

"A Rejoinder," Su 473–77

"Brilliance and Bunk in Latin American Studies" (Falcoff): Wi 119–30

"Case For Continued U.S. Engagement, The" (Gregg): Su 375–84

Chan, Stanley: "The American Military Capability Gap," Su 385–400

Chang, Felix K.: "China's Central Asian Power and Problems," Su 401–25

China, People's Republic of (PRC): economic growth of, Su 441–43; economic importance, Su 412–18; military capability, Su 385–400; and the United States, Wi 77–82; Xinjiang, Su 401–25

"China's Central Asian Power and Problems" (Chang): Su 401–25

"Civil-Military Relations" (Cohen): Sp 177–86

Clark, Mark T.: "Proliferation in the Second Nuclear Age," Wi 130–39

Cohen, Eliot A.: "Civil-Military Relations," Sp 177–86

Communism: Bolsheviks, Su 479–88

"Correspondence": "American Anti-Communism," Sp 277–83, Fa 613–614

Dickinson, Fred R.: "Japan-Who Listens?," Su 488–98

Dual Containment: Middle East, Wi 17–23; Iran and Iraq, Sp 223–40

East Asia: and the West, Su 379–81

East-Central Europe: and NATO, Wi 39–57, Fa 555–567

"Editor's Column" (McDougall): Wi 1–6, Sp 169–74, Su 337–42, Fa 503–511

"Eight Steps Toward a New China Policy" (Waldron): Wi 77–82

Eurasia: Wi 148–61

"Eurasia after the Third Empire" (Synder): Wi 148–61

"Evolution of the Western Idea, The" (Gress): Fa 525–544

Falcoff, Mark: "Brilliance and Bunk in Latin American Studies," Wi 119–30

"Federalist Perspective, A" (Segal): Su 461–71

Finland: and NATO, Fa 557–567

Foreign policy: of postcommunist states, Fa 555–567, 615–628, 642–653; of the United States, Wi 7–13

"Founding Fathers of Communism Reexamined, The" (Hollander): Su 479–88

Garfinkle, Adam:

"The U.S. Imperial Postulate in the Mideast," Wi 15–29

Index

- "Israel's Abiding Trouble in Lebanon," Fa 603–612
- Gavin, Francis J.:** "Wilsonianism Reconsidered," Fa 628–641
- Geopolitics:** Wi 7–13, Fa 569–590
- Gray, Christopher M.:** "Why the 'Melting Pot' Has Melted," Wi 139–48
- Grayson, George W.:** "Mexico's Future is Up for Grabs," Wi 91–105
- Gregg, Donald P.:** "The Case For Continued U.S. Engagement," Su 375–84
- Gress, David R.:**
"The Drama of Modern Western Identity," Fa 525–544
"The Subtext of Huntington's 'Clash,'" Sp 285–99
"The Weak Heart of Postmodern Europe," Wi 59–68
- Harkavy, Robert E.:** "Images of the Coming International System," Fa 569–590
- Hatcher, Patrick Lloyd:** "The Unwinnable War on the Drug Trade," Fa 653–660
- Henderson, David R.:** "Lessons of East Asia's Economic Growth," Su 427–43
- Hillen, John:** "Superpowers Don't Do Windows," Sp 241–57
- Hollander, Paul:** "The Founding Fathers of Communism Reexamined," Su 479–88
- Hong Kong:** economic growth of, Su 434–35
- Hurst, G. Cameron, III:** "The U.S.-Japanese Alliance at Risk," Wi 69–76
- "Illusion of Bloodless Victories, The"** (Noonan): Sp 308–20
- "IMF through a Mexican Lens, The"** (Vásquez): Sp 259–76
- "Images of the Coming International System"** (Harkavy): Fa 569–590
- Immigration:** from Mexico to the U.S., Wi 100–02; the end of, Wi 139–48
- "Information Technology and Intelligence Reform"** (Berkowitz): Wi 107–18
- Information Technology:** Wi 107–18
- Intelligence Reform:** of the United States, Wi 107–18
- International System:** Fa 569–590
- Iran:** Sp 223–40
- Iraq:** Sp 223–40
- Islam:** the West, Su 378–79
- "Israel's Abiding Trouble in Lebanon"** (Garfinkle): Fa 603–612
- Japan:** economic growth of, Su 427–33; identity of, Su 489–98; Nye initiative, Su 354–58; and the United States, Wi 69–76; Su 343–74
- "Japan-Who Listens?"** (Dickinson): Su 488–98
- Kagan, Donald:** "Roles and Missions," Sp 187–98
- Kurth, James:** "NATO Expansion and the Idea of the West," Fa 555–567
- Latin America:** studies of, Wi 119–30
- Lebanon:** Fa 603–612
- "Lessons of East Asia's Economic Growth"** (Henderson): Su 427–43
- Longue Dureé, La:** Wi 165–68, Sp 331–32, Su 501–02
- McNeill, William H.:** "What We Mean by the West," Fa 513–524
- Meech Lake Accord:** Su 448–50
- Mexico:** and its future, Wi 91–105; and the International Monetary Fund, Sp 259–76; political culture, Sp 320–28
- "Mexico's Flight From Freedom"** (Radu): Sp 320–28
- "Mexico's Future is Up for Grabs"** (Grayson): Wi 91–105
- Middle East:** dual containment, Wi 17–23
- Military capability:** of the United States, Wi 12–3; the U.S. towards East Asia, Su 385–400
- Military strategy:** of the United States, Sp 309–20, Su 388–89
- NATO** (*see* North Atlantic Treaty Organization)
- Noonan, Michael P.:** "The Illusion of Bloodless Victories," Sp 308–20

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): and East-Central Europe, Wi 40–57, Fa 555–567; enlargement of, Wi 34–6, Sp 209–21, Fa 555–567

“NATO Germany and Pragmatism’s Finest Hour” (Sicherman): Fa 615–628

“NATO West in a Divided Europe, The” (Kurth): Fa 555–567

“Operations, Procurement, and Industrial Base” (Summers): Sp 199–207

Partnership for Peace: and East-Central Europe, Wi 45–7; enhancement of, Sp 217–20; and Russia, Wi 34–6

“Prizes and Pitfalls of NATO Enlargement, The” (Solomon): Sp 209–21

Proliferation: Wi 130–39

“Proliferation in the Second Nuclear Age” (Clark): Wi 130–39

Quebec: federalism, Su 461–71; the Meech Lake Accord, Su 448–50; the referendum debate, Su 446–48

“Quebec Perspective, A” (Boucher): Su 445–60

Radu, Michael:

“Mexico’s Flight From Freedom,” Sp 320–28

“Why Eastern and Central Europe Look West,” Wi 39–57

“Reference Shelf” Wi 163–64, Sp 331–32, Su 499–500

“Rejoinder, A” (Boucher): Su 473–77

“Revenge of Geopolitics, The” (Sicherman): Wi 7–13

“Review Essays”: Wi 119–61, Sp 285–328, Su 479–987; Fa 615–660

“Roles and Missions” (Kagan): Sp 187–98

Rubinstein, Alvin Z.: “America’s Stake in Russia Today,” Wi 31–8

Russia: NATO expansion, Wi 34–6, Sp 219–20; Partnership for Peace, Wi 34–6; and the United States, Wi 31–8; Fa 545–553

“Russian Foreign Policy in Search of a Nation,” (Bilinsky): Fa 642–653

Segal, Hugh: “A Federalist Perspective,” Su 461–71

Sicherman, Harvey:

“NATO Germany and Pragmatism’s Finest Hour,” Fa 615–628

“The Revenge of Geopolitics,” Wi 7–13

“The Strange Death of Dual Containment,” Sp 223–40

“William R. Kinter: An Appreciation,” Su 333–35

Singapore: economic growth of, Su 435–36

Sino-American relations: Wi 77–82

Snyder, Jed C.: “Eurasia after the Third Empire,” Wi 148–61

Solomon, Gerald B.: “The Prizes and Pitfalls of NATO Enlargement,” Sp 209–21

South Korea: economic growth of, Su 46–39

“Strange Death of Dual Containment, The” (Sicherman): Sp 223–40

Special sections: “Agenda 2000,” Wi 7–105; “Are U.S. Forces Overstretched?,” Sp 175–207; “America’s Alliance Anxieties,” Sp 209–257; “Fresh Perspectives on East Asia’s Future,” Su 343–443; “The Struggle to Save Canada,” Su 445–77; “Western Civ in World Politics,” Fa 513–567

“Subtext of Huntington’s ‘Clash,’ The” (Gress): Sp 285–99

Summers, Harry G., Jr.: “Operations, Procurement, and Industrial Base,” Sp 199–207

“Superpowers Don’t Do Windows” (Hillen): Sp 241–57

Tahir-Kheli, Shirin: “Time to End the Neglect of South Asia,” Wi 83–90

Taiwan: economic growth of, Su 439–41

“Time to End the Neglect of South Asia” (Tahir-Kheli): Wi 83–90

United States of America, The: alliances, Wi 11–2, Wi 69–76, Sp 241–57, Su 343–74; and China, Wi 77–82; dual containment, Sp 223–40; global engagement, Su 375–84; imperialism in the Middle East, Wi 17–20; national strategy, Sp 300–8; and Russia, Wi

Index

- 31–8, Fa 545–553; and South Asia, Wi 83–90
- U.S. Defense:** civil-military relations, Sp 177–86; current roles and missions, Sp 187–98; defense posture, Sp 243–246; military capability, Wi 12–3, Su 385–400; Fa 591–601
- “U.S. Defense Industry After the Cold War, The”** (Weidenbaum): Fa 591–601
- “U.S.-Japanese Alliance at Risk, The”** (Hurst): Wi 69–76
- “U.S.-Japanese Alliance for the Next Century, A”** (Asher): Su 343–74
- “U.S. Imperial Postulate in the Mideast, The”** (Garfinkle): Wi 15–29
- “U.S. Strategy in the Wilderness Years”** (Berkowitz): Sp 299–308
- “Unwinnable War on the Drug Trade, The”** (Hatcher): Fa 653–660
- Vásquez, Ian:** “The IMF through a Mexican Lens,” Sp 259–76
- Waldron, Arthur:** “Eight Steps Toward a New China Policy,” Wi 77–82
- “Weak Heart of Postmodern Europe, The”** (Gress): Wi 59–68
- Weidenbaum, Murray:** “The U.S. Defense Industry After the Cold War,” Fa 591–601
- “West’s Stake in Russia’s Future, The”** (Billington): Fa 545–553
- Western civilization:** the clash of, Sp 285–99; and NATO, Fa 555–567; in history Fa 513–544
- “What We Mean by the West”** (McNeill): Fa 513–542
- “Why Eastern and Central Europe Look West”** (Radu): Wi 39–57
- “Why the ‘Melting Pot’ Has Melted”** (Gray): Wi 139–48
- “William R. Kinter: An Appreciation”** (Sicherman): Su 333–35
- “Wilsonian Legacy in the Twentieth Century, The”** (Gavin): Fa 628–641
- Wilsonianism:** Fa 628–641
- Xinjiang:** Su 401–25

SURVIVAL:

The IISS Quarterly

Published for the IISS by Oxford University Press

Survival—the International Institute for Strategic Studies' quarterly—is a leading journal in the international and strategic-studies field. It features original research, case-studies and innovative assessments of current international problems.

'Europe's most important journal on international security'

—Josef Joffe, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and **Harvard University**

'indispensable reading'

— Andrew Pierre, **Carnegie Endowment for International Peace**

In 1996 subscribers to ***Survival*** read:

Chris Patten and *Alan Dupont* debating whether ASIAN VALUES exist
Michael J. Green and *Simon Nuttall* on JAPAN'S FOREIGN RELATIONS
Fawaz Gerges, *R. James Woolsey* and *Shahram Chubin* on ROGUE STATES
Philip Zelikow, *Nicole Gnesotto* and *Pauline Neville-Jones* on
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
Mitchel B. Wallerstein, *Amitabh Mattoo* and *David Dewitt* on
PROLIFERATION IN CHINA AND INDIA
Ronald Asmus, *Richard Kugler* and *F. Stephen Larrabee* estimating the
COSTS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

Review Essays: Looking at the issues behind the books under review

Book Reviews: The latest and important titles reviewed each quarter

Letters to the Editor: Stimulating debate on articles from previous issues

1997 Order Form for Volume 39 (4 Issues) ■ US\$68/£43

- ☐ Please send me a free sample copy.
- ☐ Please enter my 1997 subscription to ***Survival***.
- ☐ I enclose a check payable to Oxford University Press.
- ☐ Please charge my Mastercard/Visa/American Express/Diners/JCB Card.

Card Number:

Exp. Date:

PLEASE PRINT DETAILS

Signature.....

Name.....

Address.....

City/State.....

Zipcode.....

*Please note: £ Sterling rates apply in UK and Europe, US\$ rates elsewhere. Customers in the EU and Canada are subject to their own local sales tax.

Oxford University Press Journals Marketing (X97) 2001 Evans Road Cary NC 27513 USA
Tel: USA & Canada Only 1 800 852 7323 or 919 677 0977 Fax: 919 677 1714



JAI PRESS INC.

Advances in Developmental Policy Studies

Edited by **Stuart S. Nagel**, *Department of
Political Science, University of Illinois*

Volume 3, In preparation, Fall 1997
ISBN 0-7623-0220-8

Approx. \$73.25

TENTATIVE CONTENTS: Introduction: Developing Regions and Win-Win Thinking, *Stuart Nagel*. PART I. AFRICA POLICY PROBLEMS. President and Parliament in Zambia, *Stanley Bach*. Middle East Politics: The 1952 Egyptian Revolution and Its Effects, *Dimitri Voyiadzis*. PART II. ASIA POLICY PROBLEMS. The Military and Democratization in China in the Post Cold War Era, *George Jan*. Environmental Stewardship and Sustainable Development in India, *Rashmi Shrivastava*. PART III. EAST EUROPE POLICY PROBLEMS. SECTION A. FORMER SOVIET UNION. Women and Family Policy in Lithuania, *Alina Zvinkliene*. Judicialization of Politics Amidst Regime Transition and Rapid Economic Changes: The Cases of Eastern Europe and the C.I.S., *George Ginsburg and Carl Pinkele*. SECTION B. EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE. Yugoslavia Nostalgia, Pragmatism and Reality, *Jim Seroka*. Political Cultures in the United States and East Central Europe Compared: Policy Implications, *Gyorgy Csepele and Daniel German*. Academia and Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe, *B.J.S. Hoetjes*. Restructuring Social Welfare Services in Post-Socialist Poland, *Ludmila Dziewiecka-Bokun*. PART IV. LATIN AMERICA POLICY PROBLEMS. The Role of the Sandanista Revolution in the Process of Democratization in Nicaragua, *Gary Prevost*. Public Policy in a Multi-Ethnic State: The Case of National Service in Trinidad and Tobago, *Ralph Premdas*. Customs Administration Systems in Mexico and the United States: A Comparative Study, *Lawrence Graham and Jose Luis Mendez*. Central American Development Strategies: Concepts and Choices, *Howard Lentner*.

Also Available:

Volumes 1-2 (1996-1997)

\$73.25 each

55 Old Post Road No. 2 - P.O. Box 1678, Greenwich, Connecticut 06836-1678

Tel: (203) 661-7602 Fax: (203) 661-0792



JAI PRESS INC.

International Review of Comparative Public Policy

Edited by **Nicholas Mercuro**, *Department of
Economics and Finance, University of New Orleans*

Volume 9, Foundations of Public Policy in Islam

In preparation, Fall 1997

ISBN 0-7623-0268-2

Approx. \$73.25

Edited by **Sehrah Behdad**, *Department of Economics,
Denison University* and **Farhad Nomani**, *Department of
International Economics, American University of Paris*

TENTATIVE CONTENTS: Forward. Islam, Revivalism and Public Policy, *Sehrah Behdad*. Ideology and Institutions in Islamist Approaches to Public Policy, *S.V. Nasr*. Islamism and Economics: Policy Implications for a Free Society, *Timur Kuran*. Islamic Jurisprudence and Public Policy, *Ali Rahnama*. Islam and Human Rights, *Ann Elizabeth Mayer*. Women, Sexuality and Social Policy in Islamic Cultures, *Haideh Moghissi*. Muslim Family Law: Articulating Gender, Class and the State, *Nahla Abdo*. Islam, Islamists and Labor Law, *Marsha Pripstein Posusney* and *Karen Pfeifer*. Commercial Law: The Conflict in Shari'a and Secular Law, *William Ballantyne*. Taxation and Public Finance, *Volker Nienhaus*. Problems of Interest and Banking in Islamic Public Policy, *Farhad Nomani*.

Also Available:

Volumes 1-8 (1990-1996)

\$73.25 each

55 Old Post Road No. 2 - P.O. Box 1678, Greenwich, Connecticut 06836-1678

Tel: (203) 661-7602 Fax: (203) 661-0792



JAI PRESS INC.

Research in Public Policy Analysis and Management

Edited by **Stuart S. Nagel**, *Department of Political
Science, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign*

Volume 8, Super-Optimizing Policy Analysis

In preparation, Winter 1997

ISBN 0-7623-0044-2

Approx. \$73.25

TENTATIVE CONTENTS: PART I. ECONOMIC POLICY. The "Big Tradeoff"—Fundamental Law or "Red Herring"?, *Robert Haveman*. Women and Children in Poverty: A Policy Analysis, *Sue Campbell Clark*. PART II. TECHNOLOGY POLICY. Airport Location, the USSR, and Super-Optimum Solutions, *O.I. Larichev, L.I. Pavlova, and E.A. Osipova*. Optimum Budget Allocation for Alternative Energy Development in Japan, *Akiko Yumoto*. PART III. SOCIAL POLICY. Abortion, Birth Control, and Public Policy, *Rhonda Peek and Mark Koenig*. The Drug War: There Has to be A Better Way, *Patrick Walls*. PART IV. POLITICAL POLICY. Improving Productivity in the Civil Service through the SOS Approach, *King Chow*. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Social and Political Solution, *Gideon Doron*. PART V. LEGAL POLICY. Super-Optimum Mediation, *John W. Cooley*. Illegal Searches: History and Alternatives, *Kevin Young Joon Pak*. PART VI. DEVELOPMENTAL POLICY. Super-Optimum Solutions in Developmental Policy, *King W. Chow*. Urban, Regional, and National Development in China, *Tong Dao-Chi*. Super-Optimizing Analysis and Constitutional Reform, *Sebastian Saiegh*.

Also Available:

Volumes 1-7 (1981-1995)

+ **Supplements 1-2** (1982-1989)

\$73.25 each

55 Old Post Road No. 2 - P.O. Box 1678, Greenwich, Connecticut 06836-1678

Tel: (203) 661-7602 Fax: (203) 661-0792



JAI PRESS INC.

Studies in Law, Politics and Society

Edited by **Susan S. Silbey**, *Department of Sociology, Wellesley College* and **Austin Sarat**, *Department of Law, Jurisprudence and Social Thought and Department of Political Science, Amherst College*

Volume 16, 1997, 325 pp.
ISBN 0-7623-0232-1

\$73.25

CONTENTS: Editor's Introduction, *Austin Sarat and Susan S. Silbey*. PART I. CRIMINAL LAW: FACING DEATH. Psychological Secrecy and the Death Penalty: Observations on "The Mere Extinguishment of Life," *Craig Haney*. Death-bound Doctrine: Scenes of Murder and Its Inheritance, *Peter Rush*. PART II. CRIMINAL LAW: THE TECHNOLOGIES OF POLICING. Reflections on Power Relations in Community Policing, *William Lyons*. "The Sun Has Been Too Quick for Them": Criminal Portraiture and the Police in the Late Nineteenth Century, *Martha Merrill Umphrey*. Hunting Among Police and Predators: The Enforcement of Traffic Law, *Mark Cooney*. The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True and False Confessions: *Richard Ofshe and Richard Leo*. PART III. SEXUALITY, FAMILY AND THE LAW. Enacting Intimacy, *Leslie Moran*. Everyday Surveillance, Everyday Resistance: Computer Monitoring in the Lives of the Appalachian Poor, *John Gilliom*. Managing Motherhood: The Changing Response to Prenatal Drug Users, *Katherine Beckett*.

Also Available:

Volumes 1-15 (1978-1995)

\$73.25 each

55 Old Post Road No. 2 - P.O. Box 1678, Greenwich, Connecticut 06836-1678
Tel: (203) 661-7602 Fax: (203) 661-0792



JAI PRESS INC.

Research in Politics and Society

Edited by **Gwen Moore**, *Department of Sociology, State University of New York at Albany*
and **J. Allen Whitt**, *Department of Sociology University of Louisville*

The purpose of *Research in Politics and Society* is to examine the interrelations of politics and society from an international and interdisciplinary community of scholars.

Volume 5, 1995, 292 pp.
ISBN 1-55938-117-5

\$73.25

Edited by **Richard E. Ratcliff**, *Syracuse University*
Melvin L. Oliver, *University of California, Los Angeles*
and **Thomas M. Shapiro**, *Northeastern University*

CONTENTS: Introduction: Because That's Where the Money Is, *Richard E. Ratcliff, Melvin L. Oliver, and Thomas M. Shapiro*. PART I. Negative Consequences to the Rise of Income Inequality, *Denny Braun*. The Rich Get Increasingly Richer: Latest Data on Household Wealth During the 1980's, *Edward N. Wolff*. "Them That's Got Shall Get": Inheritance and Achievement in Wealth Accumulation, *Melvin L. Oliver, Thomas M. Shapiro, and Julie E. Press*. PART II. Savings and Investment among the Wealthy: The Uses of Assets by High-Income Families in 1950 and 1983, *Richard E. Ratcliff and Suzanne B. Maurer*. Conservative Policy-Making and Growing Urban Inequality in The 1980's, *David M. Grant and James H. Johnson, Jr.* Children in Poverty: Lessons from the Economy and Public Policies, *Sheldon Danziger and Glenn Beamer*. The War Against Welfare Moves to the States, *Nancy Kleniewski*. Racial/Ethnic Differences in the Impact of Work and Family on Women's Poverty, *Lisa Catanzarite and Vilma Ortiz*. PART III. Assets and the Welfare State: Policies, Proposals, Politics, and Research, *Michael Sherraden, Deborah Page-Adams, Gautam Yadama*. The Politics of Income Redistribution, *S.M. Miller and Jacqueline Ortiz*.

Also Available:

Volumes 1-4 (1985-1992)

\$73.25 each

55 Old Post Road No. 2 - P.O. Box 1678, Greenwich, Connecticut 06836-1678
Tel: (203) 661-7602 Fax: (203) 661-0792

Orbis (ISSN 0030-4387) is published quarterly by:

JAI Press Inc., 55 Old Post Road No. 2, P.O. Box 1678, Greenwich, Connecticut 06836-1678.

Editorial Offices: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102-3684.

Submission of Articles. The editors invite submissions of articles (preferably no more than seven thousand words, reference notes included) bearing upon contemporary international issues important to the United States. Preference will be given to articles including evaluations of different policy options. Authors are encouraged to request manuscript specifications and a style sheet from the editor before beginning to write.

Books and Publications for Review. Materials should be sent to the Book Review Editor, *Orbis*, 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102-3684.

Subscriptions. \$65.00 per year for individuals, Canada and Foreign \$85.00, Airmail \$105.00; \$215.00 per year for institutions, Canada and Foreign \$235.00, Airmail \$255.00. Address correspondence regarding subscriptions and bulk orders to JAI Press Inc., 55 Old Post Road No. 2, P.O. Box 1678, Greenwich, Connecticut 06836-1678. *Postmaster:* Send address changes to: Subscription Dept., 55 Old Post Road No. 2, P.O. Box 1678, Greenwich, Connecticut 06836-1678. (Europe and United Kingdom) 38 Tavistock Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 7PB, England. All subscriptions must be prepaid and are for the 1998 calendar year only. Periodicals postage paid at Ann Arbor, MI, and additional offices. Newsstand distribution is by Bernhard DeBoer, Inc., 113 East Centre Street, Nutley, New Jersey 07110.

Advertising and Permissions. Address all correspondence regarding advertising or permission to photocopy articles to JAI Press Inc.

Microfilm. Beginning with Volume 37, *Orbis* is available on microfiche from JAI Press. Each volume is recorded separately and is obtainable at the end of the volume year. Volumes 1-36 of *Orbis* are available on microfilm from University Microfilms International, P.O. Box 1346, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106; call toll free 1-800-521-0600. Volumes 1-36 of *Orbis* are also available on microfiche from KTO Microform, Route 100, Millwood, New York 10546.

Reprints and Back Issues. Beginning with Volume 37, back issues are available from JAI Press. Back issues of *Orbis*, Volumes 1-36, are available from Kraus Reprint and Periodicals, Route 100, Millwood, New York 10546.

The opinions expressed in articles and reviews in this journal are those of the contributors and should not be construed as representing those of the Foreign Policy Research Institute or the editors of *Orbis*. Reproduction of contents without permission is forbidden.

Copyright © 1997 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute
except where otherwise noted.

Orbis

A Journal of World Affairs

(ISSN: 0030-4387)

Periodicals
Postage Paid at
Ann Arbor MI
and Additional Offices

JAI PRESS INC.

55 Old Post Road No. 2

P.O. Box 1678

Greenwich, Connecticut 06836-1678

(Address Service Requested)

Liberty International

400/19 139/
TROY STATE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY-SERIALS DEPT
TROY AL 36062-0001

